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Abstract 
 
Agrifood value chains in developing countries including Africa have been undergoing rapid 
transformation driven by continued population growth, rising urbanization, increasing incomes, 
shifts in consumer dietary requirements and demand for quality food. Although this 
transformation presents considerable opportunities for smallholder farmers, their integration 
into these value chains still remains a major challenge due to myriad constraints including, but 
not limited to, high transaction costs associated with inputs and output markets, inadequate 
access to inputs, finance, and services such as extension and transportation. However, 
horizontal and vertical coordination have been recognized as effective mechanisms for 
smallholder farmers’ participation in these chains. They serve as avenues for increasing 
bargaining power, sharing risk, reducing transaction costs, and ensuring economies of scale, as 
well as smallholder access to services such as inputs and technologies, extension, credit, and 
output markets. This study therefore contributes to the growing literature on agrifood value 
chains by exploring the role of these mechanisms on the production and market performance 
among smallholder farmers in northern Ghana. In particular, the study first examines the impact 
of vertical coordination mechanisms-written contracts, verbal contracts and spot market 
transactions – on farm performance outcomes such as net farm income, total farm income, total 
household income, labor productivity and price margins, using multinomial BFG model to 
account for selectivity bias. Second, the study employs an endogenous switching regression 
model to examine the impact of farmer groups and collective marketing on farm net revenues 
of smallholder rice farmers. It also examines the relationship between farmer group and 
collective marketing participation decisions. Third, propensity score matching and sample 
selection stochastic production frontier approaches are employed to examine the impact of 
farmer groups on farm yields and technical efficiency of smallholder farmers. Finally, the study 
also explores the role of inclusive value chains and social networks on smallholder market 
performance outcomes: prices received, quantity of paddy sold and net returns, using a 
xiii 
 
treatment effects model to account for selection bias stemming from observed and unobserved 
factors. The empirical results reveal that participation in vertical coordination mechanisms is 
associated with increased farm performance outcomes relative to spot market transactions, with 
the highest gains stemming from written contract participation. Moreover, access to credit, 
association membership and labor significantly influence vertical coordination participation 
decisions. Furthermore, farmers who are members of farmer groups and participated in 
collective marketing obtained higher output prices, and also incurred lower input costs. The 
empirical results also show that farmer group and collective market participation decisions are 
significantly influenced by mobile phone ownership, access to credit, distance to markets and 
road status. Also, farmers who participated in farmer groups and collective marketing earned 
significantly higher farm net revenues than non-participants. The study further reveals that 
farmer groups play significant role in improving farm yields and technical efficiency, relative 
to farmers who produce and market paddy individually. The positive impacts of inclusive value 
chains and social networks on smallholder market performance have also been revealed by this 
study. Inclusive value chain participating farmers received significantly higher paddy prices, 
traded higher quantities of paddy and earned higher net returns, compared to non-participants. 
Similarly, farmers who are members of horizontal social networks benefit from improved 
market performance. The estimates further reveal that inclusive value chain participation 
decisions and market performance outcomes are significantly influenced by social networks, 
distance to markets, mobile phone ownership and access to credit. These findings call for 
development policy measures to promote contractual engagement in smallholder output 
transactions, formation and development of farmer groups and encouraging collective 
marketing, as well as strengthen social networks for improved value chain competiveness and 
efficiency.     
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Wertschöpfungsketten für Agrarerzeugnisse in Entwicklungsländern, einschließlich 
Afrika, befinden sich in einem rasanten Wandel, der durch anhaltendes 
Bevölkerungswachstum, steigende Urbanisierung, steigende Einkommen, veränderte 
Ernährungsgewohnheiten der Verbraucher und die Nachfrage nach hochwertigen 
Lebensmitteln angetrieben wird. Obwohl diese Veränderungen für Kleinbauern erhebliche 
Chancen bieten, bleibt ihre Integration in die Wertschöpfungsketten eine große 
Herausforderung. Die Begründung hierzu liegt in den zahlreichen Restriktionen, wie den hohen 
Transaktionskosten im Zusammenhang mit Input- und Outputmärkten, unzureichenden 
Zugangsmöglichkeiten, Finanzen und Dienstleistungen sowie Expansion und Transport. 
Horizontale und vertikale Koordinierungsmaßnahmen werden jedoch als wirksame 
Mechanismen für die Beteiligung der Kleinbauern an den Wertschöpfungsketten angesehen. 
Sie dienen als Mittel zur Stärkung der Verhandlungsmacht, zur Risikoteilung, zur Senkung der 
Transaktionskosten und zur Sicherstellung von Größenvorteilen. Außerdem dienen sie der 
Sicherstellung des Zugangs der Kleinbauern zu Produktionsmitteln, Technologien sowieso zu 
Expansions-, Kredit- und Absatzmärkten. Diese Studie trägt daher der stets wachsenden 
Literatur über landwirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungsketten bei, indem sie die Rolle dieser 
Mechanismen für die Produktion und Marktleistung von Kleinbauern im Norden Ghanas 
untersucht. Insbesondere untersucht die Studie zunächst die Auswirkungen vertikaler 
Koordinierungsmechanismen - schriftliche Verträge, mündliche Verträge und 
Spotmarkttransaktionen - auf die landwirtschaftlichen Leistungsergebnisse wie 
landwirtschaftliches Nettoeinkommen, landwirtschaftliches Gesamteinkommen, 
Haushaltseinkommen, Arbeitsproduktivität und Preisspannen. Hierbei wird das multinomiale 
BFG-Modell zur Berücksichtigung der Selektivitätsverzerrung verwendet. Als zweites 
verwendet die Studie ein endogenes Switching-Regressionsmodell, um die Auswirkungen von 
Bauernvereinigungen und Kollektivvermarktung auf die landwirtschaftlichen Nettoeinnahmen 
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von Reisbauern zu untersuchen. Darüber hinaus wird der Zusammenhang zwischen den 
Bauernvereinigungen und den Entscheidungen über die gemeinsame Marketingbeteiligung 
untersucht. Drittens werden das Propensity Score Matching und Ansätze der Stochastischen 
Production-Frontier Analysis unter Berücksichtigung der Sample Selection-Problematik 
verwendet, um die Auswirkungen von Bauerngruppen auf die landwirtschaftlichen Erträge und 
die technische Effizienz von Kleinbauern zu untersuchen. Schließlich untersucht die Studie 
auch die Rolle integrativer Wertschöpfungsketten und sozialer Netzwerke für die Performance-
Ergebnisse der Kleinbauern: Erhaltene Preise, Menge des verkauften Rohreises und 
Nettoerträge. Hierbei wird ein Behandlungseffektmodell verwendet, um Auswahlverzerrungen 
zu berücksichtigen, die sich aus beobachteten und unbeobachteten Faktoren ergeben. Die 
empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Teilnahme an vertikalen Koordinierungsmechanismen 
mit einer Steigerung der landwirtschaftlichen Leistung bezüglich Spotmarkttransaktionen 
verbunden ist, wobei die höchsten Gewinne aus der schriftlichen Vertragsbeteiligung 
resultieren. Darüber hinaus beeinflussen der Zugang zu Krediten, die Mitgliedschaft in 
Verbänden und die Arbeitskraft maßgeblich die Entscheidungen über die Teilnahme an der 
vertikalen Koordination. Zudem erhielten Landwirte, die Mitglied in Bauernvereinigungen 
waren und an der gemeinsamen Vermarktung teilnahmen, höhere Produktionspreise und auch 
niedrigere Inputkosten. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen auch, dass die Entscheidungen der 
Bauerngruppen und der kollektiven Marktbeteiligung maßgeblich von Mobiltelefonbesitz, 
Zugang zu Krediten, Entfernung zu Märkten und Straßenzustand beeinflusst werden. 
Außerdem erzielten Landwirte, die an Bauernvereinigungen und Kollektivvermarktungen 
teilnahmen, deutlich höhere Nettoeinnahmen als Nichtteilnehmer. Die Studie zeigt ferner, dass 
die Bauernvereinigungen eine wichtige Rolle bei der Verbesserung der landwirtschaftlichen 
Erträge und der technischen Effizienz im Vergleich zu Landwirten spielen, die ihren Reis 
einzeln produzieren und vermarkten. Die positiven Auswirkungen von integrativen 
Wertschöpfungsketten und sozialen Netzwerken auf die Marktperformance von Kleinbauern 
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wurden in dieser Studie ebenfalls aufgezeigt. Landwirte, die an der Wertschöpfungskette 
teilnahmen, erhielten im Vergleich zu Nichtteilnehmern deutlich höhere Rohreispreise, 
verkauften höhere Rohreismengen und erzielten höhere Nettoerträge. Ebenso profitieren 
Mitglieder dieser horizontalen sozialen Netzwerke von einer verbesserten Marktleistung. Die 
Analysen zeigen ferner, dass integrative Entscheidungen über die Beteiligung an der 
Wertschöpfungskette und die Ergebnisse der Marktleistung maßgeblich von sozialen 
Netzwerken, der Entfernung zu den Märkten, dem Besitz von Mobiltelefonen und dem Zugang 
zu Krediten beeinflusst werden. Diese Ergebnisse erfordern entwicklungspolitische 
Maßnahmen zur Förderung des vertraglichen Engagements bei Kleinbauern, der Bildung und 
Entwicklung von Bauerngruppen und der Förderung des kollektiven Marketings sowie zur 
Stärkung sozialer Netzwerke zur Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Effizienz der 
Wertschöpfungskette.     
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
 
1.1 Agrifood value chain systems in Africa  
Agriculture plays important role in reducing poverty and ensuring economic growth in 
developing countries including Africa. The sector employs over half of the continent’s 
population, and contributes more than 32% of the continent’s gross domestic product (Veras, 
2017). However, African agriculture is still characterized by low productivity, over reliance on 
rainfall, with limited irrigation facilities, as well as basic infrastructural problems such as access 
to markets and financing (Babu and Shishodia, 2018). In view of these challenges, African 
governments have increasingly made strides towards advancing the agricultural transformation 
agenda, leading to significant progress in agricultural productivity growth in the first decade of 
the 21st century (Barrett et al., 2017). This productivity growth is partly attributed to the lunch 
of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) in 2003 at 
Maputo, Mozambique, where most African heads of states registered their commitments to 
promoting and improving the agricultural sector by pledging to invest a minimum of 10% of 
budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector (Benin, 2016; Barrett et al., 2017).  
The CAADP initiative was aimed at increasing investment in agriculture for economic growth 
through promoting uptake of improved agricultural technologies for increased productivity, 
improving smallholder market access, combating inequality and promoting regional integration 
(Benin, 2016). Similarly, the G-8 meeting held in 2009 in Italy got participating nations renew 
their funding commitments to the CAADP (AU-NEPAD 2014; Yumkela et al. 2011). For 
Africa to fully achieve the impact of this initiative, requires transformation of the entire agrifood 
sector in terms of structural change in farming, agro-industry and marketing. Structural 
transformation through reallocation of economic resources from low productive activities to 
more productive ones stands the chance of providing the needed agricultural-led economic 
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growth expected in Africa. A rapid response could involve increasing the productivity of 
activities at each stage of the different agrifood value chains, as well as work towards effective 
coordination of the various links within the agrifood chains.  
In the past two to three decades, agrifood value chain transformation has been typically 
recognized as crucial for accelerating poverty reduction, improving food and nutrition security, 
as well as ensuring overall economic growth (Vandercasteelen et al., 2018; Bachewe et al., 
2018; Ecker, 2018). A considerable body of literature has identified factors such as rising 
incomes, rapid population growth, increasing urbanization, and changing consumer dietary 
preferences among others, as the main drivers of the agrifood value chain transformation 
(Swinnen and Miet Maertens, 2007; Reardon et al., 2009; Ouma et al., 2013). Undoubtedly, all 
these transformational drivers have contributed to a growing demand for food and agricultural 
products, and thus present greater opportunities for smallholder farmers’ integration into such 
diversity of agrifood value chains in Africa. However, smallholder farmers in Africa and other 
developing countries are unable to take advantage of the agrifood value chain transformation 
due to vicissitudes of challenges including, but not limited to, high transaction costs in both 
input and output markets, and inadequate access to services such as productivity-enhancing 
innovations, credit, extension services, and transportation (Kilelu et al., 2017), resulting in low 
crop yields, minimal use of modern inputs, and increased post-harvest losses (Rapsomanikis, 
2015).   
In the last one and half decades, some studies have suggested that an agriculture-led approach 
to development with strong focus on productivity growth in the entire agrifood value chains, 
offers the best opportunity for rapid and inclusive economic growth in Africa (Partnership to 
Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa 2002; World Bank 2007; Staatz and Dembélé, 2008). 
Agrifood value chain development approach has been recognized by African governments, 
donor agencies, NGOs, and the private agribusiness companies as a promising tool for 
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addressing smallholder production and marketing challenges, and facilitating their inclusion in 
these chains for improved welfare (Ton et al., 2011). The value chain approach is regarded as 
an integrated approach in the production setup with harmonized collaboration by various actors 
along the chain from input supply through production, processing to marketing (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002). It focuses on coordinating the various chain activities for enhanced efficiency 
and competitiveness.  
The literature has broadly categorized coordination in agrifood value chain into horizontal and 
vertical coordination (Bijman et al., 2006). Horizontal coordination occurs among value chain 
actors who are into the same line of agribusiness activity (e.g., farmer groups or cooperatives), 
with the objective of fostering collective action to address shared constraints associated with 
value chain participation (Kilelu et al., 2017). Vertical coordination on the other hand occurs 
between actors at different levels of the value chain (e.g., the link between farmers and traders 
or processors) for effective alignment of activities between these actors (Bijman et al, 2011). It 
is regarded as institutional and value chain innovation, which can take various forms ranging 
from spot market transactions (0% coordination) to full ownership integration (100% 
coordination), within which are various coordination forms such as contracting, outgrower 
schemes, and partnerships (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007; Barrett et al., 2012). The most 
common and widespread vertical coordination mechanism in Africa is contracting (written or 
verbal), wherein smallholder farmer(s) or farmer groups enter into agreement with buyers for 
the production and supply of an agricultural commodity under forward agreements, mostly at 
predetermined prices (Bijman, 2008; Bellemare, 2018).     
As argued by Bijman et al. (2011) and Poulton et al. (2010), effective and efficient coordination 
of the horizontal and vertical relationships among agrifood value chain actors- smallholder 
farmers, inputs and service providers, buyers and processors among others- as well as 
facilitating goodwill, trust and cooperation amongst them will be particularly important for 
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improved governance and chain efficiency. Both types of coordination stand to overcome the 
above-noted challenges facing smallholder farmers. For instance, horizontal coordination 
through formation of farmer groups, cooperatives or similar forms of farmer collective action 
serves as avenue for increasing bargaining power, sharing risk, reducing transaction costs, and 
ensuring economies of scale, as well as consolidating their vertical relationships with buyers 
for improved efficiency and efficacy of the agrifood value chains (Bijman, et al., 2006; Reuben 
et al., 2006). Vertical coordination through contracts is important in ensuring smallholder 
access to inputs and technologies, extension services, credit, and output markets. This study 
tries to comprehensively investigate the role of these coordination mechanisms within the 
context of agrifood value chains and their related implications on both farm and market 
performance in northern Ghana, using rice as a case following the renewed interests of 
government and other stakeholders in revamping the rice value chain for improved efficiency 
and welfare of smallholder farmers.  
1.2 Problem setting and motivation  
 
Multiple production and marketing challenges hindering linkages of smallholder farmers in 
developing countries to agrifood value chains that have, in recent times, undergone tremendous 
transformations require all-inclusive stakeholder intervention to improve smallholder welfare 
and ensure rural economic transformation (Reardon et al., 2009). Exacerbation of these 
challenges is driven by changes in the procurement systems of produce buyers such as traders, 
aggregators, and processors among others, which have not only created strict technical 
requirements but also compliance costs, making it difficult for such resource-constrained 
farmers to effectively participate in these formalized agrifood chains (Bijman et al., 2011). 
Moreover, changes in consumer dietary requirements resulting from several factors such as 
increasing incomes, urbanization, as well as other socio-demographic transformations have 
increased the demand for food and the need for smallholder farmers to follow strict food safety 
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and quality standards, which jointly serve as drivers for smallholder exclusion in agrifood value 
chains in developing countries including Africa (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). However, 
governments, donor agencies, and the private sector have collaboratively rolled out agrifood 
value chain development interventions in their quest to ameliorate the state of affairs in 
smallholder agriculture in developing countries. Under these interventions, smallholder farmers 
are linked to produce buyers in the value chains through horizontal and vertical coordination 
mechanisms. These mechanisms facilitate access to input and output price information, finance, 
uptake of productivity-enhancing technologies for improved productivity and farm output, as 
well as promoting market access and welfare.    
A plethora of empirical evidence has highlighted smallholder farmers’ welfare gains associated 
with both horizontal and vertical coordination in agrifood value chains in developing countries 
including Africa. For example, horizontal and vertical coordination tend to increase smallholder 
farmers’ incomes (e.g., Bellemare, 2012; Schipmann & Qaim, 2010; Fischer and Qaim, 2012; 
Maertens and Vende Velde, 2017; Mojo et al., 2017), farm yields, profits, and efficiency (e.g., 
Ma and Abdulai, 2016; Abate et al., 2015; Rao and Qaim, 2012), technology adoption (e.g., 
Ainembabazi et al., 2017; Wossen et al., 2017), household asset holdings (e.g., Michelson, 
2013; Mojo et al., 2017), and household food security (e.g., Bellemare & Novak, 2017). This 
study contributes to this growing literature by examining the role of farmer groups, collective 
marketing, and contracting in improving smallholder farm and market performance outcomes: 
farm net revenues, household income, prices received, price margins, labor productivity, farm 
yields and technical efficiency, using data from a recent survey of smallholder rice farmers from 
selected districts in northern Ghana: Tolon, Kumbungu, Sagnarigu districts, Savelugu Nanton 
Municipal and Tamale metropolis. The specific objectives of this study are presented in the 
next section. Findings from this study could inform development policy in respect of the design 
and implementation of agrifood value chain development interventions in the cereal staple 
sector for the benefit of smallholder farmers in Ghana. 
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1.3 Objectives of the study      
The main objective of this study is to examine the role of coordination mechanisms in 
improving smallholder farm and market performance in the rice value chain in northern Ghana. 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
1. To evaluate the impact of vertical coordination mechanisms on farm performance amongst 
smallholder farmers in the rice value chain in northern Ghana.   
2. To examine the role of farmer groups and collective marketing in improving the livelihood 
of smallholder farmers in the rice value chain in northern Ghana.   
3. To examine the impact of farmer groups on farm yield and technical efficiency of 
smallholder rice farmers in northern Ghana. 
4. To assess the role of inclusive value chain participation and social networks on market 
performance among smallholder rice farmers in northern Ghana.  
 
1.4 Review of Ghana’s agriculture sector 
Agriculture plays a major role in Ghana’s sustainable long term economic growth and 
development. The sector accounts for about 20% of Ghana’s gross domestic product and 
majority of the poorest households derive their livelihoods from agriculture and its linkage with 
agribusinesses, as it provides employment to about half of the working population (SRID-
MoFA, 2016). Between 2008 and 2015, Ghana’s annual growth rate averaged about 4.2%, 
which is below the targeted rate of 6%, and was projected by the statistical service to further 
slow down to about 3.3% in 2016 (Ibid, 2016). Agricultural production in Ghana is 
predominantly on smallholder basis with about 90% of landholdings being less than two 
hectares (MoFA, 2017).  
In Ghana, Agriculture is categorized into four broad sub-sectors namely crops, livestock, 
fisheries, and forestry (MoFA, 2017). Crops sub-sector is the dominant one, accounting for 
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about 75%, while the other sub-sectors constitute the remaining 25% (SRID-MoFA, 2016). The 
cash crops grown in Ghana include cocoa, palm oil, fruit, coconut, rubber, cashew, cotton, and 
horticulture, with the dominant sub-sector being cocoa. Available statistics indicate that Ghana 
is the second largest producer of cocoa in the world after Ivory Coast, accounting for about 20% 
of global exports (World Bank, 2017). The cocoa sub-sector, which is operated under a 
controlled marketing system by Ghana COCOBOD, accounts for about 7% of Ghana’s GDP, 
12% of total agricultural value added, as well as about 25% of export earnings (Ibid, 2017). The 
major staple crops produced include cassava, yam, plantain, maize, rice, soybeans, sorghum, 
cowpea, and millet. The livestock sub-sector is characterized by the production of poultry, 
sheep, goats, cattle and pigs. The poultry sector constitutes the largest source of animal protein, 
and currently experience the highest growth in the livestock sector. Statistics indicate that about 
80% of the broiler meet are supplied by smallholder farmers. In the fisheries sub-sector, Ghana 
has the natural conditions for fisheries (marine and inland) development, and majority of the 
inland fish comes from the Volta Lake (MoFA, 2017).   
Despite the important role of agriculture in the Ghanaian economy, the sector is still beset with 
several challenges including, but not limited to, inadequate extension services and low uptake 
of productivity enhancing technologies, limited access to inputs such as improved seed and 
fertilizer, lack of access to credit especially, among smallholder farmers, inadequate access to 
both domestic and international markets, limited storage and irrigation facilities, particularly in 
northern Ghana, and insecure land tenure system.  These challenges result in low yields for both 
the staples and cash crops, and stagnated overall agricultural growth rates. Currently, the 
average yield of cocoa in Ghana stands at estimated 400-450kg/ha, which is among the lowest 
in the world (Ghana COCOBOD, 2015). The yields of cereal crops are estimated at 1.7 
tonnes/ha compared to the average yield of 2.0 tonnes/ha and the 5.0 tonnes/ha potential yield 
(WDI, 2016). Similarly, Ghana has recorded about 43-66% yield gap for the staple commodities 
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(World Bank, 2017). Over the last decade, available statistics indicate that staple yield growth 
rate has lagged behind output growth (GSS, 2016). In particular, between 2005 and 2015, Ghana 
recorded about 4% annual output growth for cereals and 10% for roots and tubers, and an 
average yield growth of 1.7% for cereals and less than 5% for roots and tubers over the same 
period (World Bank, 2017). This suggests that in Ghana, output growth of staples is mainly 
driven by area expansion.  
These low yields coupled with continued population growth, increasing consumer incomes, and 
high rates of urbanization have resulted in Ghana’s inability to meet its food needs, and has 
become a net importer of both raw and processed foods such as rice, poultry, sugar, and 
vegetable oil among others. According to World Bank’s (2015) global merchandize imports 
statistics, Ghana’s food imports in 2015 accounted for about 17% of total merchandize imports, 
which is estimated at US$ 13.3 billion dollars, and have been projected to increase fourfold 
over the next 20 years. This has undoubtedly called for all-inclusive stakeholder policy 
initiatives to ameliorate the state of affairs and stimulate substantial increase in domestic 
agricultural production.  
To this end, the Ghana government has over the years intensified efforts to spur agricultural 
transformation through increase in agricultural investment for improved productivity and 
growth rates of the sector. For instance, under the Ghana Shared Growth and Development 
Agenda (GSGDA: II-2014-2017), the government focused mainly on accelerated agriculture 
modernization as one of its economic development priorities. This effort is part of the 
ECOWAS action and its regulatory policy, and also well-articulated in the Medium-Term 
Agricultural Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) of Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 
With World Bank support of US$ 64.5 million, the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project 
(GCAP) has also been launched by government in its quest to further the agriculture 
commercialization agenda. The GCAP mainly aims at developing inclusive Public-Private 
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Partnerships (PPPs), increasing investment in infrastructure, securing access to productive land, 
and strengthening smallholder value chain linkages for increased on-farm productivity and 
value addition in selected agrifood value chains (MoFA, 2018). This initiative is complemented 
with other policies such as the Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS II), which also has 
a major bearing on Ghana’s agriculture sector outcomes through highlighting agricultural 
productivity and value chain development by supporting both private and public initiatives.  
The government of Ghana through MoFA, has also recently launched a new flagship program 
known as the Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ), which focuses on maize, rice, soybean, sorghum 
and vegetables value chains, aims to increase food production and achieve food self-sufficiency 
and job creation. The implementation of the five-year PFJ program is built on five pillars: 
provision of improved seeds, supply of fertilizers, provision of agricultural extension services, 
facilitation of market arrangements, post-harvest loss reduction, and monitoring and evaluation 
of program implementation through an electronic platform (MoFA, 2017). The program targets 
about 200,000 farmers across all the districts in Ghana, and intends to create over 750,000 jobs 
within the targeted agrifood value chains (Ibid, 2017).  Other agricultural development 
initiatives include the USAID-funded Feed the Future (FtF) programs such as Agriculture 
Technology Transfer (ATT), Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement 
(ADVANCE II), Resiliency in Northern Ghana (RING), Financing Ghanaian Agriculture 
Project (FinGAP) among others. 
These agricultural development initiatives contribute to revamping the agriculture sector in 
Ghana through facilitating the provision of extension services and facilitating access to inputs, 
which could promote the uptake of productivity-enhancing innovations, as well as adoption of 
drought-tolerant and fast growing crop varieties. This leads to increased yields, output quality, 
and opportunities for value-addition (World Bank, 2017).  The GCAP is utilizing outgrower 
scheme approach where nucleus farmers complement the efforts of agricultural extension 
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agents in transferring improved technologies to smallholder farmers. Increased investment in 
irrigation facilities is also important in promoting long-term agricultural productivity growth in 
Ghana. However, irrigation development lags behind it full potential, and only 3% of public 
agriculture spending is channeled into irrigation investment (GIDA/IWMI, 2015). Currently, 
Ghana has a total of area of 206,868 hectares of land under irrigation, which represents about 
2.6% of total land area under cultivation and about 41% of irrigable land (GIDA/IWMI, 2015). 
Investments in the rehabilitation of the irrigation facilities is ongoing under the GCAP in 
collaboration with Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA), which is to enable farmers 
to adapt their production to unpredictable climate (Choudhary et al., 2015). 
Promoting smallholder market access is one of the policy priorities of Ghana government under 
the above mentioned development initiatives. Facilitating farmers’ linkage to markets is crucial 
to agricultural development and rural poverty reduction. Smallholder farmers’ integration into 
agricultural value chains can facilitate technology transfer for improved productivity, boosts 
income levels, stimulate agribusiness investments, as well as supports diversification (World 
Bank, 2017). Several opportunities still abound Ghana’s agricultural sector for accelerated 
transformation. The rapidly thriving middle-class resulting from the country’s lower to medium 
income status and the emerging oil economy implies a growing consumer consciousness on 
food safety standards, and demand for quality food. This presents an opportunity for farmers 
and other actors in the agrifood value chains to adopt production intensification strategies to 
meet this rapidly changing market requirements, and stimulate import substitution. Given that 
considerable percentage (35-40) of the youth form the Ghanaian population, government 
policies to promote youth employment especially in agribusiness value chains would be 
important to achieving inclusive and sustainable economic growth (SADA, 2016). In addition, 
continuous implementation of reforms such as strengthening research institutions for the 
generation of improved technologies, promoting transparent land tenure systems and 
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governance, as well as improving the overall regulatory framework is a promising option for 
raising agricultural productivity and economic growth in Ghana.        
1.5 Review of the rice sector in Ghana 
Rice plays an important role in ensuring food and nutrition security among rural and urban 
households in Ghana. It trades behind maize as the second most important cereal staple in 
Ghana. Rice cultivation covers about 233,000 hectares, with an annual average production of 
641,000 metric tonnes (SRID-MoFA, 2016). In Ghana, the primary rice producing areas are 
Volta, Ashanti, Eastern, Upper East, and Northern regions, although it is grown throughout all 
the regions in Ghana (GAIN, 2018). Rice cultivation is done under three ecosystems: rainfed 
lowland (78%), rainfed upland (6%), and irrigation system (16%) (MoFA, 2009). Commonly 
grown varieties include Agra rice, Jasmine 85, TOX 3109, Nerica 1, and Nerica 2 (Ragasa et 
al., 2013). Available statistics presented in figure 1.1 show that domestic rice production has 
increased steadily over the last decade compared to the area expansion cultivated to rice.  
  
Source: MoFA Statistics, 2017.  
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In the same vein, rice consumption continue to increase steadily, attributable to Ghana’s 
growing population and entrepreneurial middle-class, increasing incomes, rising urbanization 
among other factors (MoFA, 2017). The total rice consumption in 2017/18 stands at an 
estimated 1.0 million metric tonnes, while the per capita consumption of 35kg in 2016/17 is 
expected to reach about 40kg by 2020 (GAIN, 2018). This increasing consumption is boosting 
domestic demand for rice in Ghana. 
However, domestic rice production in Ghana falls short of the consumer demand, and the deficit 
(70%) is offset by imported rice making Ghana a net importer (MoFA, 2017). Ghana rice 
imports slightly declined from 580,000 metric tonnes in 2016/17 to 550,000 metric tonnes in 
2017/18 (GAIN, 2018), suggesting that domestic rice production and quality is increasing, and 
meeting consumer demand. Rice importation to Ghana has also steadily increased over the 
years, and so does the value of the rice import bill (see figure 1.2). The inability of Ghana’s 
domestic rice production to meet the growing domestic demand is attributable to several 
challenges confronting the sector. Rice production is dominated by smallholder farmers, 
cultivating an average of less than two hectares of farm size, and often faced with limited access 
to improved technologies, extension and advisory services, production inputs, finance, 
irrigation facilities, processing facilities, and output markets. These challenges result in low 
paddy yields, poor quality and uncompetitive rice compared to the imported ones. Most of the 
rice produced stems from low-quality seed often mixed with other varieties resulting in uneven 
maturity during harvest and differences in shapes and sizes of rice grains (FAO, 2013). 
However, the government and its development partners have over the years intensified efforts 
in developing the rice sub-sector through implementing agricultural interventions with the 
objective of increasing rice productivity and quality to match with the imported ones. Rice is 
one of the major food security crops well-articulated in Ghana’s Medium Term Agriculture 
Sector Investment Plan (METASIP). The Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) 
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with support from Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD) developed the National 
Rice Development Strategy (NRDS) to boost the rice sub-sector. 
  
Source: MoFA statistics, 2017. 
The CARD initiative is spearheaded by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA). The initiative aims at doubling rice production in Sub-Saharan Africa within a span 
of 10 years (2008-2018) through rationalizing and increasing investment in the rice sector, 
developing the existing rice-growing ecologies, building capacities for effective sector 
management, and  coordinating rice development interventions through NRDS. The NRDS 
operates within several thematic areas, namely, quality seed system development, improved 
fertilizer marketing and distribution, Post-harvest and rice marketing management, irrigation 
and water control investment, access and maintenance of modern equipment, development of 
research and technology, formation and development of Farmer Based Organizations (FBOs), 
and credit management.  
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Some other rice sector interventions include the government flagship Planting for Food and 
Jobs program and Ghana commercial agriculture project (GCAP). The Planting for Food and 
Jobs program facilitates technology adoption by providing 50% subsidy on rice seed and 
fertilizer to increase application rates for increased productivity (MoFA, 2017). The 
government aims at reducing rice importation by 10% under the flagship program (MoFA, 
2017). The GCAP is also promoting both rain-fed rice and irrigation cultivation especially in 
Northern Ghana through provision of matching investment grants, and expanding irrigation 
access for smallholder rice farmers (World Bank, 2017). The USAID-Feed the Future program 
is another important intervention implemented particularly in the northern part of Ghana. 
Components of the program include the Agricultural Development and Value Chain 
Enhancement (ADVANCE II), Agricultural Technology Transfer (ATT), Resiliency in 
Northern Ghana (RING), Strengthening Partisanships, Results and Innovations in Nutrition 
Globally (SPRING), Financing Ghanaian Agriculture Project (FinGAP), Agricultural Policy 
Support Project (APSP) among others. These agricultural interventions have adopted 
facilitative value chain approach to address key constraints in relation to the development, 
availability and adoption of agricultural technologies, finance, and output markets for the 
benefit of smallholder farmers in the rice, maize and soya value chains in Northern Ghana. 
These government and donor funded rice interventions work closely with the Ghana Rice Inter-
professional Body (GRIB), Ghana Grains Council, and Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana 
(PFAG), umbrella bodies effectively furthering the rice value chain transformation agenda in 
Ghana. 
1.6 Brief profile of Northern Ghana 
Northern Ghana constitutes three regions namely Northern, Upper East and Upper West 
regions, which together is referred to as the Northern Savannah Ecological Zone (NSEZ). 
Figure 1.3 presents the map of northern Ghana. It is a high agricultural potential area endowed 
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with abundant and fertile land (6 million hectares) for the commercial cultivation of a variety 
of crops such as cereals/grains, cassava, cotton, shea and raising aquaculture and livestock 
(World Bank, 2017). Despite the fact that farmers predominantly depend on rainfall for food 
production, the region has significant irrigation potential, as about 23 large and medium, and 
104 small dam sites are available and can be developed to command over 547,000 hectares of 
irrigable land (SADA, 2016). It is estimated that the agricultural potential of northern Ghana 
could attract private investment in agriculture especially in the areas of irrigation and down-
stream processing infrastructure development and job creation along the agrifood value chains 
in the area.    
Despite the potential, northern Ghana lags behind the south of Ghana in terms of development 
and other socio-economic indicators, and houses majority of Ghana’s poor whose major 
occupation is farming (World Bank, 2011). The region trades behind in terms of access to 
education, health care (including maternal and child health), safe and portable water among 
others in the country (GSS, 2016). Farmers in northern Ghana are highly vulnerable to shocks 
(floods, drought, diseases, conflicts etc.) due to limited income diversification sources. The 
region is highly susceptible to environmental degradation, and also characterized by low 
intensity and poorly distributed rainfall leading to low productivity. It is noted as the least 
developed region in Ghana although it covers over 40% of the country’s land area and contains 
about 30% of the population (GSS, 2016). The government of Ghana rolled out the Savannah 
Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) together with other development interventions to 
implement a comprehensive long-term development plans for northern Ghana, and for bridging 
the north-south development gap.  SADA is a key government authority for furthering the 
development agenda of northern Ghana. The authority coordinates, facilitates, and implements 
development projects in collaboration with both public and private players, to ensure successful 
investments vis-à-vis job creation and social impacts on the people (SADA, 2017). 
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Fig. 1.3: Map of Northern Ghana.   Source: Antwi et al. (2014). 
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1.7 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of a collection of journal articles organized as follows. Chapter one presents 
the general introduction of the study, chapters two to five are a collection of journal articles 
while conclusions and policy implications are presented in chapter six. Specifically, chapter 
two explores the vertical coordination mechanisms:-written contracts, verbal contracts, and spot 
market transactions- and their impacts of farm performance outcomes such as net farm income, 
total farm income, total household income, labor productivity and price margins among 
smallholder rice farmers. Chapter three examines the role of farmer groups and collective 
marketing in improving smallholder rice farmers’ net revenues. In this chapter, the relationship 
between farmer group membership and collective market participation is explored. In chapter 
four, the impact of farmer groups on farm yields and technical efficiency among smallholder 
rice farmers is examined, using sample selection stochastic production frontier approach to 
account for selection bias arising from unobserved attributes. Chapter five explores the role of 
inclusive value chain participation and social networks in improving smallholder rice farmers’ 
market performance outcomes such as paddy prices, quantity traded, and farm net returns. The 
final chapter presents the conclusions and policy implications from the study.   
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Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that contracting facilitates farmer participation in agrifood value chains, 
evidence on farmers’ participation in different forms of contracts and the impact on farm 
performance is still limited. This study examines the determinants and impacts of vertical 
coordination mechanisms- spot market transactions, written, and verbal contracts- on farm 
performance of rice farmers in northern Ghana, using a multinomial BFG model to account for 
selectivity bias. The findings indicate that vertical coordination participation decision is 
significantly influenced by age, access to credit, labor, association membership and sales to 
institutional buyers. The empirical results also reveal significant gains in farm performance 
outcomes from participating in written and verbal contracts, relative to spot market transactions, 
with the highest gains associated with the use of written contracts. (JEL Classifications: C34, 
C35, D23, Q12, Q13) 
 
Keywords: Vertical coordination mechanisms, farm performance, multinomial BFG model, 
rice farmers, Ghana. 
 
 
24 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Agrifood value chains in developing countries continue to undergo rapid transformation due to 
increasing incomes, urbanization and consumer consciousness in food quality and safety (Minot 
& Sawyer, 2016). The expansion of agricultural commodity markets, supermarkets, 
agribusiness firms, and their requirements for food grades and standards drive the need for 
vertical coordination in agrifood value chains (Barrett, Bellemare, Michelson, Narayanan, & 
Walker, 2012; Henderson & Isaac, 2017). Some recent studies have shown that participation in 
agrifood value chains is associated with improved smallholder farmers’ welfare (eg. Rao & 
Qaim, 2011; Saenger, Terero & Qaim, 2014). However, challenges such as underdeveloped 
market systems and infrastructure, limited access to financial capital and technology, high 
transaction costs associated with input and output markets, among others, limit smallholder 
participation in agrifood value chains in developing countries (Abdulai & Birachi, 2009; 
Otsuka, Nakano, & Takahashi, 2016). These challenges are still somehow unresolved, and often 
make it difficult for farmers to take advantage of prevailing market opportunities (Swinnen & 
Maertens, 2007).  
However, contracting is recognized as the dominant form of vertical coordination mechanism 
that facilitates smallholder farmers’ participation in agrifood value chains (Otsuka et al., 2016; 
Bolwig, Gibbon, & Jones, 2009). It falls between spot market transaction (0% vertical 
coordination), and full vertical integration (100% vertical coordination), and addresses 
constraints related to inadequate access to credit and extension, market imperfections, and high 
transaction costs (Bellemare, 2012). Smallholder farmers enter into contractual agreements 
with downstream buyers to reduce transaction costs and obtain other benefits associated with 
using contracts (Barrett et al., 2012). Such agreements can involve specification about the 
transaction only such as product quality, delivery times, as well as sales price (marketing 
contract), or specifications related to production process, product quality, seed variety, 
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chemicals used among others (production contract) (Maertens & Vande Velde, 2017; Roussy, 
Ridier, Chaib, & Boyet, 2018). Contracting is important in facilitating farmers’ access to inputs, 
credit, and technology, as well as reduces risks associated with prices and markets (Mishra, 
Kumar, Joshi, & Dsouza, 2018; Kariuki & Loy, 2016). Buyers can pre-finance smallholder 
farmers, by providing them with inputs, technology and cash credit, and costs associated with 
these provisions are deducted from the final produce at point of product delivery (Bellemare, 
2012). 
Contracting in smallholder output markets has received considerable attention in development 
economics literature. In particular, some authors have modeled contracting in a dichotomous 
framework, involving farmers’ decisions to enter into contracts with agribusiness firms and 
supermarkets, or supply produce in spot markets (eg. Bellemare, 2012; Michelson, 2013; 
Maertens & Vande Velde, 2017). Recent empirical evidence in developing countries has 
highlighted positive welfare impacts associated with smallholder participation in agrifood value 
chain through contracting (eg. Rao & Qaim, 2011; Michelson, 2013). In the vegetables sector 
in Kenya, Rao and Qaim (2011) show positive impact of value chain participation on household 
income, while Michelson (2013) found that farmer participation in supermarket channels 
through contracts increases household productive asset holdings in Nicaragua. In output 
markets, evidence on smallholder farmers’ participation in different forms of vertical 
coordination mechanisms such as written contracts, verbal contracts and spot market 
transactions, and their related impacts on farm performance is still limited in the empirical 
literature. To the best of our knowledge, only the studies by Ma & Abdulai (2016), and 
Trifković (2016) investigated the impacts of different forms of vertical coordination 
mechanisms on smallholder farm performance. In particular, Ma & Abdulai (2016) found 
significant increase in net returns associated with written and verbal contracts participation by 
apple farmers in China. The study by Trifković (2016) revealed that in the catfish sector in 
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Vietnam, vertically integrated and contract farms achieve higher yields and farm revenues than 
independent farms. Some previous studies investigated the determinants of farmers’ market 
participation decisions, quantities of produce transacted and choice of market place for output 
transactions (eg. Abdulai & Birachi, 2009).  
The present study contributes to the growing literature on vertical coordination mechanisms 
and their impacts on farm performance in three ways. First, we assess the factors influencing 
farmers’ decisions to participate in written contract, verbal contract and spot market in output 
transactions, as well as highlight the impact of these factors on farm performance. Second, we 
examine the causal effects of written and verbal contracts participation on farm performance 
outcomes such as net farm income, total farm income, and total household income, relative to 
spot market transactions. Finally, we decompose net farm income into margins (price margins) 
and yield effects (labor productivity), and examine the impact of the coordination mechanisms 
on these performance outcomes. This will provide policy makers with insights into the multi-
dimensional effects of participating in the vertical coordination mechanisms, as well as which 
mechanism is of substantial benefits to smallholder farmers in agrifood value chains.  
We use data from a recent survey of smallholder rice farmers in five districts of northern Ghana. 
In recent times, the Ghana government has intensified collaborative efforts with donor agencies 
and agribusiness firms to upgrade the domestic cereal food staples including rice by 
implementing value chain interventions. The interventions aim at increasing efficiency of these 
value chains for the benefit of large number of smallholders. The findings from this study can 
also enhance stakeholder policy targeting efforts towards addressing multiple market failures 
facing smallholder farmers in Ghana. Given the fact that participation in vertical coordination 
mechanisms is non-random, we employ the selectivity approach for the multinomial logit 
(MNL) model introduced by Bourguignon, Fournier & Gurgand (2007) to account for selection 
bias associated with observed and unobserved attributes. We also compare the estimates from 
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this approach to Lee’s (1983) selection bias correction model, which computes only one 
selectivity correction term for all vertical coordination choices, to provide further insights into 
the differential impacts of coordination mechanisms on farm performance in the rice value 
chain.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents an overview of rice production 
and marketing in Ghana. Section 3 captures the data and summary statistics of the variables 
used in the analysis. Conceptual framework is captured in section 4, followed by empirical 
specification in section 5. The empirical results are presented in section 6, while the final section 
concludes. 
2.2 Overview of rice production and marketing in Ghana 
Rice has become the second most important cereal staple in Ghana after maize, and its 
production is done under three ecosystems: rainfed lowland (78% of arable area), rainfed upland 
(6%), and irrigation (16%) systems (MoFA, 2009). The major rice producing areas in Ghana 
include Volta, Ashanti, Eastern, Northern, and Upper East regions (MoFA, 2009). Domestic 
rice production increased from 390,000 MT in 2016/2017 to 450,000 MT in 2017/2018 (GAIN, 
2018). Rice forms an important part of Ghanaian diet and contribute to food security among 
rural and urban households. Rice consumption is increasing, driven by population growth, 
urbanization and changing habits of consumers, which creates a gap between demand and local 
supply. The consumption of rice in 2017/2018 is estimated at 1.0 million MT, and the per capita 
rice consumption in 2016/2017 stood at 35kg, and is estimated to reach about 40kg by 2020 
(GAIN, 2018). Domestic rice production still covers about 30-40% of consumer demand, 
allowing for imports of larger quantities to address both quantity and quality differences 
between local production and demand (Angeluci et al., 2013).  
Other major cereal staples in Ghana include Maize, wheat, and sorghum. Maize is considered 
the most important cereal staple in Ghana mainly produced in the middle-southern part and 
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northern regions. Statistics indicate that maize production increased from 1.75 million MT in 
2016/2017 to 1.8 million MT in 2017/2018, with an estimated consumption of 1.9 million MT 
in 2017/2018 (GAIN, 2018). Ghana does not grow wheat domestically, and relies on imports 
for all its wheat needs. Wheat is mostly processed into flour for making bread, cakes and other 
pastries. Wheat consumption is estimated at 590,000 MT in 2017/2018, with per capita 
consumption of 20kg per year (GAIN, 2018). Sorghum is also one of the fundamental cereal 
crops mostly produced in northern Ghana. Statistics indicate that sorghum production in Ghana 
declined (12%) from 262,000 MT in 2015 to about 229,000 MT in 2016 (MoFA, 2016). 
Consumption of sorghum was 199,756 MT in 2016, with an estimated per capita consumption 
of about 5kg (SRID-MoFA, 2016).       
The share of rice production in total cereal output in Ghana is about 16% (maize 62%, sorghum 
14%). Recent increase in the production of rice and other cereal staples in Ghana is attributed 
to the renewed commitment of government and donor agencies to revamp the cereal staple 
chains by initiating a number of interventions1. For instance, under government’s five-year 
Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) flagship program, 50% subsidy on seed and fertilizer was 
introduced to make it affordable for smallholder farmers for increased application rates and 
yields (GAIN, 2018). In northern Ghana, rice is grown by over 279, 000 households with 
average farm size of about two hectares, and cultivating about 70% of total land area (USAID, 
2009). Majority of smallholder farmers grow improved rice varieties, although some still grow 
traditional varieties (Ragasa et al., 2013). Examples of improved rice varieties commonly 
grown by farmers in northern Ghana include Jasmine 85, AGRA rice, Togo marshal, Digang, 
Nerrica 1, Nerica 2, and Nabogo rice. The traditional varieties include GR 18, TOX 3108 (GR 
22), and Mandii (Ragasa et al., 2013). Smallholder rice farmers produce and supply paddy rice 
                                                          
1 Other interventions in northern Ghana include Feed the Future-USAID/ATT, Ghana Commercial Agriculture 
Project (GCAP), ADVANCE II, GHASIP projects etc.  
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to buyers, using vertical coordination mechanisms such as spot market transactions, written and 
verbal contracts. These buyers are institutions or private companies2, aggregators and 
processors mostly located in the regional capitals of northern Ghana and some parts of southern 
Ghana. They usually enter into seasonal marketing contracts with smallholder rice farmers at 
the beginning of the growing season, and then travel to the contracted farmers after harvest to 
mobilize the paddy for onward processing and sales. These contractual arrangements, although 
not without challenges, have been found useful, because they provide assured markets for 
farmers and provide buyers with regular supply of paddy for their agribusinesses. However, 
some smallholder rice farmers do not get the opportunity to enter into marketing contracts with 
these private companies and other buyers, compelling them to sell paddy in spot markets, by 
either selling at farmgate to buyers who randomly travel to the rice growing areas during harvest 
period, or transport to market centers for sale. In other cases, local rice processors in the 
communities also provide markets for this category of farmers. 
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics  
This study uses data from a recent farm household survey conducted from June to August, 2016 
in five districts of northern Ghana; Tamale metropolis, Savelugu Nanton Municipal, Tolon, 
Kumbungu and Sagnarigu districts. A multistage sampling approach was employed in selecting 
the sample for this study. First, we used purposive sampling technique to select these five 
districts based on the intensity of rice production, as well as their position as some of the major 
beneficiary areas of rice value chain interventions in northern Ghana. Second, in consultation 
with officials of development projects (FtF-USAID-Ghana3) and MoFA extension agents, we 
randomly selected two to three communities from each district in proportion to size of the 
                                                          
2 Examples of the private companies that contract with smallholder rice farmers in northern Ghana include 
premium foods limited, AMSIG Resources, SAVBAN limited, BUSAKA enterprise, Investment Protocol Services 
Limited (IPSL) etc. 
3 The project components under the FtF-USAID-Ghana programme include Agriculture Technology Transfer 
project (ATT), Resiliency in Northern Ghana (RING), Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement 
(ADVANCE), Strengthening Partnerships, Results and Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING) projects.   
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district. Finally, we randomly sampled smallholder rice farmers in proportion to the farmer 
population in each area. In total, 458 rice farmers were sampled and interviewed, using 
structured questionnaire with the help of trained research assistants, and under the supervision 
of one of the authors. The data collected covered information related to 2015 production season. 
The survey gathered information from farmers on personal, household and farm-level 
characteristics, asset ownership, and access to credit and marketing activities such as vertical 
coordination mechanisms. 
Table 2.1 presents the definition and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
The dependent variables are the vertical coordination mechanisms (spot market, written and 
verbal contracts) such that the chosen mechanism is assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise. 
The study sample constitutes 43% of farmers who supply paddy in spot markets, 33% use 
written contracts, and 24% use verbal contracts. The outcome variables include the net farm 
income, total farm income, and total household income. Table 2.1 shows that net farm income 
from rice production and sales constitute about 31% of total farm income, and 28% of total 
household income. Table 2.2 reports systematic differences in farmer characteristics with 
respect to the vertical coordination mechanisms, and associated t-tests results. Significant age 
differences exist between farmers who use verbal contracts in output transactions and those 
who carry out spot market transactions. In particular, farmers who supply paddy in spot markets 
and those who use written contracts are relatively younger than rice farmers who engage buyers 
with verbal contracts, suggesting that older farmers are more likely to choose verbal contracts 
for output transactions. Again, vertical coordination mechanism users significantly vary in 
terms of education. The results show that farmers who use written contracts for output 
transactions are more educated than farmers who use verbal contracts and spot market supply. 
However, there are no significant differences in education between farmers who supply in spot 
market and those who use verbal contracts.  
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Table 2.1: Variable definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Spot market  1 if farmer chose spot market, 0 otherwise 0.43(0.49) 
Written contract 1 if farmer chose written contract, 0 otherwise 0.32(0.47) 
Verbal contract 1 if farmer chose verbal contract, 0 otherwise 0.24(0.42) 
Net farm Income Gross revenue from rice production less variable 
input cost (GH¢/ha) 
1,152.29(1,816.18) 
Total farm income  Gross revenue from all crops including paddy rice 
less input cost (GH¢)  
3,723.59 (4,056.53) 
Total household 
income 
Annual household income including off-farm 
earnings and remittances (GH¢) 
4,102.50 (4,294.30) 
Age Age of respondent (years) 37.46(11.65) 
Education Education of respondent (years) 2.71(4.40) 
Gender  1 if farmer is male, 0 otherwise  0.88(0.32) 
Farm Size Size of farm (hectares) 1.14(1.26) 
Access to credit  1 if farmer is not credit constraint, 0 otherwise  0.40(0.49) 
Mobile phone 1 if farmer owns a mobile phone, 0 otherwise 0.45(0.49) 
Market perception  Farmer perception of paddy rice demand in 
previous year prior to the survey (1=low, 0=high) 
0.35 (0.47) 
Road status  1 if market road is motorable, 0 otherwise 0.73 (0.44) 
Distance to market Distance to market (km) 6.57(4.08) 
labor Total labor used in rice production (worker –
days/ha) 
55.86 (23.58) 
Importance of legal 
contracts 
1 if farmer considers legal contracts important, 0 
otherwise 
0.51(0.50) 
Institutional buyer 1 if farmer sells to institution, 0 otherwise 0.21(0.41) 
Association 1 if farmer belongs to farmer group, 0 otherwise 0.50(0.50) 
Farm vehicle  1 if farmer owns farm vehicle, 0 otherwise 0.07(0.26) 
Sagnarigu 1 if farmer is located in Sagnarigu district, 0 
otherwise 
0.12(0.33) 
Tolon 1 if farmer is located in Tolon district, 0 otherwise 0.22(0.41) 
Kumbungu  1 if farmer is located in Kumbungu district, 0 
otherwise 
0.24(0.42) 
Savelugu Nanton 1 if farmer is located in Savelugu Nanton 
Municipal, 0 otherwise 
0.20(0.40) 
Tamale 1 if farmer is located in Tamale metropolitan area, 
0 otherwise 
0.20(0.40) 
Note: GH¢ is Ghanaian currency: US$1 = GH¢ 4.19 in 2016, Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation 
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Table 2.2: Differences in characteristics among users of vertical coordination mechanisms  
Variable Spot market Written contract aDiff.  
(t-stat.) 
Verbal contract bDiff.  
(t-stat.) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 36.451 11.534 37.370 10.789 0.75 39.427 12.828  2.08 ** 
Credit access   0.289 0.454 0.516 0.501 4.41*** 0.463 0.500  3.10*** 
Education 2.269 4.153 3.046 0.366 1.66 * 3.054 4.648  1.52 
Gender 0.888 0.315 0.887 0.317 0.02 0.872 0.334 -0.40 
Farm Size 1.071 0.941 1.190 1.592 0.86 1.207 1.252  1.07 
Labor  50.304 21.794 62.540 24.474 4.92*** 56.663 23.139 2.39** 
Dist. to market 6.545 3.925 6.465 3.607 0.19 6.788 4.940  0.473 
Mobile phone 0.299 0.459 0.582 0.494 5.51*** 0.563 0.498  4.68*** 
Road status  0.705 0.456 0.761 0.427 1.16 0.736 0.442 0.572 
Import. of legal contract 0.355 0.479 0.728 0.446 7.41*** 0.527 0.501  2.96*** 
Market perception 0.208 0.406 0.556 0.498 7.17*** 0.327 0.471 2.32** 
Association 0.187 0.391 0.774 0.419 13.44*** 0.718 0.451 10.75*** 
Farm vehicle  0.086 0.281 0.039 0.195 1.73 * 0.100 0.301  0.39 
Institutional buyer 0.101 0.302 0.364 0.482 6.20*** 0.218 0.414  2.82*** 
Net farm income  929.992 1,365.047 1,223.066 1,690.430 1.78 * 1,453.282 2,521.677 2.36 ** 
Total farm income  3,237.234 3,331.721 4,210.974 4,737.583 2.24** 3,925.582 4,164.990 1.58 
Total household income 3,392.254 3,468.399 4,898.470 4,942.842 3.34*** 4,281.855 4,499.133 1.93** 
Sample size 197 151  110  
Note: *, **, *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a Differences in characteristics between written contract and spot market users. 
b Differences in characteristics between verbal contract and spot market users.
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We also observe that farmers who use written contracts and those who engage in transactions 
via verbal contracts constitute higher proportion of farmers who are not credit constrained, as 
well as generate higher net farm incomes, total farm income, and total household income 
relative to farmers who supply in spot markets. We also observe that farmers who use written 
contracts and those who use verbal contracts mostly own mobile phones, attach greater 
importance to legal contracts, mostly belong to farmers’ associations, employ higher amount of 
labor, and mostly sell paddy to institutional buyers, as compared to farmers who supply paddy 
in spot markets. It is important to mention that the differences in outcomes by coordination 
mechanisms cannot be interpreted as impacts since other confounding factors are not accounted 
for in the means. 
 
2.4 Conceptual Framework 
 
2.4.1 Vertical coordination mechanism choice decision    
 
In this section, we present a conceptual framework in relation to farmers’ decisions to 
participate in vertical coordination mechanisms for output transactions. Following the concepts 
presented in Ma and Abdulai (2016), and Ito, Bao, & Su (2012), we assume that farmers are 
risk neutral in order to simplify our model. Given that a rice farmer engages a buyer in an output 
transaction involving quantity of paddy at a given price, and associated input cost, using a 
coordination mechanism 𝑗 among 𝑀 coordination mechanisms, farmer’s objective would be to 
maximize net farm income, specified as:  
𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥
∗ = 𝑝𝑄(𝜔, 𝑍) −𝑊𝜔,                                                                                                                      (1)                                                                     
where 𝑝 is output price per kg, 𝑄 is the output (paddy) quantity in kg, 𝑊 is the input prices, 
𝜔 is a vector of input quantities (eg. fertilizer, herbicide, and labor), and 𝑍 is a vector of farm 
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and household level characteristics. Net farm income can be expressed as a function of input 
and output prices, the choice of vertical coordination mechanism (𝑉), and farm and household 
level characteristics as follows: 
𝑉∗ = 𝑉∗(𝑃,𝑊, 𝑉, 𝑍)                                                                                                                               (2) 
For any well-behaved profit function, applying Hoteling’s lemma directly to equation (1) yields 
a reduced form of the following rice output supply function: 
 𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑃,𝑊, 𝑉, 𝑍)                                                                                                                                 (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) suggest that net farm income from rice production (𝑉∗) and rice output 
(𝑄) are influenced by the input and output prices, choice of vertical coordination mechanism, 
and farm and household level characteristics. In line with Ito et al. (2012), we also decompose 
net farm income into labor (𝐿) productivity (𝑄 𝐿⁄ ) and price margin (𝑝 −𝑊𝜔 𝑄⁄ ) to evaluate 
the contribution of vertical coordination mechanisms to these farm performance outcomes, 
which is one of the objectives of the present study.    
We assume that a farmer chooses coordination mechanism that yields maximum net farm 
income (𝑉𝑖𝑗
∗ ) compared to the net farm income from any other coordination mechanism (𝑉𝑖𝜏
∗ ). 
The expected net farm income associated with each coordination mechanism cannot be directly 
observed. What is observed is the actual participation in vertical coordination (𝑉). However, 
the expected net farm income can be expressed as a function of observable factors in a latent 
variable (𝑉𝑖𝑗
∗ ) model as: 
𝑉𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗       𝑉 =
{
 
 
 
 
1         𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑖1
∗ > max(𝑉𝑖𝜏
∗ ) 𝑜𝑟 𝜀𝑖1 < 0
𝜏 ≠ 1
.
.
𝑀        𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑖𝑀
∗  > max(𝑉𝑖𝜏
∗ ) 𝑜𝑟 𝜀𝑖𝑀 < 0
𝜏 ≠ 𝑀
  ,                                          (4) 
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where 𝛽𝑗 is the parameter to be estimated and 𝜂𝑖𝑗 is the error term; and 𝑍𝑖𝑗 is a vector of farm 
and household level factors influencing vertical coordination choices. These variables include 
age, gender, education, access to credit, farm size, association membership, labor, road status 
ownership of mobile phone, farm vehicle, distance to markets and location variables. The 
variables are included in the analysis based on the existing literature (eg. Abdulai & Birachi, 
2009; Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005; Ito et al., 2012). 
It is also assumed that the observed covariates in 𝑍𝑖𝑗 are uncorrelated with the unobserved 
stochastic component 𝜂𝑖𝑗, i.e. 𝐸(𝜂𝑖𝑗|𝑍𝑖𝑗) = 0. In addition, assuming that 𝜂𝑖𝑗 are independently 
and identically Gumbel distributed, the selection equation (4) leads to a multinomial logit 
(MNL) model (McFadden, 1973). The probability that vertical coordination mechanism 𝑗 is 
chosen by farmer i is specified as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃(𝜀𝑖𝑗 < 0|𝑍𝑖𝑗) =
exp(𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗)
∑ exp (𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛽𝜏)
𝑚
𝜏≠1
,  𝑗 = 1, 2, 3                                                                        (5) 
As stated earlier, the three vertical coordination mechanisms examined in this study include 
spot market transactions (𝑗 = 1), written contract (𝑗 = 2), and verbal contract (𝑗 =  3). Note 
that farmers who supply paddy in spot market are the base group for comparison in the present 
analysis. The multinomial logit (MNL) model constitutes the first stage, and is estimated with 
maximum likelihood method to obtain coefficients associated with each coordination 
mechanism. However, we compute marginal effects of the coefficients to allow for better 
interpretation of the results (Wooldridge, 2010). We also test the MNL model for the IIA 
assumption by conducting suest-based Hausman test, which is a modification of Hausman and 
McFadden test (Long & Freese, 2005). 
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2.4.2 Impact evaluation and selection bias  
This study also investigates the impact of each coordination mechanism 𝑗 on a set of farm 
performance outcomes. Given that the vector of outcome variables is a linear function of 
household and farm level factors 𝑋𝑖𝑗 and a coordination mechanism choice dummy (𝑉𝑖𝑗), the 
outcome equation is specified as: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛾 + 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗,                                                                                                                      (6)  
where  𝑌𝑖𝑗 is a vector of outcome variables, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are vectors of parameters to be estimated; 
𝜇𝑖 is the error term and satisfies 𝜇𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎). It is worth noting that the parameter 𝛿 captures 
the impact of vertical coordination mechanism on the outcomes. However, given that farmers 
self-select into choice of coordination mechanisms for output transactions, using OLS method 
could result in selectivity bias. In this case, the error terms in the coordination choice model 𝜂𝑖𝑗 
and the outcome equations 𝜇𝑖𝑗  are correlated, and the expected values of 𝜇𝑖𝑗 conditional on 
sample selection are nonzero, which leads to inconsistent estimates. To account for the potential 
selectivity bias, we consider the methods proposed by Lee (1983), Dubin & McFadden 
(hereinafter DMF, 1984), and the approach developed by Bourguignon et al. (hereinafter BFG, 
2007).  
Lee makes restrictive assumptions and fails to take into account the risk of multi-collinearity, 
which is considered in the DMF’s approach. Moreover, Lee’s (1983) approach estimates only 
one selectivity term, even when there are multiple alternatives (Bourguignon et al., 2007). The 
DMF approach is also restrictive because it only extends the number of correction parameters 
to M-1 for M alternatives. Given the limitations of the two approaches, Bourguignon et al. 
(2007) proposed an approach to account for selectivity bias with multiple outcomes, while 
accounting for the limitations of the Lee and DMF’s approaches. It relaxes the restrictive 
assumption by estimating different selectivity correction terms for each coordination 
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mechanism alternative. That is, the number of selectivity correction terms is equal to the number 
of vertical coordination alternatives. It also identifies the direction and sources of the bias (Park, 
Mishra, & Wozniak, 2014). In this study, we use the selectivity bias correction method by 
Bourguignon et al. (2007), which we refer to as “Multinomial BFG Model”, as it provides 
deeper insights into the impact of coordination mechanisms on farm performance. 
2.5 Empirical specification 
2.5.1 Multinomial BFG model 
The multinomial BFG model is a two-stage impact assessment procedure. In the first stage, we 
estimate MNL model (eq. 5) to examine the determinants of coordination mechanism 
participation, and then compute selectivity correction terms, which are included in the second 
stage, to estimate the outcomes consistently. To estimate the impact of coordination 
mechanisms on the outcomes in the second stage, we specify the following three regimes of 
outcome equations:  
Regime 1 (Spot Market):           𝑌𝑖1 = 𝑋𝑖1𝛾1 + 𝜇𝑖1   𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 1                                                    (7𝑎) 
Regime 2 (written contract):   𝑌𝑖2 = 𝑋𝑖2𝛾2 + 𝜇𝑖2   𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 2                                                    (7𝑏) 
Regime 3 (Verbal Contract):    𝑌𝑖3 = 𝑋𝑖3𝛾3 + 𝜇𝑖3    𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 3                                                   (7𝑐) 
where 𝑌𝑖1, 𝑌𝑖2 and 𝑌𝑖3 are outcomes such as net farm incomes, total farm income, and total 
household income from participating in spot markets, written and verbal contracts, respectively; 
𝑋 is a vector of household and farm level factors; 𝛾 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, 
and 𝜇 is the error term. We identify the model since variables in 𝑍 in eq. (4) and 𝑋 in eqs. (7a-
7c) are allowed to overlap during estimation. In such cases, at least one variable in 𝑍 should not 
feature in 𝑋 (see section 6.1). Therefore, to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of 𝛾 in the 
outcome equations, we estimate the following regimes of selection bias corrected outcome 
equations (Bourguignon et al., 2007): 
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Regime    1:  𝑌𝑖𝑆𝑀 = 𝑋𝑖1𝛾1 + 𝜎1 [𝜌1𝑚(𝑃𝑖1) +∑𝜌𝑗𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗)
𝑃𝑖𝑗
(𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 1)𝑗
] + 𝜈𝑖1      if 𝑉 = 1   (8𝑎) 
Regime    2:  𝑌𝑖𝑊𝐶 = 𝑋𝑖2𝛾2 + 𝜎2 [𝜌2𝑚(𝑃𝑖2) +∑𝜌𝑗𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗)
𝑃𝑖𝑗
(𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 1)𝑗
] + 𝜈𝑖2      if 𝑉 = 2  (8𝑏) 
Regime    3:  𝑌𝑖𝑉𝐶 = 𝑋𝑖3𝛾3 + 𝜎3 [𝜌3𝑚(𝑃𝑖3) +∑𝜌𝑗𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗)
𝑃𝑖𝑗
(𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 1)𝑗
] + 𝜈𝑖3      if 𝑉 = 3   (8𝑐) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is the probability that farmer i chooses coordination mechanism 𝑗, 𝜌𝑗 represents the 
correlation between 𝜇𝑖𝑗 and 𝜂𝑖𝑗 , and 𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗) is the conditional expectation of  𝜂𝑖𝑗, used to correct 
for selection bias, 𝜎𝑗 is the standard deviation of 𝜇𝑖𝑗, 𝜈𝑖𝑗 is the error term. Note that a significant 
selectivity correction term 𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗) associated with any coordination specification indicates the 
presence of selection bias, and insignificant term suggests that selection bias is absent and OLS 
method could produce consistent estimates. 
2.5.2 Treatment Effects of Vertical Coordination Mechanisms 
The average treatment effects on the treated (ATT), which is the causal effect of vertical 
coordination mechanisms can also be estimated using the multinomial BFG model. Farmers 
who participate in written contracts and those who use verbal contracts constitute the treatment 
groups and separate predictions of the treatment effects are carried out, relative to farmers who 
supply paddy in spot markets. In particular, the conditional expectations of the outcomes from 
written contract (𝑗 = 2)  and verbal contract (𝑗 = 3) participation, with spot market as base, is 
specified as (Bourguignon et al., 2007): 
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𝐸(𝑌𝑖2|𝑉 = 2) = 𝑋𝑖2𝛾2 + 𝜎2 [𝜌2𝑚(𝑃𝑖2) + 𝜌1𝑚(𝑃𝑖1)
𝑃𝑖1
(𝑃𝑖1 − 1)
+ 𝜌3𝑚(𝑃𝑖3)
𝑃𝑖3
(𝑃𝑖3 − 1)
]       (9𝑎) 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖3|𝑉 = 3) = 𝑋𝑖3𝛾3 + 𝜎3 [𝜌3𝑚(𝑃𝑖3) + 𝜌1𝑚(𝑃𝑖1)
𝑃𝑖1
(𝑃𝑖1 − 1)
+ 𝜌2𝑚(𝑃𝑖2)
𝑃𝑖2
(𝑃𝑖2 − 1)
]       (9𝑏) 
The conditional expectations of the outcomes of farmers who participate in written contracts 
and those who use verbal contracts in output transactions in the counterfactual case that they 
sell in spot market is specified as; 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑉 = 2) = 𝑋𝑖1𝛾1 + 𝜎1 [𝜌1𝑚(𝑃𝑖2) + 𝜌2𝑚(𝑃𝑖1)
𝑃𝑖1
(𝑃𝑖1 − 1)
+ 𝜌3𝑚(𝑃𝑖3)
𝑃𝑖3
(𝑃𝑖3 − 1)
]     (10𝑎) 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑉 = 3) = 𝑋𝑖1𝛾1 + 𝜎1 [𝜌1𝑚(𝑃𝑖3) + 𝜌2𝑚(𝑃𝑖1)
𝑃𝑖1
(𝑃𝑖1 − 1)
+ 𝜌3𝑚(𝑃𝑖2)
𝑃𝑖2
(𝑃𝑖2 − 1)
]     (10𝑏) 
The ATT is computed as the difference between equations (9𝑎) and (10𝑎), and (9𝑏) and 
(10𝑏), respectively. If we represent the inverse mills ratios in the brackets of equations (9𝑎) 
and (10𝑎), and (9𝑏) and (10𝑏) by 𝜆, the ATTs for written contract (11𝑎) and verbal contract 
(11𝑏) can be respectively specified as: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑊𝐶 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖2|𝑉 = 2) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑉 = 2) = 𝑋𝑖2(𝛾2 − 𝛾1) + 𝜆𝑖2(𝜎2 − 𝜎1)                           (11𝑎)  
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑉𝐶 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖3|𝑉 = 3) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑉 = 3) = 𝑋𝑖3(𝛾3 − 𝛾1) + 𝜆𝑖3(𝜎3 − 𝜎1).                           (11𝑏)    
 
2.6 Empirical Results and Discussion 
2.6.1 Drivers of vertical coordination mechanism choices among rice farmers 
The marginal effects of factors affecting farmers’ coordination mechanism choices are 
presented in table 2.3. Note that farmers who supply paddy in spot market constitute the base 
group for comparison in the analysis. The results from diagnostic tests, such as the suest-based 
Hausman tests of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Wald test for combining 
alternatives indicate that the null hypotheses fail to be rejected, implying that the farmers have 
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been appropriately categorized based on the coordination mechanism participation (see Table 
2.A3 in the appendix). We also identified the multinomial BFG model to ensure unbiased and 
consistent outcome estimates, by including in the coordination choice model, two valid 
instruments that significantly influence coordination choice decisions but are uncorrelated with 
the outcomes. In particular, we use variables representing farmers’ perceptions about paddy 
market demand and importance attached to legal contracts as instruments. In a two-stage 
procedure, these instruments are included in both stages of the multinomial BFG model and 
their significance levels tested in each stage (Dimova & Gang, 2007). The chi-square tests 
indicate the significance of these instruments at 1% level in the coordination choice model and 
insignificant in the outcome models for all the three coordination specifications, suggesting that 
the instruments are valid (see Table 2.A3 in appendix). As shown in table 2.3, farmers with 
perception of low paddy market demand are more likely to engage buyers via written contracts, 
and less likely to supply paddy in spot markets. This finding is consistent with the notion that 
contracting is used to deal with sluggish markets through providing smallholder farmers with 
guaranteed markets. In addition, farmers who consider legal contracts important in output 
transactions are more likely to engage buyers with written contracts, and less likely to supply 
in spot market. This suggests that the farmer sensitization on contracting and output market 
management in value chain interventions is yielding positive results in the study area.  
It is important to point out that some of the variables in the coordination choice model such as 
access to credit and association membership are potentially endogenous. Access to credit is an 
important determinant of vertical coordination choice for output transactions in the study area. 
Farmers who are resource-constrained require sufficient financial capital to purchase inputs and 
pay for labor expenses. In this study, access to credit variable was constructed by seeking 
responses from a farmer on whether he/she needed credit, and if so whether he/she obtained the 
amount of credit required (Jappelli, 1990; Baydas, Meyer, & Aguilera-Alfred, 1994; Jappelli, 
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Pischke, & Souleles, 1998).  Therefore, a farmer who did not require credit, or demanded credit 
for paddy production and marketing, applied for it, and received the required credit amount is 
assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise. Agribusiness companies and other produce buyers 
in supply contract agreement with farmers may advance credit to these farmers, which is 
deducted from produce at point of delivery. On the other hand, farmers who received credit 
from financial institutions may choose to enter into contracts with buyers to ensure guaranteed 
market for their produce, as well as facilitate timely credit repayment. Therefore, farmers’ 
decisions to participate in contract, and access credit may be jointly determined, making access 
to credit variable potentially endogenous in coordination choice model. In the same vein, 
smallholder farmers often join associations to enter into contractual arrangements with a buyer, 
reduce transaction costs, and improve their bargaining power in output markets (Bolwig et al., 
2009; Ragasa & Golan, 2014). In that case, belonging to a farmer association could be regarded 
as a precondition for participating in vertical coordination. This makes association membership 
potentially endogenous in the vertical coordination model.         
We account for the endogeneity of access to credit and association membership variables using 
a two-stage control function approach outlined in Wooldridge (2015). The first stage involves 
estimating separately access to credit and association membership variables as functions of all 
other explanatory variables in the vertical coordination choice model, including a set of valid 
instruments. These instruments should significantly influence access to credit and association 
membership, but not participation in vertical coordination.  For access to credit, we use farmers’ 
knowledge of credit sources as an instrument, which significantly influences access to credit, 
but not vertical coordination choice. The available credit sources in the study area include 
commercial banks, rural banks, financial NGOs (FNGOs), and microfinance companies, 
although farmers may also obtain credit from informal sources including friends and relatives, 
as well as other informal money lenders. In this study, the farmers’ knowledge of credit sources 
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variable is captured as a dummy variable, where one is assigned to a farmer who is aware of 
these existing credit sources, and zero otherwise. The results indicate that farmers with 
knowledge of credit sources are more likely to apply for credit, a finding that is consistent with 
the result reported by Dutta & Magableh (2006) for Jordan. However, having knowledge of 
credit sources does not appear to influence farmers’ decisions to participate in vertical 
coordination in output transactions.  
With regards to membership in farmers’ associations, we used distance from a farmer’s home 
to meeting venue of the association as instrument. We argue that further distance to 
association’s meeting point discourages potential members from joining the association, as they 
may not effectively take part in meetings and other group activities. The results reveal that 
farmers who reside further away from association’s meeting venue are less likely to be members 
of farmers’ associations. However, distance to association’s meeting venue did not have 
significant influence on vertical coordination participation. The results of the first stage 
regression estimates are presented in table 2.A2 in the appendix. In the second stage, both the 
observed access to credit and association membership variables and their respective predicted 
residuals from the first stage are included in the vertical coordination choice model (MNL). 
Table 2.3 shows that the access to credit and association membership residuals for all the 
coordination specifications are not statistically significant, implying that the model has been 
estimated consistently (Wooldridge, 2010). 
The marginal effect of observed access to credit variable is positive and significant for written 
contracts and significantly negative for spot market specification, suggesting that rice farmers 
who had access to enough credit, and not credit constrained are more likely to engage buyers 
using written contracts, and less likely to supply paddy in spot markets. Association 
membership exhibits a positive and significant impact on written contracts and verbal contracts 
choices but negative and significant impact on spot market transactions, suggesting that farmers 
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who belong to farmer associations are more likely to engage paddy buyers in output 
transactions, using written contracts and verbal contracts, but less likely to supply paddy in spot 
markets. This finding is consistent with Bellemare & Novak (2016), and Maertens & Vande 
Velde (2017). Farmers belonging to farmers’ associations normally benefit from collective 
action through collective marketing, bulk input purchase, and other group activities, which 
enable members to enjoy economies of scale, increased bargaining power, and reduced 
transaction costs.      
Table 2.3: Determinants of vertical coordination mechanism choices: MNL model 
 
Variable 
Spot market 
Marginal effects S.E 
Written contract 
Marginal effects S.E 
Verbal contract 
Marginal effects S. E 
Age -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.002  0.005 ** 0.002 
Credit access   -0.206*** 0.067  0.147 ** 0.062  0.058 0.058 
Education -0.012  0.008  0.004 0.006  0.008  0.006 
Gender  0.026 0.105  0.039 0.085 -0.065 0.092 
Farm Size -0.036 0.027 -0.016 0.023  0.019 0.022 
Labor  -0.003 ** 0.001  0.002 ** 0.001  0.001 0.001 
Dist. to market  0.002 0.008 -0.007 0.007  0.005 0.006 
Mobile phone -0.214 ** 0.089  0.112 0.081  0.101 0.075 
Road status  -0.067 0.098 0.066 0.084  0.001 0.081 
Import. of legal contract -0.330*** 0.088  0.349*** 0.076 -0.019 0.075 
Market perception -0.223*** 0.074  0.287*** 0.075 -0.063 0.065 
Association -0.560*** 0.047  0.305*** 0.049  0.254 *** 0.048 
Farm vehicle   0.120 0.128 -0.178 ** 0.078  0.058 0.109 
Institutional buyer -0.340*** 0.065  0.354*** 0.090 -0.013 0.078 
Sagnarigu  0.055 0.169  0.189 0.165 -0.245*** 0.065 
SaveluguNanton -0.200 ** 0.085  0.342*** 0.102 -0.141*** 0.068 
Tolon -0.104 0.103  0.173 0.114 -0.068 0.081 
Kumbungu  0.079 0.112  0.100 0.107 -0.179 ** 0.068 
Credit residual -0.041 0.247 0.175 0.220 -0.133 0.213 
Association residual  0.508 0.505 -0.588 0.469  0.079 0.413 
Note: Based group is spot market; **, *** mean significant at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Age exhibits positive effect on verbal contract choice, suggesting that relatively older farmers 
are more likely to choose verbal contracts in output transactions, and are less likely to choose 
written contracts and spot market transactions. The results also show that farmers who engage 
more labor in farm activities are more likely to choose written contracts in output transactions, 
and less likely to supply in spot market. Mobile phone ownership shows a significant negative 
effect on spot market transactions, and positive but insignificant effect on written and verbal 
contracts, suggesting that farmers who own mobile phones are less likely to sell in spot markets, 
and more likely to engage buyers using written and verbal contracts. The use of mobile phones 
promotes effective communication, and facilitates acquisition of information on inputs and 
output prices, which could guide farmers to negotiate for better prices, as well as reduce 
transaction costs associated with buyer search, and setting up transactions (Akar, Ghosh, & 
Burrell, 2016). In addition, farmers who use written and verbal contracts already have their 
produce buyers, who have carried out successful business exchanges with these farmers over 
the past five years. This category of farmers easily contact and notify their buyers to arrange 
for produce pick-up, especially when paddy delivery is at farmgate. We also find that farmers 
who sell their produce to institutions and produce buying companies are more likely to engage 
these buyers via written contracts, and less likely with verbal contracts and spot market. The 
findings on location variables reveal that, relative to Tamale metropolis (reference area), rice 
farmers in Savelugu-Nanton and Kumbungu districts are more likely to use written contracts, 
but less likely to engage buyers through spot market and verbal contracts, implying that location 
fixed effects also play important role in vertical coordination choices in output markets.  
2.6.2 Impact of vertical coordination mechanisms on farm performance outcomes  
The multinomial BFG model is estimated for each farm performance outcome: net farm income, 
total farm income and total household income, labor productivity and price margins. However, 
we display only the net farm income estimates (table 2.4) due to space limitation, but estimates 
of the other outcomes are available upon request. Note that the estimator variances were 
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bootstrapped with 100 replications to account for heteroscedasticity (Huesca & Camberos, 
2010). Three selectivity correction terms related to the three coordination mechanisms have 
been revealed by the study, which are used to control for selection bias. According to Dimova 
and Gang (2007), for each net farm income specification, a negative (positive) selectivity 
correction term related to any coordination mechanism indicates lower (higher) net farm income 
than those of randomly chosen farmers, suggesting that farmers with better (worse)  unobserved 
attributes switch from using the given coordination mechanism into using the alternative 
coordination mechanism.  
The results show significant selectivity correction terms for spot market and written contract 
specifications, indicating the presence of selection bias, and lending support to the estimation 
of the multinomial BFG model. In particular, the selectivity correction term related to verbal 
contract in the spot market specification is found to be negative and statistically significant at 
5% level, suggesting that net farm income from spot market transactions are downward biased 
relative to randomly chosen farmers. This means that for farmers using verbal contracts, 
switching to spot market transactions would lead to a significantly negative impact on their net 
farm incomes. Also, in spot markets, farmers with unobserved attributes linked to higher net 
farm income have switched towards using verbal contracts in output transactions. The results 
also reveal a positive and significant selectivity correction term related to verbal contract in the 
written contract specification. In other words, net farm incomes from participating in written 
contracts are upward biased, because farmers with worse unobserved attributes switch from 
using written contracts to engaging buyers with verbal contracts.  
We also present net farm income estimates when Lee’s model is used in accounting for selection 
bias (see table 2.A1 in appendix). As previously stated, Lee’s model estimates a single 
selectivity correction term for all coordination choices and fails to provide insight as to which 
coordination mechanism constitutes the source of the bias. It reveals insignificant selectivity 
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correction term in the net farm income estimation, suggesting that the model fails to account 
for the fact that the net farm incomes have been influenced by farmers who move to different 
coordination mechanisms, because they do not perform well under other coordination 
mechanisms.          
Table 2.4: Impact of vertical coordination mechanisms on net farm income: BFG estimation  
 
Variable 
Spot market  
Coefficients        S.E 
Written contract 
Coefficients    S.E 
Verbal contract 
Coefficients         S.E 
Constant   4.092*** 0.558  7.022 *** 1.325  2.574 2.681 
Age  0.011 0.010 -0.014 0.012  0.005 0.013 
Credit access   -0.450 0.276  0.191 0.264  0.231 0.302 
Education -0.011 0.032  0.043** 0.022  0.055 0.038 
Gender  1.045*** 0.356  0.084 0.503  1.912** 0.905 
Farm Size  0.224** 0.115  0.212** 0.096  0.329** 0.149 
Labor   0.001  0.005  -0.007* 0.004 -0.006  0.005 
Dist. to market -0.025 0.028 -0.020  0.029 -0.010 0.030 
Mobile phone -0.173 0.346  0.511** 0.263  0.872** 0.435 
Road status   0.245 0.274 -0.112 0.237  0.143 0.308 
Association -0.706 0.739  0.333 0.522  0.290 0.915 
Farm vehicle   0.560 * 0.339 -0.547 0.559  1.207*** 0.405 
Institutional buyer -1.077 ** 0.442  0.257 0.333  0.747 0.515 
Sagnarigu -0.251 0.571  -0.167 0.684 -0.458 0.748 
Savelugu Nanton  0.415 0.349  0.305 0.458 0.148 0.639 
Tolon  0.115 0.275  0.157 0.421 0.654 0.398 
Kumbungu   1.090*** 0.382  0.808 **  0.401 0.389 0.653 
m(P1) -0.087 0.901 -0.047 1.813 -2.461 2.595 
m(P2) -1.206 1.798 -0.061 0.627 -2.478 1.895 
m(P3) -2.013** 0.904  2.906 ** 1.538 -0.078 0.768 
Note: The dependent variable is log of net farm income; *, **, *** represent significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Examining the determinants of net farm incomes conditional on the choice of coordination 
mechanisms, table 2.4 shows positive and statistically significant effect of farm size on net farm 
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income associated with the coordination mechanism specifications. This finding suggests that 
farmers with relatively larger farm sizes earn significantly higher net farm incomes. While our 
finding is consistent with studies by Park et al. (2014), other studies found negative and 
statistically significant impact of farm size on net farm incomes (eg. Ma & Abdulai, 2016). 
Education exhibits positive and statistically significant impact on net farm incomes for the 
written contract specification, suggesting that better education contributes to higher net farm 
incomes for farmers participating in written contracts.  
The results also show that farmers who own farm vehicles and participate in verbal contracts, 
or supply paddy in spot market tend to obtain higher net farm incomes, as revealed by the 
positive and significant coefficients of farm vehicle ownership for spot market and verbal 
contract specifications. The variable representing sales to institutional buyers has a negative 
and statistically significant impact on net farm incomes from spot market transactions, implying 
that this category of farmers earn significantly lower net farm incomes. A number of factors 
could be driving this finding. First, farmers who supply in spot markets may not be able to 
produce paddy to meet the quality requirement of institutional buyers due to resource 
constraints, thus resulting in lower produce prices and ultimately lower net farm incomes. In 
addition, this category of farmers may lack the capacity to negotiate effectively for better prices 
for their produce, also contributing to reduced net farm incomes. 
2.6.3. Average treatment effects of vertical coordination mechanisms on farm 
performance outcomes 
Table 2.5 reports the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) of written and verbal contracts 
participation on farm performance outcomes such as net farm income, total farm income, and 
total household income, using the multinomial BFG method. As shown in table 2.5, 
participating in written contracts is associated with a significant increase in net farm income, 
total farm income and total household income by 8.10%, 4.38%, and 5.47%, respectively, 
relative to spot market supply. For rice farmers who engage buyers through verbal contracts, 
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participation significantly increases net farm income, total farm income and total household 
income by 5.61%, 2.70%, and 2.85%, respectively, compared to that of farmers who supply 
paddy in spot market. As can be observed, the results show that the highest gain in farm 
performance is  
Table 2.5: Average treatment effects of vertical coordination mechanisms on outcomes 
Outcome variable Mean outcome ATT t-value Change 
(%) 
Net farm income Written contract Spot market    
 6.559 (0.634) 6.068 (0.987) 0.491 5.144*** 8.10% 
 Verbal contract Spot market    
 6.495 (0.828) 6.150 (0.847) 0.345 3.057*** 5.61% 
Total farm income Written contract Spot market    
 7.904 (0.560) 7.572 (0.922) 0.332 3.775*** 4.38% 
 Verbal contract Spot market    
 7.827 (0.642) 7.621 (0.713) 0.206 2.253** 2.70% 
Total household 
income 
Written contract Spot market    
 8.132 (0.496) 7.710(0.818) 0.422 5.424*** 5.47% 
 Verbal contract Spot market    
 7.882 (0.626) 7.663 (0.723) 0.219 2.405** 2.85% 
Labor productivity  Written contract Spot market    
  3.135 (0.520)  2.977 (0.822) 0.157 1.991*** 5.27% 
 Verbal contract Spot market    
 3.167 (0.485) 3.092 (0.709) 0.075 0.915 2.42% 
Price margin Written contract Spot market    
 0.523 (0.098) 0.405 (0.153) 0.118 8.139*** 29.14% 
 Verbal contract Spot market    
 0.519 (0.099) 0.457 (0.142) 0.061 3.725*** 13.34% 
Note: ATT: average treatment effect on the treated, the dependent variable is the log of the 
outcome variables. Computation of ATT is based on the log of the predictions. **, *** mean 
significant at 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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associated with participation in written contracts, relative to verbal contacts and spot market 
participation. Our findings are consistent with other recent studies, which report that the use of 
contracts in output markets contributes significantly to promoting market access and increasing 
incomes of smallholder farmers (eg. Bellemare, 2012; Ma & Abdulai, 2016). As stated earlier, 
one of the objectives of this study is to examine the impact of vertical coordination mechanisms 
on labor productivity (𝑄 𝐿⁄ )  and price margin (𝑝 −𝑊𝜔 𝑄⁄ ). The results are shown in the lower 
part of table 2.5. We find that participation in written contracts increases labor productivity by 
5.27% at the 1% significance level. However, verbal contract participation is associated with 
about 2.42% increase in labor productivity, although not statistically significant. Table 2.5 also 
shows that farmers who transact with paddy buyers through written contracts experience 
29.14% significant increase in price margin, while verbal contract participation is associated 
with a significant increase in price margin by 13.34%. These findings are consistent with the 
results obtained by Ito et al. (2012), and suggest that output market transactions using written 
and verbal contracts contribute to improvement in labor productivity and price margins, relative 
to spot market transactions, with the highest gains associated with the use of written contracts.  
To gain further insights on the impact of vertical coordination mechanisms on farm 
performance, we examine the differential impacts of written and verbal contracts participation 
on net farm income, labor productivity, and price margin for different farm sizes. Based on our 
data, we classify farm size into two categories (small, ≤ 1.5ha; and large, >1.5ha). The results 
are presented in table 2.6. As can be observed, the results show that farmers with small farm 
sizes participating in written and verbal contracts experience significant increase in net farm 
incomes by 9.64% and 5.97% respectively, relative to spot market transactions. On the other 
hand, gains in net farm incomes associated with written and verbal contracts participation for 
farmers with large farm sizes are although positive, but not significantly different from zero.  
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This finding is consistent with the results obtained by Ito et al. (2012), and Ma & Abdulai 
(2016). With respect to labor productivity, table 2.6 shows that relative to spot market 
transactions, participation in written and verbal contracts is associated with a significant 
increase in labor productivity by 9.88% and 6.06%, respectively for farmers with small farm 
sizes. However, for farmers with large farm sizes, participating in written and verbal contracts 
decreases labor productivity, although not statistically significant. This finding can be attributed 
to the fact that farmers with large farm sizes employ relatively higher amount of labor in paddy 
production, which contributes to declining marginal labor productivity.  
Table 2.6: Average treatment effects of vertical coordination mechanisms on outcomes  
   disaggregated by farm size 
Outcome variable Mean outcome  ATT t-value Change 
(%) 
Net farm income Written Contract Spot market    
Small (≤ 1.5ha) 6.449 (0.544) 5.882 (0.869) 0.567 6.127*** 9.64% 
Large (>1.5ha) 7.044 (0.772) 6.885 (1.071) 0.159 0.637 2.30% 
 Verbal contract Spot market    
Small (≤ 1.5ha) 6.319 (0.766) 5.962 (0.780) 0.356 3.026*** 5.97% 
Large (>1.5ha) 7.128 (0.739) 6.823 (0.742) 0.304 1.424 4.45% 
Labor productivity  Written contract Spot market    
Small (≤ 1.5ha)  3.046 (0.447) 2.771 (0.502) 0.274 4.526*** 9.88% 
Large (>1.5ha) 3.527 (0.634) 3.883 (1.254) -0.356 -1.340 -9.16% 
 Verbal contract Spot market    
Small (≤ 1.5ha) 3.071 (0.425) 2.896 (0.500) 0.174 2.466** 6.06% 
Large (>1.5ha) 3.514 (0.538) 3.795 (0.896) -0.281 -1.319 -7.40% 
Price margin Written contract Spot market    
Small (≤ 1.5ha) 0.526 (0.092) 0.423 (0.135) 0.103 7.005*** 24.34% 
Large (>1.5ha) 0.508 (0.085) 0.325 (0.200) 0.182 4.452*** 56.00% 
 Verbal contract Spot market    
Small (≤ 1.5ha) 0.496 (0.084) 0.381 (0.142) 0.115 5.322*** 30.18% 
Large (>1.5ha) 0.600 (0.105) 0.370 (0.182) 0.230 5.367*** 62.16% 
Note: ATT: average treatment effect on the treated, the dependent variable is the log of the 
outcome variables. Computation of ATT is based on the log of the predictions. **, *** mean 
significant at 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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We also find that participation in written and verbal contacts tends to increase price margins, 
albeit more favorable for farmers with large farm sizes. In particular, farmers with small farm 
sizes who participate in written and verbal contracts experience significant gains in price 
margins by 24.34% and 30.18% respectively, while farmers with large farm sizes tend to obtain 
56.00% and 62.16% increases in price margins, respectively. These results suggest that farmers 
with large farm sizes tend to benefit more in terms of price margins, compared to farmers with 
small farm sizes, which is in line with the notion of scale economies, since average fixed costs 
associated with written and verbal contract participantion decline with larger farm sizes. The 
results of the ATT generally indicate that participation in written and verbal contracts tends to 
improve farm performance significantly, relative spot market transactions.                  
6. Conclusions 
This study examined the determinants of smallholder participation in vertical coordination 
mechanisms and their related impacts on farm performance, using multinomial BFG model to 
account for selection bias associated with observed and unobserved attributes. The empirical 
results revealed that participation in written and verbal contracts in smallholder output 
transactions tend to improve farm performance outcomes such as net farm income, total farm 
income, total household income, labor productivity and price margins, relative to farmers who 
supply paddy in spot markets. Farmers who participate in written contracts tend to perform 
better than their counterparts who engage buyers with verbal contracts. The estimates 
disaggregated by farm sizes indicate that farmers with small farm sizes and participating in 
written and verbal contracts earn higher net farm income, and labor productivity than farmers 
with large farm sizes. However, farmers with large farm sizes tend to benefit more from price 
margins.  
Participation in vertical coordination is significantly influenced by access to credit, mobile 
phone ownership, labor, membership in farmers’ associations, sales to institutional buyers, 
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market perception, and importance attached to legal contracts. Education, farm size, mobile 
phone and farm vehicle ownership are found to be the important determinants of net farm 
incomes. Our estimates also show that accounting for selection bias using the multinomial BFG 
model is more appropriate, because not only does it consistently estimate the impact on farm 
performance outcomes, but also provides information on the source and direction of the bias. 
The significant selectivity correction terms associated with the spot market and written contract 
specifications indicate the presence of selection bias.  
The findings from this study do have some policy implications, and clearly suggest that 
targeting output transactions with innovative marketing and risk management techniques such 
as contracting would improve smallholder farm performance and livelihoods significantly. This 
calls for promotion of contracts in smallholder output transactions, especially with the renewed 
interests of government and donor agencies in transforming the domestic rice value chain in 
Ghana. However, Government and NGOs in collaboration with private agribusinesses, 
aggregators, and other produce buyers should intensify their engagement with smallholder 
farmers on the importance and use of legal contracts in output transactions, which could be an 
important contributor to improved and effective participation in agrifood value chains. The 
positive impact of education on contractual choices and farm performance calls for government 
investment in rural education, which could build up and protect human capital for improved 
labor productivity, and other rural livelihood opportunities.  Incorporating credit schemes into 
agricultural value chain interventions could also ease smallholder credit constraints, promote 
pro-poor agricultural growth and smallholder welfare in Ghana. Finally, institutional 
innovations such as formation of farmer associations could also be re-examined and promoted, 
because of its role in reducing transaction costs and enhancing market access.  
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Appendix 
Table 2.A1: Impact of vertical coordination mechanisms on net farm income: Lee estimation 
 
Variable 
Spot market  
Coefficients        S.E 
Written contract 
Coefficients      S.E 
Verbal contract 
Coefficients         S.E 
Constant   4.040*** 0.551  6.832*** 1.203  5.000** 2.826 
Age  0.015* 0.008 -0.021** 0.010 -0.005 0.021 
Credit access   -0.384** 0.187  0.141 0.201  0.155 0.337 
Education -0.011 0.027  0.036* 0.021  0.040 0.054 
Gender  1.086** 0.482  0.158 0.478  0.862 0.564 
Farm Size  0.148 0.118  0.199** 0.091  0.326** 0.146 
Labor   0.001 0.005 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.008 
Dist. to market -0.017 0.031 -0.031 0.028 -0.023 0.067 
Mobile phone -0.115 0.229  0.239 0.207  0.188 0.353 
Road status   0.214 0.200 -0.132 0.215  0.134 0.311 
Association -0.884* 0.512  0.011 0.338  0.072 0.775 
Farm vehicle   0.156 0.368 -0.676 0.732  1.064** 0.469 
Institutional buyer -0.961** 0.423  0.299 0.219  0.807 0.790 
Sagnarigu -0.173 0.414  0.350 0.437 -0.001 0.960 
Savelugu Nanton  0.577** 0.296  0.617 0.387  0.463 0.720 
Tolon  0.193 0.376  0.417 0.389  0.800 0.514 
Kumbungu  1.196 *** 0.289  1.039*** 0.386  0.755 0.767 
m(𝑃𝑖) -0.710 0.602  0.198 0.368  0.025 1.538 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of net farm income; *, **, *** represent significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.A2: First stage estimates for addressing potential endogeneity  
Variables  Credit access  Association  
Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. err 
Constant -1.752*** 0.642  -2.056 0.672 
Age  0.007 0.008   0.008 0.009 
Education  0.000 0.023   0.020 0.024 
Gender  0.050 0.350  -0.172 0.351 
Farm Size  0.041 0.080  -0.153 0.095 
Labor   0.006 0.004   0.008* 0.004 
Dist. to market -0.014 0.027   0.044 0.032 
Mobile phone  0.104 0.220   0.555** 0.220 
Road status   0.064 0.241   0.575** 0.247 
Import. of legal contract  0.087 0.209   0.682*** 0.212 
Market perception  0.391* 0.231   0.392* 0.237 
Farm vehicle   0.021 0.397   0.110 0.403 
Institutional buyer - 0.036 0.267   0.303 0.290 
Sagnarigu  0.235 0.403   0.383 0.429 
SaveluguNanton  0.243 0.336   0.344 0.340 
Tolon  0.208 0.337   0.384 0.342 
Kumbungu  0.049 0.331   0.384 0.334 
Association  0.344 0.215  - - 
Knowledge of credit sources  0.661*** 0.220  - - 
Credit access   - -   0.265 0.210 
Distance to association meeting venue - -  -0.057** 0.022 
Log likelihood -285.29   -277.92  
Number of observations 458      458  
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.A3: Instrument validity and other diagnostic tests 
Instrument variables (market perception and importance of legal contract) 
Multinomial logit model 
 𝑐h𝑖 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑋2) 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
Vertical coordination mechanisms (VCMs) 
choices 
22.98 0.0001 
BFG Impact specifications 
VCM Specification (net farm income) 𝑐h𝑖 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑋2) 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
1. Open market 1.37 0.5044 
2. written contract 0.68 0.7101 
3. verbal contract 0.71 0.7008 
VCM Specification (Total farm income)   
1. Open market 0.56 0.7703 
2. written contract 1.14 0.5645 
3. verbal contract 0.16 0.9250 
VCM Specification (Total household income)   
1. Open market 0.25 0.8843 
2. written contract 0.92 0.6306 
3. verbal contract 0.22 0.8955 
VCM Specification (labor productivity)   
1. Open market 0.31 0.8579 
2. written contract 0.99 0.6106 
3. verbal contract 0.30 0.8601 
VCM Specification (price margin)   
1. Open market 0.49 0.7825 
2. written contract 1.75 0.4168 
3. verbal contract 0.06 0.9683 
Diagnostic tests results 
Suest-based Hausman tests of IIA assumption (N=458) 
Ho: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives 
Choice alternative 𝑐h𝑖 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑋2) 𝑑𝑓 𝑃 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 
1 14.348 21 0.854 
2 17.031 21 0.709 
3 16.416 21 0.746 
Wald tests for combining alternatives (N=458) 
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with a given pair of alternatives are 0   
(i.e., alternatives can be combined) 
Choice alternative 𝑐h𝑖 − 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑋2) 𝑑𝑓 𝑃 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 
1 & 2 124.320 20 0.000 
1 & 3 89.772 20 0.000 
2 & 3 44.210 20 0.001 
Note: A significant test is evidence against Ho; 𝑑𝑓 means degrees of freedom    
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Abstract 
 
Rapid transformation of agrifood value chains due to population growth, urbanization, rising 
consumer incomes and increased demand for food quality and safety has resulted in the need 
for smallholder farmers to coordinate horizontally through group formation and collective 
marketing to improve farm performance in developing countries. In this study, we use data from 
a recent survey of 447 rice farmers in rural areas of northern Ghana to examine the factors that 
promote these collective action decisions and their related implications on farm performance. 
We employ an endogenous switching regression model to account for potential selection bias. 
The data reveal that farmers that were members of farmer groups and participated in collective 
marketing obtained higher prices, and also incurred lower input costs. The econometric 
estimates show that age, access to credit, mobile phone ownership, distance to market and road 
status are the main drivers of group membership and collective marketing decisions. We also 
find positive and significant impacts of farmer group membership and collective marketing on 
farm net revenues.  
Keywords: Collective action, smallholder rice farmers, farm net revenue, endogenous 
switching regression model.       
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past few decades, the contribution of smallholder agriculture to economic 
transformation and poverty reduction in developing countries has received considerable 
attention in research and development (Markelova et al., 2009; Verhofstadt and Maertens, 
2014). Nonetheless, several challenges still impede smallholder farmers from effectively 
participating in both input and output markets. The main challenges include high transaction 
costs due to poor infrastructure and market imperfections, as well as limited access to credit 
and extension services (Mojo et al., 2017; Kaganzi et al., 2009; Fischer and Qaim, 2012). These 
challenges have resulted in increased development efforts in developing countries to improve 
both production capacities and access to markets (Markelova et al., 2009).  
The rapid transformation in agrifood value chains stemming from rising consumer incomes, 
urbanization, and increasing consumer demand for food safety has resulted in the need for actor 
coordination in order to improve smallholder farm performance in developing countries 
(Reardon et al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011). Effective organization of smallholders into groups 
to undertake production and marketing activities would help them strengthen their position in 
the agrifood value chain. Farmer group formation has been recognized as one of the 
development strategies for promoting collective action and facilitating market linkages in 
agrifood chains (Bernard and Spielman, 2009). It effectively contributes to reducing transaction 
costs, enhancing bargaining power to ensure higher output prices, and possibly lower input 
prices, fostering risk sharing and ensuring economies of scale (Bijman et al., 2006; Francesconi 
and Wouterse, 2015). African governments and NGOs are keenly interested in promoting the 
formation of farmer groups as a first step to commencing the implementation of agriculture and 
value chain development initiatives. For example, the Ghana ministry of food and agriculture 
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(MoFA) in collaboration with donor agencies4, has intensified efforts to promote farmers’ group 
formation as a means of improving farm performance and rural livelihoods (Salifu et al., 2010). 
The implications of farmer groups in developing countries have been greatly contested across 
various strands of the literature. Some studies reveal that farmer groups promote successful 
participation in agrifood markets and enhance smallholder welfare. For example, Fischer and 
Qaim (2012) showed that in Kenya, participation in banana farmer groups resulted in price 
advantages and increased household income. A recent study by Mojo et al. (2017) found that 
Ethiopian coffee farmer groups experienced positive gains in household incomes and assets of 
members. By contrasts, findings from other studies suggest that farmer groups performed 
poorly, and in some cases, led to dissolution of the groups (Markelova et al., 2009; Kaganzi et 
al., 2009; Francesconi and Wouterse, 2015). For example, Bernard et al. (2008) found that 
farmer groups in Ethiopia failed to improve their level of commercialization, while a study by 
Nkhoma and Conforte (2011) on Malawi reported that farmer groups could not enhance their 
welfare, which they attributed to ineffective governance and management of the groups.  
These mixed findings justify efforts in further exploring conditions that trigger successful 
operations of farmer groups, as well as mechanisms under which substantial benefits accrue to 
group members. Collective marketing undertaken by farmer groups is one of the important ways 
of ensuring sustainability of farmer groups, since it helps in reducing transaction costs, ensuring 
higher output prices, and lower input prices (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). In their study on Kenya, 
Fischer and Qaim (2012) found that about 40% of banana group members who did not 
participate in collective marketing, but engaged buyers on individual basis, experienced lower 
household incomes. This indicates that the use of farmer groups in agricultural development 
                                                          
4 The government of Ghana, through funding from the World Bank has in the past invested over US$ 9 million for 
the formation and development of farmer groups under the Agricultural Services Sub-sector Investment Project 
(AgSSIP). Feed the Future (FtF), a USAID funded program is heavily supporting farmer groups to improve 
coordination and performance among rural smallholders.  
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interventions is as important as facilitating collective marketing within such groups to ensure 
economic transformation and poverty reduction in developing countries.         
However, an issue of great interest from rural development perspective is whether or not 
members of farmer groups are willing and committed to participating in collective marketing.  
It is worth noting that some members of farmer groups do not participate in collective marketing 
due to myriad reasons, including but not limited to, difficulties in meeting quality requirements, 
lack of trust for group leaders, as well as the notion that they receive satisfactory prices by 
selling individually. Moreover, some group members live relatively far from the agreed paddy 
collection centers or in some cases, in different communities, thus making paddy bulking a 
challenge for such category of farmers. Thus, an issue that has not received much attention, 
particularly in the empirical literature is the extent to which farmer groups commit members to 
collective marketing, and how farmer groups and collective marketing impact on farm 
performance. Most of the studies mentioned earlier focused on the determinants of farmers’ 
participation intensity in farmer groups (eg. Gyau et al., 2016). The study by Fischer and Qaim 
(2012), which employed PSM approach to examine the effects of banana groups on household 
welfare, disaggregated by collective marketing found that, for banana production in Kenya, 
belonging to a farmer group improves household income through collective marketing 
participation. But a widely known weakness of PSM method is its failure to account for farmer 
unobserved attributes such as farmer’s innate skills, motivation and risk perception. However, 
the fact that group membership and collective marketing participation decisions are not 
randomly assigned, but involves farmers’ self-selection, means that unobserved attributes still 
play a role in the decision process, which could bias the PSM estimates (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
Therefore, group membership and collective marketing decisions for improved farm 
performance in smallholder agriculture still require further assessment. 
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This study contributes to the growing literature on the role of farmer groups on farm 
performance in two ways. First, we explore the factors that influence farmers’ decisions to join 
farmer groups and to participate in collective marketing. Second, we investigate the impact of 
group membership and collective marketing on farm performance, such as farm net revenues. 
The study uses recent cross-sectional data from 447 smallholder farmers in five selected 
districts of northern Ghana. We employ a bivariate probit model to assess the relationship 
between farmer group membership and collective marketing decisions, as well as factors that 
influence both decisions amongst smallholder rice farmers (Greene, 2012). An endogenous 
switching regression (ESR) model is then used to examine the impact of group membership and 
collective marketing on farm net revenues (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004) and to account for 
observable and unobservable factors that could bias the coefficients of the estimates. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents a review of farmer horizontal 
coordination in Ghana. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the analysis. The conceptual framework employed to guide the empirical analysis is 
described in section 4, followed by specification of the empirical models in section 5. Section 
6 discusses the empirical results, while conclusions and policy implications are presented in the 
final section. 
3.2 Review on farmer groups in rural Ghana 
The government of Ghana in collaboration with NGOs and donor agencies have in recent times 
implemented series of agriculture and value chain development programs aimed at promoting 
the formation of farmer groups. One of such programs involved a five year US$241 million 
agricultural development program launched in 2007, and funded by the Millennium Challenge 
Cooperation (MCC) of the USA, and implemented by the Millennium Development Authority 
(MiDA) under the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Ghana compact program. The 
program was aimed at enhancing smallholder competitiveness in high value markets through 
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increased productivity and quality of agrifood crops (MiDA, 2013). About 1242 farmer groups 
operating in the cereals, legumes, fruits and vegetables value chains were recruited and 
registered with both MiDA and MoFA under the commercial development of farmer 
organizations (CDFO) component of the program. These groups were trained on organizational, 
business and technical capacity development modules prior to the commencement of their 
various agribusiness activities.  
Overall, the MiDA project contributed to significant returns on investments in a transformed 
and competitive agricultural sector, enhanced speedy growth of the rural economy and a 
lowered poverty incidence among beneficiary smallholder farmers in Ghana. However, the 
program had a limited impact on farmer value chain integration and the promotion of collective 
investments by farmer groups. The attributed reasons were that collateral security for financial 
credit acquisition from financial institutions by farmer groups was provided by MiDA rather 
than orientating them to develop collective entrepreneurship spirit and their own financial 
capital formation, which denied majority of the farmer groups access to credit and also resulted 
in high loan default rate (ISSER, 2012). 
The agriculture component5 of the Feed the Future (FtF) program, an ongoing five year (2013-
2018) USAID funded program, is another important program that is heavily investing in the 
formation and capacity building of farmer groups to enhance technology adoption, market 
access and overall livelihoods of smallholders in Ghana. The program aims at improving 
productivity, competitiveness, and incomes of smallholder farmers in the rice, soybeans and 
maize value chains, as well as improve nutrition and resilience of vulnerable populations in 
Northern Ghana. Several NGOs also work with farmer groups in Northern Ghana to promote 
smallholder market access. Among others include Technoserve, Agricultural Cooperative 
                                                          
5 The project components under the FtF-USAID-Ghana programme include Agriculture Technology Transfer 
project (ATT), Resiliency in Northern Ghana (RING), Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement 
(ADVANCE), Strengthening Partnerships, Results and Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING) projects.   
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Development International and Volunteers Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), 
Market Development for Northern Ghana (MADE), International Fertilizer Development 
Center (IFDC), German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), Adventist Development 
and Relief Agency (ADRA), Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), Action Aid 
Ghana, and Association of Church Development Projects (ACDEP).  
The capacity building and orientation of farmer groups is gradually enhancing their 
commitment to participating in collective activities and performance in the agrifood chain. For 
example, a survey of 501 farmer groups in Ghana revealed that only about 13% of them 
participated in collective marketing (Salifu et al., 2012). This suggests that more development 
efforts are still required to enhance the level of collective marketing participation for improved 
smallholder farm performance in Ghana. 
 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
3.3.1. Group membership and collective marketing decisions             
In this section, we present a conceptual framework that is based on the assumption that rice 
farmers make two binary decisions; (1) to join farmers’ groups or not to join, (2) to participate 
in collective marketing or not to participate. To simplify the framework, we assume that rice 
farmers are risk neutral, and compare the benefits (𝐷𝑀
∗ ) generated from rice production and 
marketing as a group member or collective marketing participant to the benefits (𝐷𝑁
∗ ) from non 
group membership or non collective marketing participation. A farmer will choose to be a group 
member or collective marketing participant if the net benefits (𝐷𝑖
∗) from group membership and 
non-membership or collective marketing participation or non-participation is positive, that is, 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝐷𝑀
∗ − 𝐷𝑁
∗ > 0. However, since 𝐷𝑖
∗ is unobserved, we express it as a function of observable 
characteristics in a latent variable framework as: 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝑍𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖,   𝐷𝑖 = 1[𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0],                                                                                                   (1) 
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where 𝐷𝑖 is the group membership or collective marketing participation indicator, assigned a 
value of one, and 0 otherwise, 𝛾 denotes a vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝜀𝑖 is the error 
term assumed to be independently and identically distributed with mean zero, and variance 𝜎𝜀
2, 
and 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of observable factors such as household and farm level factors influencing 
group membership or collective marketing participation decisions.  
The probability of a farmer being a group member or collective marketing participant is 
expressed as:  
Pr(𝐷𝑖 = 1) = Pr(𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0) = Pr(𝜀𝑖 > −𝑍𝑖𝛾) = 1 − 𝐹(−𝑍𝑖𝛾)                                                     (2) 
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function for 𝜀𝑖. Given the relation among group 
membership, collective marketing participation and farm net revenues, we assume that farmers 
maximize net revenues from rice production and marketing, which can be expressed as: 
𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 = [𝑃𝑄(𝜔, 𝑍) −𝑊𝜔]                                                                                                             (3) 
where P is the price of output, Q is the expected output level, 𝜔 is the vector of input quantities, 
Z is a vector of farm and household level factors, W is a vector of input prices. It is worth noting 
that farmers are faced with varying levels of transaction costs (proportional and fixed) in both 
inputs and output markets, mostly caused by information asymmetry, which explains why they 
behave differently in a market situation (Key et al., 2000; Barret, 2008).  
Proportional transaction costs essentially reduce output prices received by farmers and increase 
input prices purchased by farmers (Key et al., 2000; Abdulai and Birachi, 2009). We therefore 
incorporate into the framework the influence of transaction costs on input and output prices, as 
well as farm net revenues received by farmers. Let us denote the proportional transaction costs 
of accessing inputs and in selling output as 𝑊𝜏
𝑐 and  𝑃𝑞
𝑐, respectively. The actual price paid for 
the inputs (𝑊𝜏
′) and that received for the output (𝑃𝑞
′) can then be expressed as 𝑊𝜏
′ = 𝑊 +𝑊𝜏
𝑐 
and 𝑃𝑞
′ = 𝑃 − 𝑃𝑞
𝑐, respectively. Now, if we denote fixed transaction costs associated with 
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purchasing inputs as 𝐹𝜏
c and the fixed transaction costs incurred in setting up output transaction 
as 𝐹𝑞
c, then farmers can be assumed to maximize the following farm net revenue function: 
 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 = [(𝑃 − 𝑃𝑞
𝑐)𝑄 − (𝑊 +𝑊𝜏
𝑐)𝜔 − 𝐹𝑞
c − 𝐹𝜏
c]                                                                          (4) 
Equation (4) implies that the farm net revenue from rice production and marketing can be 
expressed as a function of variable input quantities, input and output prices, proportional 
transaction costs associated with input and output market participation, farm and household 
level characteristics, group membership and collective marketing participation decisions 𝐷. 
This is specified as 
𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑊, 𝑃, 𝐷, 𝑃𝑞
𝑐,𝑊𝜏
𝑐 , 𝑍)                                                                                                             (5) 
For any well-specified normalized profit function, applying Hotelling’s lemma directly to 
equation (4) results in a reduced-form of the following rice output supply specification; 
𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑊, 𝑃, 𝐷, 𝑃𝑞
𝑐 ,𝑊𝜏
𝑐, 𝑍)                                                                                                             (6) 
Notice that equations (5) and (6) suggest that input and output prices, farm level and household 
characteristics, proportional transaction costs in input and output markets, group membership 
and collective marketing participation decisions tend to influence the farm net revenues 
received by farmers. 
3.3.2 Impact of group membership and collective marketing decisions on farm net 
revenues 
Given our interest in investigating the impact of group membership and collective marketing 
participation on farm net revenues, we specify the farm net revenues as a linear function of 
group membership or collective marketing participation and a vector of variables representing 
farm and household characteristics as:  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝐷𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                      (7) 
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where 𝑌𝑖 represents farm net revenue of farmer i; 𝑋𝑖 denotes a vector of farm, household and 
transaction costs characteristics; 𝐷𝑖 is a vector of dummy variables representing  group 
membership and collective marketing participation decisions as defined earlier; 𝛽 and 𝛿 
represent unknown parameters to be estimated; and 𝜇𝑖 denotes a random error term. To the 
extent that farmers self-select into group membership or collective marketing participation, 
using OLS method to estimate equation (7) may result in biased estimates. Thus, when farmers 
self-select into group membership or collective marketing participation, the error term (𝜀𝑖) in 
equation (1) and the error term (𝜇𝑖) in equation (7) may be correlated, leading to selectivity 
bias. In a non-randomized research setting, as the case in this study, the widely employed 
econometric techniques used in addressing selection bias especially in farmer group 
membership impact studies are quasi-experimental methods such as propensity score matching 
(PSM), treatment effects model or endogenous switching regression (eg. Ma and Abdulai, 
2016). However, as stated earlier, the major weakness of the PSM approach is that it only 
accounts for selection bias due to observable attributes. In this study, we account for selection 
bias due to both observable and unobservable attributes. In doing so, we employ the endogenous 
switching regression (ESR) approach to jointly estimate the impact of group membership and 
collective marketing participation on farm net revenues. Before we estimate the impact of group 
membership and collective marketing on farm net revenues, we first examine the 
interrelationship between group membership and collective marketing decisions to provide 
insight as to whether farmers who are group members are more or less likely to also participate 
in collective marketing. This is done using a bivariate probit model specified in the next section.  
3.4 Specification of the empirical models 
3.4.1 Bivariate Probit regression model 
As previously indicated, for some farmer groups that undertake collective marketing and sales 
of their paddy, some members of such groups do not participate in such a group activity, 
attributable to myriad reasons mentioned earlier. However, some farmers who are not members 
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of farmer groups also have the opportunity to participate in collective marketing and sales, 
especially in situations where group members are unable to meet quantity requirements. This 
makes group membership and collective marketing decisions potentially jointly determined. 
Therefore, we employ a bivariate probit model to analyze the joint determination of group 
membership and collective marketing decisions and the related drivers of both decisions. The 
approach involves a specification of a two-equation model that captures farmers’ decisions to 
belong to farmer groups and to participate in collective marketing, expressed as (Greene, 2012): 
𝐺𝑖
∗ = 𝐽𝑖𝛼 + 𝜗𝑖,        𝐺𝑖 = 1[𝐺𝑖
∗ > 0]                                                                                                  (8) 
𝐶𝑀
∗ = 𝑣𝑀𝜓 + ℵ𝑀   𝐶𝑀 = 1[𝐶𝑀
∗ > 0]                                                                                                                  (9) 
where 𝐺𝑖
∗ is the latent variable that represents farmer’s group membership decision; 𝐽𝑖 is a vector 
of farm-level, household and transaction costs characteristics influencing group membership 
decision; 𝐶𝑀
∗  denotes latent variable for collective marketing decision; 𝑣𝑀 is a vector of farm-
level, household and transaction costs factors influencing farmer’s collective marketing 
participation decision; 𝛼 and 𝜓 are vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated; the random 
error terms (𝜗𝑖, ℵ𝑀) are assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit 
variances, and correlation coefficient 𝜌 (Greene, 2012). A significant 𝜌 implies correlation 
between the error terms (𝜗𝑖,ℵ𝑀). That is, the decision to join farmer group and the decision to 
participate in collective marketing are interrelated, and employing the traditional univariate 
probit model would generate biased and inconsistent estimates. However, an insignificant 𝜌 
implies that the two decisions are unrelated, providing suitable grounds for the estimation of 
two separate univariate probit models to generate unbiased and consistent estimates. Maximum 
likelihood method is employed to estimate the bivariate probit model (Greene, 2012). We 
compute marginal effects to determine the probability of collective marketing participation, 
conditional on group membership and the exogenous characteristics. In doing so, the nonlinear 
conditional expectation for estimating the marginal effects is expressed as (Greene, 2012): 
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𝐸[𝐺𝑖|𝐶𝑀, 𝑣𝑀] =
Φ(𝜓𝐽𝑖 , (2𝐶𝑀 − 1)𝜓𝑣𝑀 , (2𝐶𝑀 − 1)𝜌)
Φ[(2𝐶𝑀 − 1)𝜓𝑣𝑀]
                                                             (10) 
where Φ is the cumulative density function for the standardized bivariate normal distribution. 
3.4.2. Endogenous switching regression (ESR) model  
In this section, we employ ESR method to analyze the impact of group membership and 
collective marketing on farm net revenues. The ESR method is a two-stage procedure that 
involves first estimating a selection equation (eq. 1) to examine the factors influencing farmer 
group membership or collective marketing decision. In the second stage, the impact of group 
membership or collective marketing on farm net revenues is estimated by specifying two 
regimes of outcome equations for group members and non-members or collective marketing 
participants and non-participants as follows: 
Regime 1:  𝑌1𝑖 = 𝑋1𝑖𝛽1 + 𝜇1𝑖    𝑖𝑓  𝐷𝑖 = 1,                                                                              (11a) 
Regime 2:  𝑌2𝑖 = 𝑋2𝑖𝛽2 + 𝜇2𝑖     𝑖𝑓  𝐷𝑖 = 0,                                                                             (11b) 
where 𝑌𝑖 denotes the farm net revenue per hectare for group membership and non-membership 
or collective marketing participation and non-participation regimes, 𝑋 is the vector of farm-
level, household and transaction costs characteristics; 𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters to 
be estimated and  𝜇 is the random error term. Identification of the model requires that at least 
one variable (known as an instrument) in 𝑍 from equation (1) should not feature in 𝑋. The 
identifying instrument should characteristically influence group membership or collective 
marketing participation decision, but not net revenues. In this context, we used farmers’ 
perception of rice market demand as an identifying instrument, which is hypothesized to 
influence group membership and collective marketing participation decisions, but not net 
revenues. Instrumental variable test reveals that the instrument is valid. 
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It is significant to note that the variables in 𝑋 account for potential selection bias, taking into 
account only observed factors. However, because selection bias still persists due to unobserved 
factors such as farmer innate skills and motivation, this leads to possible correlation between 
the error terms in the group membership or collective marketing choice equation (1) and net 
revenue equations (11a) and (11b), i.e, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜀𝑖, 𝜇𝑖) ≠ 0. The ESR model accounts for this 
potential selection bias as an omitted variable problem. Following Heckman (1979), we 
compute the inverse mills ratios for group members or collective marketing participants (𝜆𝑖1) 
and non-members or collective marketing non-participants (𝜆𝑖2) and the covariance terms 
𝜎𝜇1 and 𝜎𝜇2, after estimating the selection equation (1), which are then included in the outcome 
equations (11a) and (11b) as follows: 
 𝑌𝑖1 = 𝑋𝑖1𝛽1 + 𝜎𝜇1𝜆𝑖1 + 𝜉𝑖1    𝑖𝑓  𝐷𝑖 = 1,                                                                                  (12a) 
𝑌𝑖2 = 𝑋𝑖2𝛽2 + 𝜎𝜇2𝜆𝑖2 + 𝜉𝑖2    𝑖𝑓  𝐷𝑖 = 0,                                                                                  (12b) 
where 𝜆𝑖1 and 𝜆𝑖2 are the selectivity correction terms used to control for selection bias caused 
by unobserved factors; 𝜉𝑖1 and 𝜉𝑖2 are the random error terms with conditional zero means. As 
proposed by Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) is 
employed to simultaneously estimate the selection equation (1) and the outcome equations (11a) 
and (11b), using movestay command in STATA. The FIML method is used because of its 
advantage in generating consistent standard errors unlike other two-stage estimation 
procedures.  
Next, we use the coefficients from the ESR model to derive the average treatment effects on 
the treated (ATT). In doing so, we compare the expected farm net revenues from group 
members or collective marketing participants to the expected farm net revenues of the 
counterfactual hypothetical cases that they did not belong to farmer groups or marketed and 
sold their paddy individually, respectively. In particular, the expected net revenues of group 
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members or collective marketing participants and non group members or collective marketing 
non-participants, respectively are expressed as: 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷 = 1] = 𝑋𝑖1𝛽 + 𝜎𝜇1𝜆𝑖2                                                                                                  (13a)   
𝐸[𝑌𝑖2|𝐷 = 1] = 𝑋𝑖2𝛽 + 𝜎𝜇2𝜆𝑖2                                                                                                 (13b) 
The ATT for group membership and collective marketing participation is computed as the 
difference between equations (13a) and (13b), expressed as: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖2|𝐷 = 1] = 𝑋𝑖(𝛽𝑖1 − 𝛽𝑖2) + 𝜆𝑖1(𝜎𝜇1 − 𝜎𝜇2)                              (14)      
3.5 Data and descriptive statistics  
This study uses recent farm household data gathered from June to August, 2016 in five selected 
districts of northern Ghana; Tolon, Kumbungu, Sagnarigu districts; Savelugu Nanton 
Municipal and Tamale Metropolitan area. The sample for the study was drawn using a multi-
stage sampling approach. Purposive sampling method was first employed to select the five 
study districts because of their geographic accessibility and the intensive rice production in 
these areas. After purposive sampling of the districts, series of consultations were held with the 
agricultural extension agents (AEAs) of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) and 
other officials of ongoing donor funded projects (eg. Ghana-USAID/FtF) to randomly select 
about 2-3 communities from each study district. Finally, smallholder rice farmers were sampled 
on proportional basis with respect to the farmer population in each area. In total, we sampled 
477 smallholder rice farmers, including group members and non-members, and engaged them 
in face-to-face interviews, using carefully designed and structured questionnaire. The 
information elicited during the survey was related to 2015 growing season, and focused on 
household and farm-level characteristics, asset ownership, as well as production and marketing 
activities. The data were collected with the help of trained research assistants. 
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The definition and descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis are reported in table 
3.1. In our context, the dependent variables are farm group membership, collective marketing 
and farm net revenues. Group membership is captured as a dummy and assigned a value of one, 
if the famer belongs to a farmer group, and zero otherwise. As shown in table 3.1, 42% of the 
rice farmers interviewed belong to farmer groups. Collective marketing is also captured as a 
dummy variable, where one is assigned to the case where a farmer participated in collective 
marketing in the last 12 months prior to the survey, and zero otherwise. In this context, 
collective marketing refers to a case where members market and sell paddy rice through a group. 
About 19% of farmers in the sample participated in collective marketing. This suggests that 
majority of the farmers in the study area still conduct marketing and sales of their produce 
individually, which may influence output prices and farm net revenues received by farmers. 
The outcome variable is farm net revenue, which is generated from rice production and 
marketing, and is computed as the difference between gross farm revenue per hectare less 
variable costs.  
We review relevant literature to identify explanatory variables used in the present study (eg. 
Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 1998; Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Akar et al., 2016; Mojo et al., 
2017: Zanello, 2014). We include age and education in the analysis, because they are considered 
important measures of human capital, and influence farmers’ abilities to perceive, interpret, and 
respond to new events (Shultz, 1982). We expect that the likelihood of group membership and  
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Table 3.1: Variable definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Dependent variables  
Group membership  1 if farmer belongs to rice farmer group, 0 
otherwise 
0.19 (0.39) 
Collective marketing 1 if farmer participated in collective marketing, 0 
otherwise  
0.42 (0.49) 
Farm net revenue Gross farm revenue from rice production minus 
variable input cost ( GH¢) 
457.72 (638.27) 
Transaction costs variables  
Mobile phone 1 if farmer owns mobile phone, 0 otherwise 0.45 (0.49) 
Radio set 1 if farmer owns radio set, 0 otherwise 0.56 (0.49) 
Distance to market Distance travelled to the nearest market (km) 6.54 (4.08) 
Bicycle  1 if a farmer owns bicycle, 0 otherwise 0.70 (0.45) 
Road status 1 if market road if motorable , 0 otherwise 0.73 (0.44) 
Household characteristics  
Age Age of respondent (years) 37.45 (11.72) 
Education Education of respondent (years) 2.02 (3.98) 
Gender  1 if farmer is male, 0 otherwise  0.88 (0.32) 
Market perception  Farmer perception of market demand (1=high, 
0=low) 
0.32 (0.46) 
Farm characteristics  
Farm size  Size of farm (hectares) 1.14 (1.27) 
Access to credit 1 if farmer has access to enough credit and not 
liquidity constraint, 0 otherwise  
0.40 (0.49) 
Average price per kg Average selling price of paddy ( GH¢/kg) 1.19 (0.27) 
Gross farm revenue Total value of paddy output per hectare (GH¢) 799.42 (810.00) 
Yield  Quantity of rice output per hectare (kg) 665.78 ( 634.56) 
Fertilizer and 
chemical costs 
Expenditure on fertilizer and chemicals (GH¢) 171.89 (164.04) 
Location dummies  
Sagnarigu 1 if farmer is located in Sagnarigu district, 0 
otherwise 
0.12 (0.33) 
Tolon 1 if farmer is located in Tolon district, 0 
otherwise 
0.22 (0.41) 
Kumbungu  1 if farmer is located in Kumbungu district, 0 
otherwise 
0.23 (0.42) 
Savelugu Nanton 1 if farmer is located in Savelugu nanton 
Municipal, 0 otherwise 
0.20 (0.40) 
Tamale 1 if farmer is located in Tamale metropolitan 
area, 0 otherwise 
0.21 (0.40) 
Note: GH¢ is Ghanaian currency (US$1 = GH¢ 4.19), Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation 
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collective marketing participation decisions increase with age and education, following the 
argument that older and better educated farmers have more experience and skills to respond to 
the demands of the group, as well as buyer requirements. Some recent studies found positive 
and significant effects of age and education on group membership decisions (Mojo et al., 2017; 
Fischer and Qaim, 2012). We also account for possible effects of gender by including a male 
dummy in the analysis. For instance, women in northern Ghana have lower opportunities, 
capacities and motivation than men, to effectively engage in collective action, which is 
attributed to their engagement in household activities and unpaid care work in addition to their 
farming activities (Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 1998). Farm size plays important role 
because larger farm sizes lower average fixed costs associated with group membership and 
collective marketing decisions (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). Access to credit, a proxy for financial 
capital and an indicator of liquidity constraint, is seen as important in group membership and 
collective marketing decisions. Members of farmer groups undertake certain group 
commitments, such as payment of membership fees and periodic contributions for financing 
group activities including collective marketing. In addition, rice production and marketing 
require investments in inputs and labor, such that resource-constrained farmers require 
sufficient financial capital to undertake these activities. We included access to credit dummy in 
our analysis to ascertain the liquidity status of the farmers. Farmers who had access to enough 
credit were considered not liquidity constraint. Access to credit is expected to have positive 
impact on group membership and collective marketing decisions, as well as farm performance. 
Measures of transaction costs are also included in the analysis to account for their possible 
influence on group membership and collective marketing participation decisions. These 
measures include distance to markets, road status, ownership of mobile phone, radio set, and 
bicycle. We expect a positive influence of market distance on group membership and collective 
marketing. That is, farmers living farther away from the market could take advantage of joining 
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farmer groups and possibly participate in collective marketing. Road status, a proxy for overall 
quality of the infrastructure is also expected to have a positive influence on group membership 
and collective marketing. Motorable roads lower transaction costs of produce transport, as well 
as costs of acquiring production inputs (Dercon et al., 2009). Ownership of bicycle may enable 
farmers to easily transport their paddy to market centers, and as such expected to influence 
group membership and collective marketing decisions negatively (Zanello et al., 2014). Mobile 
phones and radio sets facilitate acquisition of information on input and output prices, which 
could serve as guide for farmers to negotiate for better prices. Using these ICT tools, farmers 
are able to cut down costs associated with searching for buyers, as well as setting up and 
negotiating transactions (Zanello, 2012; Akar et al., 2016). Mobile phones tend to promote 
efficient communication amongst group members for effective organization of collective 
marketing and other group activities (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). We expect group membership 
and collective marketing decisions to be positively influenced by ownership of mobile phones 
and radio sets. Finally, we include a set of location dummies to account for possible spatial 
effects and infrastructural differences of the sample districts.                   
As shown in table 3.1, an average farmer is 37 years old, has completed about 2 years of formal 
education, cultivates about 1.14 hectares of rice farm and generates a farm net revenue of 
Gh¢457.72 per hectare. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 report the mean differences by group membership 
and collective marketing participation, respectively, for the variables used in the analysis, as 
well as the statistical t-test results of these differences. As reported in table 3.2, group members 
constitute greater proportion of farmers who participate in collective marketing of their paddy. 
Specifically, about 27% and 14% of group members and non-members, respectively 
participated in collective marketing. We also find that group members obtain higher yields, 
receive higher prices, and generate higher gross farm revenues, resulting in significantly higher 
farm net revenues than non-members. Figure 3.1 shows that the cumulative distribution 
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function (CDF) of farm net revenues for group members is significantly different from that of 
non-members, revealed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. Variables with insignificant 
mean differences between members and non-members include education, gender and farm size. 
However, both category of farmers differ significantly along the rest of the variables under  
Table 3.2: Differences in characteristics of farmers by group membership  
Variable Members Non-members Difference  
(t-stat.) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 40.17 11.88 35.48 11.21  4.25*** 
Education 1.95 4.01 2.07 3.96 -0.31 
Gender  0.87 0.32 0.88  0.31 -0.33 
Mobile phone 0.63 0.48 0.32  0.46  6.87*** 
Radio set 0.64 0.47 0.50 0.50  3.12*** 
Farm size  1.08 0.98 1.19  1.44 -0.88 
Access to credit 0.57 0.49 0.27 0.44  6.82*** 
Distance to market 7.04 4.10 6.17 4.03  2.23** 
Bicycle  0.65 0.47 0.73 0.44 -1.80* 
Market perception  0.46 0.49 0.22 0.41  5.48*** 
Road status 0.84 0.36 0.65 0.47  4.57*** 
Sagnarigu 0.29 0.45 0.01 0.10  9.55*** 
Tolon 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40  1.23 
Kumbungu  0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43  1.03 
Savelugu Nanton 0.08 0.27 0.28 0.45 -5.37*** 
Tamale 0.15 0.36 0.24 0.43 -2.24** 
Collective marketing 0.27 0.44 0.14 0.35  5.20*** 
Farm net revenue  634.51 854.88 329.39 367.74  5.12*** 
Average price per kg 1.27 0.37 1.13 0.13 5.59*** 
Gross farm revenue 981.58 1,092.99 667.32 476.04 4.12*** 
Yield  773.03 841.14 587.93 410.86 3.07*** 
Fertilizer and chemical costs 154.66 175.50 184.40 154.34 -1.89** 
Sample size 188 259  
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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consideration. In particular, we observe that, on average, group members appear older and 
constitute a higher proportion of farmers who are not liquidity constrained relative to non-
members. In addition, group members mostly own mobile phones, radio sets, live in 
communities with motorable roads, travel longer distances to markets as well as possess 
perception of high rice market demand.  
 
Figure 3.1: Cumulative distribution of farm net revenues by group membership. Note: the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic of 0.216 indicates that the two distributions are statistically 
different (p = 0.000) 
 
With regards to differences in characteristics by collective marketing participation, table 3.3, 
reveals that farmers who participate in collective marketing mostly access credit and are not 
liquidity constrained, own mobile phones and radio sets, as well as live in communities with 
motorable roads. However, collective marketing participants receive significantly higher paddy 
prices and gross farm revenues than non-participants, probably contributing to the significantly 
higher farm net revenues than those farmers who marketed and sold paddy individually. As 
shown in figure 3.2, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the CDF of farm net revenues, 
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conditional on collective marketing participation, is positively and significantly different from 
the farm net revenue CDF for non-participants. On the other hand, collective marketing 
participants and non-participants do not differ along the lines of age, education, gender, bicycle 
ownership and farm size. However, it is important to note that these mean differences cannot  
Table 3.3: Differences in characteristics of farmers by collective marketing participation  
Variable Participants  Non-participants Difference  
(t-stat.) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 37.38 11.21 37.47 11.86 -0.06 
Education 2.07 4.08 2.01 3.96  0.13 
Gender  0.93 0.25 0.87 0.33  1.60 
Mobile phone 0.74 0.44 0.37 0.48  6.39*** 
Radio set 0.71 0.45 0.52 0.50  3.33*** 
Farm size  1.15 1.22 1.14 1.28  0.04 
Access to credit 0.50 0.50 0.37 0.48  2.21** 
Distance to market 5.72 3.19 6.74 4.25  2.11** 
Bicycle  0.74 0.44 0.68 0.46  0.95 
Market perception  0.48 0.50 0.28 0.45  3.61*** 
Road status 0.85 0.35 0.70 0.45  2.83*** 
Sagnarigu 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34  -0.54 
Tolon 0.25 0.44 0.21 0.40   0.93 
Kumbungu  0.42 0.49 0.18 0.39   4.81*** 
Savelugu Nanton 0.10 0.30 0.22 0.41 -2.64*** 
Tamale 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.42 -2.84*** 
Farm net revenue  751.55 1,068.78 384.67 447.77  4.98*** 
Average price per kg 1.30 0.43 1.16 0.20  4.54*** 
Gross farm revenue 1109.39 1357.68 722.45 579.14  4.10*** 
Sample size 89 358  
Note: **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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be interpreted as impacts because other cofounding factors are not accounted for in the means. 
In this study, we analyze the drivers of farmers’ group membership and collective marketing 
decisions, as well as the impacts of these decisions on farm performance measured by farm net 
revenues, while controlling for other cofounding factors. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Cumulative distribution of farm net revenues by collective marketing. Note: the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic of 0.262 indicates that the two distributions are statistically 
different (p = 0.000) 
 
3.6 Empirical results and discussion  
3.6.1 Group membership and collective marketing decisions  
Table 3.4 shows the estimation results for the bivariate probit model on group membership and 
collective marketing participation decisions. Here, the main aim is to examine whether or not 
group membership and collective marketing decisions are jointly made. As reported in table 
3.4, the correlation coefficient 𝜌 is found to be positive and significant, implying that group 
membership and collective marketing participation decisions are not independent. This implies 
that employing a univariate probit regression would generate biased and inconsistent estimates. 
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Murphy’s (2007) score test for the goodness of fit of the bivariate probit model indicates that 
the model is fit for the present analysis (see table 3.4). Before we begin discussion of the drivers 
of group membership and collective marketing decisions, it is significant to point out that some 
smallholder farmers in northern Ghana join farmer groups with the motive of accessing credit 
to undertake and/or expand their farming operations. Moreover, farmers who accessed enough 
credit for the growing season are also motivated to market and sell collectively with the notion 
of generating satisfactory farm revenues for the credit repayment. This makes access to credit 
potentially endogenous in both specifications, which when unaccounted for, could result in 
biased coefficient estimate. We address this potential endogeneity by employing the control 
function approach (Wooldridge, 2015). In doing so, we estimate a probit model in the first stage 
with access to credit as dependent variable, and including distance to credit institution as an 
instrument, which characteristically influences access to credit (see table 3.A1 in appendix) and 
not group membership or collective marketing. The observed access to credit variable and the 
predicted residuals are incorporated into the bivariate probit model in the second stage. The t-
statistic of credit residual coefficient indicates that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
access to credit is exogenous (see tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). 
 Next, we discuss the marginal effects of the exogenous variables on the probability of 
collective marketing participation, conditional on group membership. Table 3.4 reveals that, 
given group membership, farmers who have access to credit and are not liquidity-constrained 
have about 4.7% higher probability of participating in collective marketing. Participation in 
collective marketing has a higher likelihood of ensuring guaranteed markets for smallholder 
farmers, especially in situations where farmer groups have purchase agreements with buyers. 
Guaranteed markets could possibly encourage timely credit repayment. Transaction costs 
measures were found to also play significant roles in collective marketing participation,  
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Table 3.4: Maximum likelihood estimates of bivariate probit model for group membership and 
collective marketing  
Variable  Membership Collective marketing Marginal effects (in %) 
Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err. 
Constant -3.301*** 0.567 -1.886*** 0.591   
Age  0.022*** 0.008 -0.002 0.008  0.000 0.001 
Education  0.028 0.020 -0.025 0.021 -0.001 0.002 
Gender   0.087 0.290  0.243 0.309  0.033 0.019 
Mobile phone  0.643*** 0.158  0.920*** 0.171  0.145*** 0.023 
Radio set  0.244 0.164  0.430** 0.172  0.064*** 0.023 
Farm size (log)  0.045 0.136 -0.195 0.147 -0.020 0.019 
Access to credit  0.761*** 0.153  0.040 0.156  0.047** 0.021 
Distance to market 
(log) 
 0.423** 0.164 -0.146 0.165  0.021 0.022 
Bicycle  -0.456** 0.193 -0.034 0.192 -0.029 0.029 
Road status  0.467** 0.195  0.656*** 0.219  0.104*** 0.029 
Market perception  0.499*** 0.167  0.273 * 0.164  0.060*** 0.022 
Tolon  0.219 0.267  0.628** 0.305  0.086** 0.040 
Sagnarigu  1.799*** 0.390  0.365 0.341  0.143*** 0.046 
Kumbungu  -0.273 0.222  0.880*** 0.253  0.089*** 0.032 
Savelugu Nanton -0.359 0.265 -0.003 0.309 -0.020 0.040 
Residual (Credit)  0.672 1.243 -2.080 1.300 -0.210 0.174 
𝜌  0.182* 0.103     
Log-likelihood -374.19, 𝑝 = 0.000     
Wald chi-sq(𝑑𝑓 =32)                    193.23     
Wald test of 𝜌 = 0 (𝑑𝑓 = 1)  3.027, 𝑝 = 0.081    
Murphy’s score test: chi-sq (9) = 8.99,  𝑝(𝑋2) =    0.437   
Sample size 447      
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
conditional on group membership. In particular, the use of mobile phone is associated with 
about 14.5% higher likelihood of collective marketing participation. Mobile phones promote 
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effective communication among group members (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). Apart from its role 
in searching for potential buyers, updated market information related to paddy prices is 
transmitted via mobile phones, and also used to facilitate interactions and negotiations with 
buyers over terms of sale. Again, group members who own mobile phones are easily notified 
via phone communication to mobilize paddy rice at community collection centers for pick up 
by buyers. This finding shows that the use of mobile phones undoubtedly reduces fixed 
transaction costs incurred by smallholder farmers, and possibly by buyers. Similarly, given 
group membership, farmers who own radio sets are 6.4% more likely to participate in collective 
marketing. Using radio sets could facilitate receipt of market information on prices of inputs 
and output. In the Northern regional capital, Tamale, the state-owned radio station (Radio 
Savanna) periodically broadcasts in local languages, regional and district market information 
on input prices at the beginning of growing season, and output prices at harvest, which thus 
serve as guide for famers to negotiate for better paddy prices with buyers during collective 
marketing.  
Distance to markets, ownership of bicycle, and road status, which are considered measures of 
proportional transaction costs, also tend to influence collective marketing participation 
decisions. Specifically, an additional percentage increase in distance to market results in 2.1% 
more likelihood of collective marketing participation. This suggests that farmers who live 
further away from the market are more likely to participate in collective marketing. Also, as 
expected, farmers who own bicycles have 2.9% lower probabilities of participating in collective 
marketing. This is plausible, because farmers who own bicycles can easily transport their paddy 
to market centers, where they are likely to receive higher prices. Availability of adequate road 
infrastructure is also curial in rural input and output markets. It is hypothesized that good quality 
roads facilitates transport of produce from communities to market centers, as well as movement 
of produce buyers from district and regional capitals into rice growing communities at harvest 
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period. We find that farmers who reside and farm around communities with motorable roads 
have 10.4% higher probability of participating in collective marketing. Communities with 
motorable roads are accessible to paddy aggregators and produce buying companies who 
normally travel from the regional capitals of northern and southern Ghana to the rice growing 
communities during harvest for paddy mobilization. It argued that communities with non-
motorable roads discourage produce buyers from traveling to these areas to purchase produce, 
because they are likely to incur higher proportional transaction costs. Finally, we find that 
location fixed effects also play important role in farmer collective marketing participation 
decisions. In particular, relative to Tamale metropolis (reference district), living and farming 
around Tolon, Sagnarigu and Kumbungu districts, increases farmers’ probabilities of 
participating in collective marketing by 8.6%, 14.3% and 8.9%, respectively.     
3.6.2 ESR estimation results: Group membership decisions and farm net revenues 
Table 3.5 presents the empirical results for the ESR model related to the determinants of group 
membership decisions and their impacts on farm net revenues. As stated previously, the full 
information maximum likelihood method is used to simultaneously estimate the group 
membership (selection) and farm net revenue (outcome) equations, while controlling for 
farmers’ observed and unobserved attributes. We identified the ESR model by including in the 
selection equation a variable representing farmers’ perceptions on rice market demand as an 
instrument, which strongly influences a farmer’s decision to join a farmer group, but not directly 
on farm net revenue. The instrumental variable test confirms the validity of the instrument (see 
table 3.A2 in appendix). As shown in table 3.5, the results reveal negative correlation 
coefficients (𝜌) between group membership equation (1) and the farm net revenue equations 
(13a and 13b), but only significantly different from zero for the correlation between group 
membership (1) and farm net revenue (13a). This finding indicates that selection bias caused 
by observed and unobserved attributes occurred in farmers’ decisions to join farmer groups. It 
also implies that farmers who decide to be group members earn significantly higher farm net 
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revenues than those farmers who would have been randomly assigned to group membership. 
This justifies the appropriateness of using the ESR approach in the estimations. The negative 𝜌 
in both the member and non-member specifications implies positive selection bias, which 
suggests that farmers with above-average farm net revenues have higher probabilities of joining 
farmer groups. The parameter estimates for the factors influencing farmers’ decisions to join 
farmer groups are presented in the second column of table 3.5. Age is found to exhibit a positive 
and significant effect on group membership choice, implying that older farmers have a higher 
likelihood of being members of farmer groups, a finding that is consistent with the results from 
the study by Mojo et al. (2017). Consistent with the findings by Fischer and Qaim (2012), 
ownership of mobile phone appears to be an essential determinant of group membership 
decisions. This is revealed by the positive and significant coefficient of mobile phone ownership 
on group membership choice, suggesting that farmers who own mobile phones are more likely 
to join farmer groups. This is plausible, because an efficient communication amongst group 
members facilitates effective joint execution of group activities, such as collective marketing, 
bulk input purchase and price negotiations. Access to credit, which is an indicator of liquidity 
constraint, also exhibits positive and significant effect on group membership, indicating that 
farmers who are not liquidity-constrained are more likely to belong to farmer groups. Distance 
to market exerts positive significant effect on group membership, suggesting that an additional 
percentage increase in distance to markets increases the probability of group membership by 
0.50%. As argued earlier, farther distance to markets increases proportional transaction costs, 
which in turn influence farmers’ decisions to join farmer groups and possibly participate in 
collective marketing. Further, farmer group membership is positively and significantly 
influenced by radio set ownership and road status, implying that farmers who own radio sets 
and those living in communities with motorable roads are more likely to join farmer groups. 
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Table 3.5:  Full information maximum likelihood estimates of endogenous switching 
regression model for group membership and impact on farm net revenue 
Variable Selection  Members  Non-members   
 Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err 
Constant  -3.634*** 0.594  7.447*** 0.970 4.511*** 0.492 
Age  0.027*** 0.008 -0.021 ** 0.008 -0.001 0.007 
Education  0.021 0.021 -0.016 0.023 -0.000 0.018 
Gender   0.118 0.314  0.231 0.318  0.591 ** 0.260 
Mobile phone  0.756*** 0.167 -0.003 0.211 -0.047 0.171 
Radio set  0.342** 0.172  0.138 0.196 -0.109 0.145 
Farm size (log)  0.012 0.142  0.461*** 0.157  0.502*** 0.102 
Access to credit  0.744*** 0.167  0.823*** 0.241  0.292 * 0.171 
Dist. to 
market(log) 
 0.509*** 0.168 -0.542*** 0.201 -0.205 0.128 
Bicycle  -0.421** 0.204 -0.000 0.215  0.418 ** 0.181 
Road status  0.628*** 0.206 -0.470 * 0.267 -0.105 0.156 
Tolon  0.330 0.280 -0.134 0.324  0.539 ** 0.225 
Sagnarigu  1.981*** 0.420 -0.486 0.381  0.001 0.699 
Kumbungu  -0.315 0.229  0.900*** 0.303  0.920*** 0.203 
Savelugu 
Nanton 
-0.525* 0.282  0.567 0.409  0.703*** 0.202 
Market 
perception 
 0.575*** 0.169     
Residual 
(Credit) 
-0.245  1.285     
ln𝜎1  0.185 (0.087)**  
𝜌𝜇1  -0.697 (0.342)**  
ln𝜎2    0.381 (0.052) 
𝜌𝜇2   -0.283 (0.249) 
Log likelihood:                          -794.95 
LR test of indep. eqns.: 𝜒2(1):   40.91***  
Observations                               447                                   188                                     259  
Note: The dependent variable is the log of farm net revenue; *, **, *** represent significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Next, we discuss the factors influencing farm net revenues, conditional on group membership 
decisions. Age exerts a negative impact on farm net revenues of both members and non-
members, but significantly different from zero for group members. This suggests that relatively 
younger farmers earn higher farm net revenues from rice production and marketing. Non-
member male farmers obtain significantly higher farm net revenues than their male counterparts 
who are group members. The plausible explanation for this finding is that non-members of 
farmer groups may not have sales commitments to buyers during harvest period, which is 
characterized by relatively lower paddy prices especially in the study area. This category of 
farmers, especially those without immediate cash needs, have the opportunity to store their 
paddy rice for sale at later period, when prices increase.  
Farm size exhibits positive and significant impact on farm net revenue for both group members 
and non-members. In particular, an additional percentage increase in farm size results in 0.46% 
and 0.50% increase in farm net revenues for members and non-members, respectively, thus 
demonstrating scale effects in rice production and marketing. Access to credit positively 
impacts on farm net revenues received by both group members and non-members, suggesting 
that farmers who are liquidity-constrained tend to earn significantly lower farm net revenues 
from rice production and marketing. Distance to market and road status, which are proxies for 
proportional transaction costs, also play significant role in farm net revenue generation. In 
particular, an additional percentage increase in distance to market reduces net revenue by 0.54% 
and 0.20% for members and non-members, respectively. This finding shows the significance 
of transaction costs in improving farm net revenues, since rice farmers located far away tend to 
pay higher costs for the transport of their paddy to the markets.  
3.6.3 ESR estimation results: Collective marketing decisions and farm net revenues  
The estimation results for the ESR model related to the factors influencing collective marketing 
participation and their related impacts on farm net revenues are reported in table 3.6. Like the 
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group membership model, we identified the collective marketing model, using a variable that 
represents farmers’ perceptions on rice market demand as an instrument, which significantly 
influences farmers’ decisions to participate in collective marketing, but not directly on farm net 
revenues. The instrumental variable test results, reported in table 3.A2 in the appendix, confirm 
that the instrument is valid. In table 3.6, the results show that the estimated correlation 
coefficient (𝜌) between collective marketing equation and the farm net revenue function is 
negative, but statistically significant for the collective marketing participation specification. 
The negative 𝜌 in both specifications indicates positive selection bias, suggesting that rice 
farmers with above-average farm net revenues have higher probability of participating in 
collective marketing. The significance of the correlation coefficient for the collective marketing 
participation specification indicates that self-selection, caused by observed and unobserved 
attributes, occurred in farmers’ decisions to participate in collective marketing. It also implies 
that significantly higher net revenues accrue to farmers who decide to participate in collective 
marketing relative to those farmers who would have been randomly assigned to collective 
marketing participation status.  
Column 2 of table 3.6 reports the parameter estimates for the factors influencing farmers’ 
collective marketing participation decisions. As shown in table 3.6, farmers who own mobile 
phones and radio sets are more likely to participate in collective marketing. Moreover, road 
status, an indication of road infrastructure, has a positive and significant impact on collective 
marketing participation, suggesting that farmers who live and farm around communities with 
motorable roads are more likely to participate in collective marketing. Communities with 
motorable roads are easily accessible to paddy buyers, especially private produce buying 
companies who normally travel to these areas during harvest period to mobilize paddy. 
With regards to the factors influencing smallholder rice farmers’ net revenues, conditional on 
collective marketing participation, farm size exerts positive and statistically significant impact  
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Table 3.6:  Full information maximum likelihood estimates of endogenous switching 
regression model for collective marketing and impact on farm net revenue 
Variable Selection   Participants   Non-participants 
 Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err 
Constant  -1.867*** 0.601  7.732*** 1.446  4.951*** 0.409 
Age -0.010 0.007 -0.003 0.012 -0.007 0.005 
Education -0.002 0.026  0.014 0.034 -0.011 0.016 
Gender   0.134 0.358  0.085 0.563  0.503 ** 0.221 
Mobile phone  0.582 ** 0.252  0.158 0.422 -0.127 0.147 
Radio set  0.292 * 0.171 -0.556 * 0.322  0.052 0.130 
Farm size (log) -0.086 0.151  0.712*** 0.223  0.469*** 0.096 
Access to credit  0.085 0.163  0.465 * 0.272  0.806*** 0.129 
Dist. to 
market(log) 
-0.167 0.160 -0503 0.310 -0.185 * 0.110 
Bicycle  -0.126 0.196  0.138 0.344  0.143 0.150 
Road status  0.492 ** 0.250 -0.140 0.397 -0.143 0.144 
Tolon  0.141 0.318  0.177 0.554  0.334 * 0.197 
Sagnarigu -0.072 0.323 1.051 * 0.601 -0.006 0.226 
Kumbungu   0.704 ** 0.304  0.627 0.527  0.774*** 0.212 
Savelugu 
Nanton 
 0.149 0.299  0.480 0.589  0.665*** 0.188 
Market 
perception 
 0.479 ** 0.192     
Residual 
(Credit) 
 0.904 1.235     
ln𝜎1  0.365 (0.171)**  
𝜌𝜇1  -1.251 (0.425)***  
ln𝜎2    0.073 (0.040)* 
𝜌𝜇2   -0.158 (0.254) 
Log likelihood:                          -790.10 
LR test of indep. eqns.: 𝜒2(1):   16.32***  
Observations                               447                                   89                                     358  
Note: The dependent variable is the log of farm net revenue; *, **, *** represent significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
91 
 
on net revenues for both collective marketing participants and non-participants. Specifically, 
participants and non-participants respectively experience 0.71% and 0.46% significant gains in 
farm net revenues for any additional percentage increase in farm size. Access to credit is also 
found to be an important contributor to farmers’ net revenue generation. We find that collective 
marketing participating and non-participating farmers who are not liquidity constrained 
received higher farm net revenues from rice production and marketing. As argued earlier, 
relatively higher farm net revenues could ensure timely and reliable credit repayment. The 
coefficient of distance to markets, which is considered to influence proportional transaction 
costs, is found to be negative, but significantly different from zero for non-participant 
specification. This suggests that conditional on collective marketing participation, farmers who 
failed to participate in collective marketing, but marketed and sold their paddy individually, 
experienced about 0.18% significant reduction in farm net revenues for any additional 
percentage increase in distance to market centers. Interestingly, location fixed effects also play 
significant role in rice farmers’ net revenues, given collective marketing participation. In 
particular, relative to Tamale metropolitan area (reference district), participants who live and 
farm around Sagnarigu district receive higher farm net revenues than non-participants. 
However, non-participants who live and farm around Tolon, Kumbungu and Savelugu Nanton 
districts earn significantly farm higher net revenues than participants. This is because collective 
marketing and sales of paddy is usually carried out farm gates mostly during harvest period, 
which is characterized by relatively lower prices. However, non-participants around these areas, 
especially those without immediate cash needs could store their paddy to be sold at later dates 
(eg. lean season), when paddy prices appreciate. Again, this category of farmers may live in 
communities closer to the district capitals, which are characterized with good quality roads and 
can easily transport their paddy to the district and regional markets where there are likely to 
receive higher prices, hence higher farm net revenues.            
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3.6.4 Average treatment effects of group membership and collective marketing decisions 
3.6.4.1 Group membership decisions 
The results of the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) of group membership on farm 
net revenues are presented in table 3.7. The ATT shows the impact of farmer group membership 
on farm net revenues. The ATT results reveal about 81.21% farm net revenue gain by farmers, 
conditional on group membership relative to non-members. To gain further insights into the 
impact of group membership on farm net revenues received by farmers, we disaggregated farm 
net revenues based on whether group members participated in collective marketing or marketed  
Table 3.7: Impact of farmer group membership on farm net revenue 
Group membership 
Variable Members Nonmembers ATT t-value 
 Mean outcome (farm net revenue)   
 329.84 (23.41) 182.01 (9.11) 147.82 8.671*** 
Farm net revenue stratification by collective marketing 
Collective marketing  387.81 (47.57) 216.03 (20.57) 171.78 5.061*** 
Individual marketing  307.68 (26.64) 169.01 (9.66) 138.67 7.041*** 
Farm net revenue stratification by farm size 
Near landless (≤ 0.5ha) 149.82 (18.43) 83.80 (6.87) 66.02 4.576*** 
Small (0.6 – 1.5ha)  295.60 (21.70) 171.08 (9.05) 124.52 7.750*** 
Medium and 
large(>1.5ha) 
644.49 (79.62) 329.99 (22.70) 314.50 4.794*** 
Note: ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, The dependent variable is the log of 
farm net revenue. Computation of ATT is based on the antilog of the predictions, *** means 
significant at 1% levels. 
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and sold their paddy individually. Table 3.7 reveals that group members experienced 79.52% 
farm net revenues gain from collective marketing relative to non-members, while group 
members who marketed and sold  their paddy individually, gained 82.04% farm net revenues 
than non-members. This finding reinforces the significance of group membership on 
smallholder farm performance and shows that group members regardless of the mode of 
marketing significantly benefit from improved farm performance. Further, we examine ATT of 
group membership on farm net revenues base on farm size in order to examine the differential 
impacts on farm net revenues. Interestingly, farm net revenues significantly increase by about 
78.78%, 72.78% and 95.30% for nearly landless, small, and medium and large farm sizes, 
respectively, conditional on group membership. This indicates that group membership tends to 
increase the farm net revenues of all farm size categories, although the magnitude of the 
increase is highest with medium and large scale farmers. This finding is in line with the notion 
of scale economies, where the average fixed costs of group members decline with larger farm 
sizes, resulting in higher farm net revenues. The ATT results generally suggests that 
smallholder rice farmers with group membership benefit from improved farm performance than 
if they produce and market their paddy individually. 
3.6.4.2 Collective marketing participation decisions  
Table 3.8 reports the results of the average treatment effects of collective marketing 
participation on farm net revenues. The results show that collective marketing participation has 
a positive and statistically significant impact on smallholder farm net revenues. Specifically, 
rice farmers who participated in collective marketing experienced 62.22% significant gain in 
net revenues relative to non-participants. Also, we disaggregated farm net revenues based on 
farm size in order to gain indepth understanding and to examine the differential impact of 
collective marketing. As shown in table 3.8, we find that nearly landless, small, and medium 
and large farm size category of farmers earned 63.75%, 48.22% and 87.39% farm net revenues, 
respectively, conditional on collective marketing participation. This shows that farmers with 
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larger farm sizes tend to benefit more from collective marketing as compared to farmers with 
smaller farm sizes. Like the impact of group membership, collective marketing also tends to 
improve on smallholder farm performance.  
Table 3.8: Impact of collective marketing on farm net revenue 
Variable Participants Non-participants ATT t-value 
 Mean outcome (farm net revenue)   
 435.55 (37.71) 268.49 (18.92) 167.06 5.871*** 
Farm net revenue stratification by farm size 
Near landless (≤ 0.5ha) 189.96 (29.69) 116.00 (13.14) 73.96 2.636** 
Small (0.6 – 1.5ha)  409.60 (32.59) 276.33 (21.21) 133.27 4.977*** 
Medium and large(>1.5ha) 829.71 (123.16) 442.77 (46.61) 386.94 3.594*** 
Note: ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, The dependent variable is the log of 
farm net revenue. Computation of ATT is based on the antilog of the predictions. **, *** 
means significant at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
        
3.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has investigated the factors that influence farmers’ decisions to join farmer groups 
and to participate in collective marketing, as well as the impact of group membership and 
collective marketing on farm net revenues. We used recent survey data of 447 smallholder rice 
farmers from five selected districts of northern Ghana in the empirical analysis. The data reveal 
that farmers that were members of farmer groups and participated in collective marketing 
obtained higher prices for their output, and also incurred lower input costs. Farmers’ decisions 
on group membership and participation in collective marketing are shown to be jointly made, 
indicating that most farmers with group membership also participate in collective marketing. 
The empirical results support the notion that farmer group membership and collective market 
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participation decisions in smallholder agriculture essentially enhance farm performance 
through improvement in farm net revenues. Specifically, both group membership and 
participation in collective marketing exerted positive and statistically significant impacts on 
farm net revenues. Farmers who belong to farmer groups regardless of the mode of marketing 
significantly benefit from improved farm performance. Transaction costs remain critical in 
group membership and collective market participation decisions. In particular, the findings 
revealed that group membership and collective marketing decisions are positively and 
significantly influenced by mobile phone ownership and road status. That is, farmers who own 
mobile phones are more likely to join farmer groups and participate in collective marketing. 
However, farmers who faced financial constraints were found to be less likely to have group 
membership and to participate in collective marketing.  
The findings from this study show that government and donor support for the formation of 
farmer groups during implementation of agriculture and value chain interventions should as 
well incorporate strategies to facilitate smallholder collective marketing in the interventions. 
Both new and existing farmer groups could be trained on demand-driven capacity building 
modules such as group dynamics, business development as well as technical capacity 
development. Capacity building on group dynamics would enable farmer groups become more 
cohesive, and thus encourage active member participation in group activities including 
collective marketing. The important role of access to credit revealed by the study advocates for 
the need to incorporate credit schemes into agriculture and value chain development programs, 
as well as facilitate effective linkages between smallholder farmers and readily available 
financial institutions. Moreover, government investment in road infrastructure could facilitate 
easy access to rice growing communities by buyers and also ease produce movement to market 
centers.  
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Appendix 
Table 3.A1: First stage probit model estimates used for addressing credit 
endogeneity. 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Constant -1.513 0.453 
Age  0.005 0.005 
Education -0.036 ** 0.016 
Gender   0.344 0.239 
Mobile phone  0.421*** 0.131 
Radio set -0.038 0.136 
Farm size (log)  0.170 * 0.102 
Distance to market(log)  0.237 * 0.135 
Road status  0.282 * 0.156 
Bicycle   0.005 0.156 
Tolon  0.316 0.216 
Sagnarigu  0.011 0.253 
Kumbungu   0.437 ** 0.204 
Savelugu Nanton -0.013 0.219 
Distance (km) to credit institution -0.034 ** 0.013 
LR 𝑥2(15) 61.30  
P-value 0.000  
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.101  
Log likelihoods -270.66  
Number of observations 447  
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  
100 
 
Table 3.A2: Instrumental variable test for the ESR model (market perception) 
Variable  Chi-square 
(𝑋2) 
𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
Group membership model 
Group membership 9.78 0.001 
Farm net revenue (member specification) 1.76 0.184 
Farm net revenue (nonmember specification) 0.05 0.903 
Collective marketing model 
Collective marketing 7.59 0.005 
Farm net revenue (participant specification) 0.72 0.394 
Farm net revenue (non-participant specification) 0.20 0.6544 
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Abstract 
Multiple production and marketing challenges facing smallholder farmers in developing 
countries have resulted in renewed interests of governments, donor agencies and private 
agribusiness companies in forming farmer groups to help address these challenges. Using recent 
survey data of 412 smallholder rice farmers from northern Ghana, we examine the role of farmer 
groups in improving yield and technical efficiency. Due to self-selection into farmer groups, 
we use a sample selection stochastic production frontier model to account for potential selection 
bias arising from observed and unobserved attributes. The empirical results reveal that 
participation in farmer groups is associated with increased yield and technical efficiency, 
relative to farmers who produce and market rice individually. Moreover, the yield and 
efficiency gaps between group members and nonmembers increase significantly when selection 
bias is taken into account in the analysis. 
Keywords: Farmer groups, Yield, Technical efficiency, Selection bias, Northern Ghana. 
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4.1 Introduction  
Despite increased research and development efforts, addressing multiple productivity and 
market failures, smallholder farmers in developing countries are still besieged with myriad 
constraints such as low crop yields, limited access to credit and extension services, and 
information asymmetries leading to high transaction costs associated with input and output 
market participation (Markelova et al., 2009; Bernard et al., 2010; Mojo et al., 2017). These 
constraints stimulate growing interests of governments, development agencies, and 
agribusiness companies in forming farmer groups as one of the essential steps in the 
implementation of agriculture and value chain development initiatives in developing countries. 
Farmer groups can enhance rural development, poverty reduction, productivity gains and food 
security through their role in facilitating effective and efficient smallholder participation in 
agrifood value chains (Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; Ainembabazi et al., 2017).  
With the recent rapid transformation of agrifood value chains, coupled with strict food quality 
standards and new procurement systems of large agribusiness companies in developing 
countries, farmer groups’ participation in these formalized chains can reduce transaction costs 
associated with acquiring production inputs, adoption of productivity-enhancing innovations 
through increased access to private and public extension services, as well as easy access to 
credit (Bellemare, 2012; Reardon et al., 2009). Large agribusiness companies continue to 
complement the efforts of government and NGOs by establishing effective vertical coordination 
mechanisms (e.g., contracting) with smallholder farmer groups in the form of outgrower 
schemes and other supplier-buyer relationships (Barrett et al., 2017; Barrett et al., 2012). Under 
these business relationships, smallholder farmer groups are often provided with inputs and 
technical backstopping services during the cropping season, and costs associated with these 
services are charged against the final produce (Bellemare and Novak, 2016; Wang et al, 2014; 
Henderson and Isaac, 2017). Undoubtedly, these inputs and technical services have direct links 
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with yield and technical efficiency gains, which jointly indicate significant potential for 
improved smallholder livelihoods.   
While the available literature establishes the role of farmer groups in the adoption of 
productivity-enhancing innovations (e.g., Spielman et al., 2011; Abebaw and Haile, 2013; 
Ainembabazi et al., 2017), only few studies document the role of farmer groups in improving 
yield and technical efficiency (e.g., Abate et al., 2014; Ainembabazi et al., 2017). Meanwhile, 
empirical insight on this role has policy implications, especially for governments, donor 
agencies, and large agribusiness companies seeking to promote smallholder productivity 
through farmer groups. The few studies that have investigated farmer group membership effects 
on yield and technical efficiency have produced mixed findings. For example, the study by 
Abate et al. (2014) found significant positive impact of group membership on technical 
efficiency of Ethiopian farmers. Ainembabazi et al. (2017) also reported positive and significant 
effects of farmer groups on the adoption of productivity-enhancing innovations and technical 
efficiency of farmers in the Great Lakes region of Africa. However, other studies found 
statistically insignificant impact of group membership on technical efficiency (Wollni and 
Brümmer, 2012; Gedara et al., 2012). These mixed findings can be attributed to the varying 
nature of farmer groups, as well as the analytical methods used, thus providing a reasonably 
firm basis for further assessment.  
In the present study, the decision to participate in a farmer group is nonrandom and therefore 
likely to be influenced by unobserved attributes, such as farmers’ risk attitude, motivation and 
innate skills, resulting in potential selection bias. Accounting for this bias is important in 
ensuring unbiased and consistent estimates. Some studies used group membership as a 
determinant of technical efficiency and the effect directly determined through its marginal 
effect (e.g., Wollni and Brümmer, 2012; Gedara et al., 2012). Such estimation procedure fails 
to account for selection bias associated with unobserved attributes. However, Abate et al. (2014) 
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and Ainembabazi et al. (2017) employed propensity score matching (PSM) method to address 
selection bias. Meanwhile, the limitation of the PSM method such as its failure to control for 
farmers’ unobserved attributes is now widely known in the empirical literature.  
The present study seeks to contribute to the literature by examining the role of farmer groups 
in sustained efforts to improve yield and technical efficiency of smallholders in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Specifically, we examine the factors that influence smallholder participation in farmer 
groups, using data from a recent survey in five selected districts of northern Ghana. The findings 
from such a study can enhance stakeholder understanding of these factors for better policy-
targeting efforts geared towards addressing the multiple productivity and marketing challenges 
confronting smallholder farmers. For example, the Ghana government, donor agencies and 
large agribusiness companies have collaboratively intensified efforts in revamping the rice 
value chain through initiating a number of agriculture and value chain development 
interventions6. These interventions generally aim at strengthening the position of smallholder 
rice farmer groups in the value chain, through easy access to inputs, technical services and 
output markets. We also examine the impact of farmer groups on the yield and technical 
efficiency of smallholder farmers. In doing so, we account for selection bias associated with 
observed and unobserved attributes, using PSM and Greene’s (2010) sample selection 
stochastic production frontier (SPF) approaches, respectively to obtain unbiased and consistent 
parameter estimates (Bravo-Ureta et al., 2012).  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an overview of rice production 
and farmer groups in Ghana. Section 3 describes the conceptual framework, as well as the 
empirical specification. The data and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis 
                                                          
6 Examples of the current rice sector interventions include Ghana Feed the Future (FtF) project, Ghana Commercial 
Agriculture Project (GCAP), Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (GASIP), Rice Sector Support 
Project (RSSP) etc. 
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are presented in section 4, followed by discussion of the empirical results in section 5. The final 
section presents the conclusions and policy implications from the study. 
4.2 Rice production and farmer groups in Ghana 
In Ghana, rice is the second most important cereal staple after maize, with a total cultivated 
area of about 233,000 hectares and average annual production of 641,000 metric tonnes (SRID-
MoFA, 2016). Northern, Volta and Upper east regions are the main rice producing areas, with 
a total average production of about 467, 000 metric tonnes, constituting about 72% of the 
national annual average (SRID-MoFA, 2016).  Rice production is done under three ecosystems 
namely rainfed upland, rainfed lowland and irrigated systems. The dominant ecosystem is the 
rainfed lowland, which covers about 78% of the arable area followed by the irrigation system 
(16%), and rainfed upland system covering about 6% of the arable area (MoFA, 2009). The rice 
sector is mostly dominated by smallholder farmers who cultivate an average of less than two 
hectares of rice.  
Rice does not only form an integral part of Ghanaian diet, but also contributes to ensuring food 
security among rural and urban households. Recent increases in rice consumption, due to 
population growth, urbanization, and changing dietary habits of consumers, have created a wide 
gap between local supply and demand (MoFA, 2009). Available statistics indicate that domestic 
rice production covers about 30-40% of domestic demand, with the shortfall provided by large 
quantities of imports (Angelucci et al., 2013). To increase rice production and local supply, the 
government of Ghana, development agencies, and the private sector collaboratively implement 
agricultural value chain interventions to ensure a paradigm shift from the traditional subsistence 
rice production to market-oriented production. They facilitate the formation of farmer groups, 
an important step towards implementing these interventions to promote collective action and 
improve farmer welfare.  
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In Ghana, the interests in aggregating smallholder farmers into groups for agricultural 
production and marketing resumed strongly at the beginning of the 20th century, and by 2010, 
about 10,000 farmer groups existed (Salifu et al., 2012; Francesconi and Wouterse, 2015). 
Ongoing development interventions in northern Ghana are the USAID funded Ghana Feed the 
Future (FtF) programs such as the Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement II 
(ADVANCE II), Agricultural Technology Transfer (ATT), and Resiliency in Northern Ghana 
(RING) projects among others. The ADVANCE II is a four-year (2014 - 2018) project 
implemented by ACDI/VOCA in partnership with Technoserve Ghana, Association of Church 
Development Projects (ACDEP) and PAB Consult Ltd. The goal of ADVANCE II is to scale 
up private sector investments in agriculture to achieve food security among poor rural 
households, as well as improve competitiveness in the rice, maize, and soybean value chains. It 
focuses on three key activity components: enhancing smallholder productivity, improving 
market access and trade for smallholder farmers, and strengthening and building local capacity.  
The project adopts a facilitative value chain approach by linking smallholder farmer groups to 
inputs, finance, equipment, information, and output markets through relatively larger nucleus 
(commercial) farmers and traders (aggregators). ADVANCE II project has been working with 
existing farmer groups that were formed under past interventions (eg. Millennium Development 
Authority (MiDA) Agriculture program), and are still in active farming business with promising 
growth potentials. Moreover, smallholder farmers were set up into groups and registered to 
participate in the project in target areas without existing farmer groups. Both existing and new 
farmer groups were assigned to produce and market the targeted value chain crops under larger 
nucleus farmers or Outgrower Businesses (OBs)7 with demonstrable investment capacities.  
                                                          
7 Nucleus farmers/OBs under the ADVANCE II project in northern Ghana include Premium Foods Ltd., Gundaa 
Produce company Ltd., Khama enterprise, Asawaba farms Ltd etc.  
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The farmer groups in our study were supported with capacity building on climate smart 
agricultural practices, provision of improved rice varieties, quality inputs, mechanization 
services (eg. tractor and threshing services), and market access. Evidence from the survey 
indicated that farmer groups accept membership based on the farmer’s moral track record in 
the community, his/her willingness to participate in group activities, commitment to rice 
production, meeting group’s obligations such as attending meetings, payment of membership 
fees and periodic contributions to run the group’s activities, as well as contribute to achieving 
group’s objectives. The farmer groups have at least four executive members: Chairperson, Vice 
Chairperson, Secretary and Organizer, mandated to manage the groups’ activities. The groups 
facilitate input and output market linkages, as well as extension services for their members. In 
particular, the groups’ executives negotiate on behalf of their members for lower input prices, 
higher paddy prices from the larger (commercial) nucleus farmers or buyers, as well as facilitate 
collective activities (e.g., meetings, bulk input purchase, collective sales, mutual labor support 
etc.), and group training and extension service delivery.  
Some of the farmer groups also collaborated with the ATT project, and received similar 
services. However, we did not find evidence of group members not supported by any of the 
above mentioned projects. The ATT is a five year (2013-2018) USAID funded project 
implemented by the International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) in northern Ghana. 
The project is also aimed at increasing competitiveness of the rice, maize and soybean value 
chains. It disseminates agricultural technologies through on-farm demonstrations for increased 
productivity, as well as promotes market access for smallholder farmers. However, evidence on 
whether the farmer groups in our sample collaborated with other projects such as the RING, 
SPRING and GCAP could not be revealed by the survey.  
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4.3 Conceptual framework 
In this section, we present a multi-step approach to examine the impact of farmer groups on 
yield and technical efficiency. We begin with a description of farmer’s decision to participate 
in a farmer group, followed by specification of the general stochastic production frontier model, 
and the procedure used in accounting for potential selection bias. 
4.3.1 Farmer group participation decision 
We assume that a farmer makes a binary decision on whether to participate in a farmer group 
or not. The probability of participating in a farmer group is therefore determined by a 
comparison of the expected benefits (𝐺𝑀
∗ ) from participation, and the expected benefits (𝐺𝑁
∗ ) 
from non-participation. Intuitively, a farmer will choose to participate in a farmer group if the 
benefits from participation is greater than the benefits from non-participation; i.e. 𝐺𝑖
∗ = 𝐺𝑀
∗ −
𝐺𝑁
∗ > 0. However, 𝐺𝑖
∗ is a latent variable that is unobservable. What is observed is the actual 
participation in a farmer group. We thus express 𝐺𝑖
∗ as a function of observable characteristics 
in a latent variable framework as: 
𝐺𝑖
∗ = 𝛾′𝑍𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖, 𝐺𝑖 = 1[𝐺𝑖
∗ > 0],                                                                                                  (1) 
where 𝐺𝑖 is the farmer group participation indicator, assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise, 
𝛾 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝜔 is the error term with zero mean and variance 𝜎2, 
and 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of observable farm and household characteristics believed to influence farmer 
group participation decision. The probability of participating in a farmer group is specified as: 
Pr(𝐺𝑖 = 1) = Pr(𝐺𝑖
∗ > 0) = Pr(𝜔𝑖 > −𝑍𝑖𝛾) = 1 − 𝐹(−𝑍𝑖𝛾),                                                     (2) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function for 𝜔𝑖. In general, because farmers are 
heterogeneous, not all of them will belong to farmer groups. However, farmer group 
participation is expected to be associated with higher yield and technical efficiency, relative to 
farmers who produce and market paddy on their own (Abate et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2018). 
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4.3.2 Stochastic production frontier (SPF) model 
We employ the stochastic production frontier model, with the assumption that the farmers in 
our context either produce paddy rice exclusively as group members or nonmembers. In 
general, the SPF model is specified as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑋, 𝐺𝑀) + 𝜀𝑖,       𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 − 𝑢𝑖𝑗,                                                                                                           (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is yield of the i
th farmer, 𝑋 denotes a vector of inputs and other explanatory variables, 
𝐺𝑀 is a dummy variable that captures the effect of farmer group participation, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 is the two-
sided error term, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 denotes the one sided error term capturing efficiency. The subscript 𝑗 
refers to 𝐺𝑀 for group membership and 𝐺𝑁 for nonmembership. Because farmers self-select 
into participating in farmer groups, selection bias may arise due to observed and unobserved 
attributes. This bias needs to be addressed when estimating the stochastic production frontier 
model (SPF) to obtain unbiased and consistent yield and technical efficiency estimates (Bravo-
Ureta et al., 2012). 
4.3.3 Addressing selection bias in stochastic production frontier (SPF) model 
Given that a farmer makes a binary decision to participate in a farmer group or not, some of the 
factors (observed and unobserved) influencing farmer group participation decision may also 
influence yield and technical efficiency. In other words, the error term in the selection equation 
is correlated with the conventional error term in the stochastic production frontier model, 
leading to potential selection bias, which needs to be addressed to obtain unbiased and 
consistent parameter estimates associated with participation.  
Some past studies have applied sample selection correction models with various assumptions 
to deal with selection bias stemming from unobserved attributes in SPF models (e.g., Lai et al., 
2009; Kumbhakar et al., 2009; Greene, 2010). In particular, Lai et al. (2009) and Kumbhakar 
et al. (2009) assume that the selection bias arises from the correlation between the error term in 
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the selection equation (𝜔𝑖) and the error terms in the conventional SPF model, 𝜀𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖, 
respectively. However, Greene (2010) argues that selection bias is due to correlation between 
𝜔𝑖 and the noise term (𝑣𝑖) in the conventional SPF model. Greene’s (2010) approach can be 
seen as an extension of the Heckman’s sample selection corrected linear model, as well as the 
nonlinear models by Terza (2009) to the stochastic production frontier model. Because the 
approaches by Lai et al. (2009) and Kumbhakar et al. (2009) require computationally 
demanding log likelihood functions (Greene, 2010), we employ the multi-step approach 
presented in Bravo-Ureta et al. (2012) in the present study to address selection bias stemming 
from both observed and unobserved attributes. 
In line with Bravo-Ureta et al. (2012), we use PSM method to account for selection bias arising 
from observed attributes, and Greene’s (2010) SPF sample selection model to correct for 
selection bias due to unobserved attributes. Using the PSM method, we construct a 
counterfactual group of farmers with similar time-invariant characteristics as those who 
participate in farmer groups. It is important to mention that in implementing PSM method, the 
variables included in the analysis should be fixed over time, especially in cases where baseline 
data are not available to select the appropriate variables (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The 
PSM method involves fitting a binary choice (in this case probit) model to generate propensity 
scores for group members and nonmembers. These propensity scores, which represent the 
probability of participating in a farmer group, are used to match group members with 
nonmembers, based on the observed time-invariant characteristics.  
As indicated previously, to control for selection bias from unobserved attributes, we use 
Greene’s (2010) sample selection SPF model, which along with the error structures, is specified 
as: 
Sample selection:     𝐺𝑖 = 1[𝛾
′𝑍𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖 > 0],   𝜔𝑖~𝑁[0, 1] 
SPF:                          𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,   𝜀𝑖~𝑁[0,   𝜎𝜀
2] 
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                                  (𝑦𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) is observed only when 𝐺𝑖 = 1                                                       (4) 
Error structure:          𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 
                                   𝑢𝑖 = |𝜎𝑢𝑈𝑖| = 𝜎𝑢|𝑈𝑖|,  where 𝑈𝑖~𝑁[0, 1] 
                                   𝑣𝑖 = 𝜎𝑣𝑉𝑖, where 𝑉𝑖~𝑁[0, 1]  
                                   𝜔𝑖, 𝑣𝑖~𝑁2[(0, 1), (1, 𝜌𝜎𝑣, 𝜎𝑣
2)]    
where 𝐺𝑖 is a binary variable that takes on a value of one for farmer group members, and zero 
for nonmembers, 𝑍 is a vector of explanatory variables included in the sample selection model, 
and 𝜔𝑖 is the unobservable error term,  𝑦 denotes yield, 𝑋 is a vector of inputs in the production 
frontier model, and 𝜀 denotes the composed error term. The coefficients 𝛾 and 𝛽 are the 
parameters to be estimated, while the elements in the error structure correspond to those 
normally included in the stochastic production frontier model. The parameter 𝜌 indicates the 
presence or absence of selection bias associated with unobserved attributes. In particular, a 
significant 𝜌 indicates the presence of selection bias on unobserved attributes (Greene, 2010). 
On the other hand, insignificant  𝜌 implies absence of selection bias, in which case the 
maximand reduces to that of the maximum simulated likelihood estimator of the basic frontier 
model. Note that the standard errors are adjusted using the approach by Murphy and Topel 
(2002). The model parameters are estimated using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno 
(BFGS) approach, and asymptotic standard errors are obtained by employing the Berndt-Hall-
Hall-Hausman (BHHH) algorithm estimator8. Some other recent studies have employed the 
sample selection SPF approach to examine impact of technology adoption (e.g., Abdulai and 
Abdulai, 2017; Villano et al., 2015), as well as evaluate project participation impact (e.g., De 
los Santos-Montero and Bravo-Ureta, 2017; Gonzalez-Flores et al. 2014). It is important to note 
that the Greene’s (2010) sample selection SPF model is first estimated for group members and 
                                                          
8 Readers interested in details of the full model and its estimation can refer to Greene (2010).  
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then repeated for nonmembers, in which case the dependent variable (𝐺𝑖) in the selection 
equation is reversed, i.e 𝐺𝑖 equals one for nonmembers, and zero for group members.    
4.3.4 Empirical model specification 
As stated previously, we employ the PSM method to estimate a probit model using observable 
farm and household characteristics to generate propensity scores, which are then used to match 
group members and nonmembers with similar observed time-invariant characteristics. Caliendo 
and Kopeinig (2008) and Khandker et al. (2010) discuss the various matching criteria used in 
implementing the PSM method. These include nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, 
kernel matching, mahalanobis matching, spline matching, as well as stratification and interval 
matching.  
In the present study, the nearest neighbor matching algorithm is used with a maximum of five 
matches per group member, and a caliper of 0.025. This matching criterion produced 407 
matched observations out of 412 observations, comprising 186 group members and 221 
nonmembers. We also used kernel (epanechnikov option) matching method with a bandwidth 
of 0.05. A balancing test was conducted after both matching procedures to ascertain which of 
them yielded better matched sample. Mean comparisons revealed that the nearest neighbor 
matching yielded better matched sample than the kernel matching. Moreover, the nearest 
neighbor matching method is the most commonly used one in the empirical literature (e.g., 
Bravo-Ureta et al., 2012; Gonzalez-Flores et al., 2014). Therefore, the sample generated by the 
nearest neighbor matching method is used in this study.  
After the matching procedure, we then estimate the SPF model with correction for selection 
bias. However, before doing so, we model farmer’s decision to participate in a farmer group, 
which is described by a criterion function, and expressed as a function of exogenous farm and 
household characteristics (𝑍) influencing farmer group participation as follows: 
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𝐺𝑖 = 𝛾0 +∑𝛾𝑗𝑍𝑖𝑗
14
𝑗=1
+ 𝜔𝑖                         (5) 
where 𝐺𝑖 is a binary variable assigned a value of one for a group member, and zero otherwise, 
𝛾 is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and 𝜔 is the error term distributed as 
𝑁(0, 𝜎2). The variables in 𝑍 include age, education, gender, mobile phone ownership, bicycle 
ownership, distance to market, total farm land, access to irrigation, access to credit, extension 
visits, and location variables.  
However, it is important to point out that access to credit is likely to be facilitated through 
farmer group participation, because some farmers in northern Ghana often join farmer groups 
with the motive of accessing credit to undertake and/or expand their farming operations. 
Similarly, one would expect that a farmer receives more extension visits due to membership in 
a farmer group. This makes access to credit and extension visits variables potentially 
endogenous in predicting farmer group participation. This endogeneity needs to be addressed 
to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates. In doing so, we employ a two-stage control function 
approach outlined in Wooldridge (2015). The first-stage involves estimating, separately, access 
to credit and extension visits on instruments and other variables included in the farmer group 
participation probit model (Ainembabazi et al., 2017). These instruments should significantly 
influence access to credit and extension visits but not directly affect farmer group participation. 
We used distance to credit institution and status of farm road as instruments for access to credit 
and extension visits, respectively (See table A2 in the appendix). One would expect that 
motorable farm roads could encourage farm visits by extension officers, while farmers who live 
farther away from credit institution could be less likely to access credit from this source. In the 
second-stage estimation, the observed access to credit and extension visits variables, as well as 
their respective residuals predicted from the first-stage are incorporated into the farmer group 
participation probit model.    
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We evaluate the two most common functional forms used in efficiency studies: Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) and Translog ((TL) models (Bravo-Ureta et al., 2007; Seymour, 2017). A maximum 
likelihood ratio test led to the rejection of the TL in favor of the CD functional form at 5% level 
of significance9. The Cobb-Douglas (CD) functional form can be specified as: 
ln (𝑌𝑖) = 𝛽0 +∑𝛽𝑗ln𝑋𝑗𝑖
5
𝑗=1
+∑𝛿𝑘𝐷𝑘𝑖
8
𝑘=1
+ 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖,       𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐺𝑖 = 1      (6) 
where 𝑌𝑖 denotes yield of farmer 𝑖; 𝑋𝑗𝑖 is quantity of the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ input; 𝐷 represents dummy 
variables; 𝛽 and 𝛿 are unknown parameters to be estimated; 𝑣 and 𝑢 are the elements of the 
composed error term, 𝜀. The dependent variable in the SPF model is the yield of paddy rice in 
kilograms. The explanatory variables are represented by a total of five inputs and seven 
dummies. The inputs are land planted with rice (in hectares), quantity of seed (in kilograms), 
quantity of fertilizer (in kilogram), quantity of active ingredients in chemicals (in kilograms), 
and labor employed in farm activities (in worker-days). The dummy variables include access to 
irrigation, soil quality, rice variety and location dummies. Following Battese’s (1997) approach, 
we account for zero values of fertilizer and chemicals by including dummies for these inputs in 
the SPF model, such that the logarithm of the inputs with zero values is taken only if it is 
positive, and zero otherwise (Villano et al., 2015). This is done to ensure unbiased and efficient 
parameter estimates of the SPF model.  
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
In the present study, we used recent farm household data collected from June to August, 2016 
in five districts of northern Ghana: Tolon, Kumbungu, Sagnarigu districts, Savelugu Nanton 
municipal and Tamale metropolis. The sample for the study was drawn using a multi-stage 
                                                          
9 Although the CD is restrictive and nested in the flexible TL model, it yields satisfactory parameter estimates than 
the TL model. Mayen et al. (2010) argue that estimation of the translog model is sometimes complicated with 
multicollinearity issues especially between inputs and the interaction terms. 
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sampling approach. First, in consultation with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) 
and some officials of ongoing donor funded projects (e.g., Ghana-USAID/FtF project), 
purposive sampling method was used in selecting the five study districts due to their geographic 
accessibility and the intensive rice production in these districts. Second, two to three 
communities were randomly sampled from each study district. Finally, employing proportional 
sampling technique, smallholder rice farmers were randomly sampled based on farmer 
population in each district. A total of 412 smallholder rice farmers, comprising of 186 group 
members and 226 nonmembers were sampled, and interviewed, using structured questionnaire. 
Data was gathered on several factors including farm and household characteristics, asset 
ownership, as well as production and marketing activities related to the 2015 production season. 
The field survey was conducted with the help of trained research assistants, and under the 
supervision of one of the authors. 
Table 4.1 presents the definition and summary statistics of variables used in the empirical 
analysis. It shows that 45% of the farmers participate in farmer groups, whose primary focus is 
rice production and sales. Table 4.1 also shows that on average, a farmer in the sample is about 
38 years old, has been through about 2 years of formal education, cultivates 2.8 hectares, and 
generates about 731.02 kilogram of rice yield. Differences in variable means between group 
members and nonmembers, and statistical t-tests for unmatched and matched samples are 
presented in Table 4.A1. We observe significant differences in variable means between group 
members and nonmembers for the unmatched sample. In particular, group members appear 
older, mostly own mobile phones, have better extension services, relative to nonmembers. The 
group members mostly plant improved rice varieties10, apply higher amounts of fertilizer, 
chemicals, labor, as well as generate higher yield than nonmembers. We also observe that the  
                                                          
10 Improved rice varieties commonly grown by farmers in the study area include Jasmine 85 (Gbewaa rice), 
AGRA rice, Togo marshal, Digang (Abirikukogu), Nerica 1, Nerica 2, Nabogo rice etc. Examples of Traditional 
rice varieties grown include GR 18 (Afife), TOX 3108 (GR 22) and Mandii.    
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Table 4.1: Variable definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Group membership  1 if farmer participates in a rice farmer group, 0 
otherwise 
0.45 
Age Age of respondent (years) 37.90 (11.78) 
Education Education of respondent (years) 2.05 (4.04) 
Gender  1 if farmer is male, 0 otherwise  0.90 
Mobile phone 1 if farmer owns mobile phone, 0 otherwise 0.32  
Distance to market Distance to market (km) 6.39 (4.03) 
Bicycle  1 if a farmer owns bicycle, 0 otherwise 0.71 
Total Farm land Total farm land under farmer’s control (hectares) 3.82 (3.24) 
Access to credit 1 if farmer has access to sufficient credit and not 
credit constrained, 0 otherwise  
0.44 
Extension visits Number of extension visits to farmer in a year 
(2015)  previous to the survey 
1.56 (2.75) 
Access to irrigation  1 if farm is under irrigation, 0 otherwise 0.22 
Variety  1 if farmer planted improved rice variety, 0 if 
farmer planted traditional rice variety 
0.69  
Farm road status 1 if farm road is motorable, 0 otherwise 0.69 
Sagnarigu 1 if farmer is located in Sagnarigu district, 0 
otherwise 
0.14 
Tolon 1 if farmer is located in Tolon district, 0 
otherwise 
0.24 
Kumbungu  1 if farmer is located in Kumbungu district, 0 
otherwise 
0.26 
Savelugu Nanton 1 if farmer is located in Savelugu nanton 
Municipal, 0 otherwise 
0.18 
Tamale 1 if farmer is located in Tamale metropolitan 
area, 0 otherwise 
0.16 
Input and output variables used in SPF model  
Rice yield Total yield of rice harvested (kg/ha) 731.02 (752.80) 
Land Area of land planted with rice (ha) 2.80 (3.05) 
seed Quantity of seed planted (kg/ha) 41.16 (38.84) 
Fertilizer  Total quantity of fertilizer applied (kg/ha) 80.12 (84.73) 
Chemical  Total amount of active ingredient of chemical 
applied (kg/ha) 
2.39 (2.68) 
Labor Total labor used in rice production per hectare 
(worker-days/ha) 
 55.64 (24.89) 
Soil quality  1 = fertile soils, 2 = infertile soils 0.20 
Fertilizer dummy 1 if farmer did not apply fertilizer, 0 otherwise 0.09  
Chemical dummy 1 if farmer did not apply chemicals, 0 otherwise 0.12 
Note: Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation 
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proportion of farmers with access to credit is significantly higher for group members than 
nonmembers. In this study, we construct the access to credit variable by eliciting responses 
from a farmer on whether he/she needed credit for rice production and marketing, and if so 
whether he/she received the amount of credit required. A farmer who did not need credit, or 
demanded credit, applied for it, and received the required amount is assigned a value of one, 
and zero otherwise (Jappelli, 1990).    
In the matching process, a trimming procedure was employed to establish a region of common 
support (see figure 4.A1 in appendix), which is defined by the area of positive density within 
𝐺 = 1 and 𝐺 = 0 distributions (Smith and Todd, 2005). In the region of common support, the 
estimated propensity scores range between 0.039 and 0.995. As observed in figure 4.1, almost 
all the propensity scores generated fall within the area of common support, though some few 
observations are off the common support region. This suggests that the nonmembers form a 
reasonable counterfactual for the group members. It is useful to mention that the PSM method 
accounts for the differences in observed attributes. As shown in table 4.A1, we observe no 
significant mean differences in terms of the observed characteristics between the two groups 
aside Savelugu Nanton (location dummy) after matching, suggesting that the balancing 
condition of the variables is fulfilled (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003; Bravo-Ureta et al., 2012). The 
next section discusses the sample selection SPF estimates, which accounts for selection bias 
due to unobserved attributes. 
4.5 Empirical results and discussion 
4.5.1 Farmer group participation decision 
Table 4.2 presents estimates of the factors influencing a farmer’s decision to participate in a 
farmer group. Marginal effects are computed to allow for a better interpretation of the results 
(Greene, 2012). The parameter estimates are jointly significant at 1% level, as revealed by the 
chi-square test statistic (LR 𝑋2(14) = 158.71). Table 2 also reports the residual coefficients of 
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the potential endogenous variables that include access to credit and extension visits predicted 
from the first-stage. The results show that these residuals are not statistically different from 
zero, suggesting that the access to credit and extension visits variables are not endogenously 
determined in farmer’s decision to participate in a farmer group. We find that the decision to 
participate in a farmer group is positively and significantly influenced by farmer’s age. In 
particular, an older farmer has about 0.6% probability of participating in a farmer group, which 
is consistent with the finding by Mojo et al. (2017). The results also show that farmers who 
have access to sufficient credit, and are not credit constrained are about 24.2% more likely to 
participate in farmer groups, as revealed by its positive and significant marginal effect. Apart 
from the fact that farmers with access to sufficient credit are able to fulfill their group 
commitments such as payment of membership fees and periodic cash contributions, they can 
procure production inputs such as fertilizer and chemicals, and as well pay for labor expenses. 
The marginal effect of extension visits variable is also found to be positive and significant, 
suggesting that a farmer who receives extension visits has about 1.6% higher probability of 
participating in a farmer group. Similar finding is reported in other recent studies (e,g., Ma and 
Abdulai, 2016).  
Distance to market also exhibits positive and significant effect on farmer group participation 
decision. In particular, additional percentage increase in market distance is positively and 
significantly associated with about 1.1% probability of participating in a farmer group. 
Intuitively, farther distance to market raises transaction costs, which tend to encourage 
participation in farmer groups, and probably paddy sales to agribusiness companies at farmgate. 
The results also reveal that a farmer with access to irrigation is about 20.8% more likely to 
participate in a farmer group. Table 4.2 also shows that relative to Tamale (reference district), 
farmers located around Sagnarigu district have about 55.3% higher probability of participating 
in farmer groups, while farmers located in Savelugu Nanton are about 13.8 % less likely to 
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participate in farmer groups, suggesting that location fixed effects also influence farmers’ 
decisions to participate in farmer groups.  
Table 4.2: Probit model estimates of factors influencing farmer group participation decision  
Variables  Probit coefficients   Marginal effects 
Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. err 
Constant -1.559*** 0.478    
Age  0.024*** 0.007  0.006*** 0.002 
Education  0.012 0.019  0.003 0.005 
Gender  -0.154 0.292  -0.042 0.080 
Mobile phone  0.213 0.236  0.058 0.064 
Distance to market  0.035* 0.021  0.009** 0.005 
Bicycle -0.097 0.218  -0.026 0.060 
Total farm land  0.012 0.037  0.003 0.010 
Access to credit  0.866*** 0.151  0.238*** 0.036 
Extension visits  0.050* 0.027  0.013* 0.007 
Access to irrigation   0.757*** 0.242  0.208*** 0.064 
Tolon  0.185 0.257  0.050 0.070 
Sagnarigu  2.011*** 0.613  0.553*** 0.163 
Kumbungu  -0.229 0.298  -0.063 0.081 
Savelugu Nanton -0.502** 0.265  -0.138** 0.072 
Credit residual  -1.242 1.185    
Extension residual   0.297 0.690    
LR 𝑥2(14)  158.71     
Log likelihood -204.27     
Number of observations 412     
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.5.2 Stochastic production frontier (SPF) estimates 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present estimates of the conventional and sample selection SPF models for 
the unmatched and matched samples, respectively. The likelihood ratio (LR) test led to the 
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rejection of null hypothesis of homogeneous technology between group members and 
nonmembers at 5% level for the unmatched (𝐿𝑅 = 43.42, 𝑋2 = 27.02, 𝑑𝑓 = 13) and matched 
(𝐿𝑅 = 42.92,  𝑋2 = 27.02, 𝑑𝑓 = 13) samples, lending support for the estimation of separate 
SPF models for members and nonmembers. This finding is further confirmed by the positive 
and significant effect of farmer group participation dummy on yield. As shown in tables 4.3 
and 4.4, the null hypothesis test of no technical inefficiency (𝜆 = 0) is also rejected at 1% level 
in all cases, implying that technical inefficiency is an important contributor to variability in 
observed yield.    
The results of sample selection SPF model have established statistical support for the presence 
of selection bias associated with unobserved attributes, as revealed by the significant 𝜌 for the 
group member specification. What this means is that a farmer who decides to participate in a 
farmer group obtain higher yield and technical efficiency (TE) compared to that of a randomly 
chosen farmer in our sample. This is probably due to better unobserved attributes such as 
production skills, motivation and good risk management behavior influencing farmers’ 
decisions to be members of farmer groups. This finding is consistent with the findings of other 
recent studies on smallholder rice farmers (e.g., Rahman et al., 2009; Rahman, 2011; Villano 
et al., 2015). The evidence of selection bias on unobserved attributes in this study justifies the 
use of separate sample selection SPF models for group members and nonmembers, and the 
parameter estimates and TE scores from the conventional SPF model are bias and inconsistent 
(Bravo-Ureta et al. 2012; Gonzalez-Flores et al. 2014).  
As expected, all the estimated models present positive partial production elasticities, which 
measure the percentage contribution of each input to percentage change in yield. With regards 
to the conventional inputs, the results show that land and chemicals make the highest 
contribution to rice yield for both categories of farmers, as revealed by the expected positive 
and significant effects of these inputs at least at 5% level. Similar results have also been reported 
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Table 4.3 Parameter estimates for the conventional and sample selection SPF models: Unmatched sample 
 
Variables  
Conventional SPF  Sample selection SPF 
Pooled  Members  Nonmembers  Members  Nonmembers 
Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E 
Constant  4.204*** 0.245  4.467*** 0.395  4.190*** 0.338  4.363*** 0.495  4.215*** 0.445 
ln land  0.227*** 0.049  0.261*** 0.084  0.226*** 0.063  0.273*** 0.105  0.241*** 0.068 
ln seed 0.054* 0.031  0.022 0.044  0.125*** 0.047  0.024 0.054  0.131** 0.060 
ln fertilizer 0.150*** 0.049  0.188*** 0.072  0.092 0.072  0.196** 0.085  0.085 0.088 
ln chemical 0.291*** 0.066  0.291*** 0.096  0.292*** 0.096  0.282** 0.122  0.315*** 0.121 
ln labor 0.004 0.055  0.053 0.081  0.030 0.077  0.070 0.084  0.071 0.102 
Fertilizer dummy 0.663*** 0.225  0.486 0.371  0.564* 0.309  0.540 0.473  0.533 0.376 
Chemical dummy 0.312*** 0.111  0.141 0.179  0.313** 0.148  0.123 0.191  0.345** 0.169 
Soil quality 0.260*** 0.065  0.353*** 0.108  0.225*** 0.083  0.365*** 0.126  0.235*** 0.087 
Variety  0.416*** 0.062  0.427*** 0.096  0.370*** 0.085  0.422*** 0.112  0.377*** 0.093 
Irrigation  0.256*** 0.074  0.347*** 0.104  0.268** 0.109  0.307** 0.135  0.244** 0.121 
Tolon  0.165** 0.072  0.153* 0.092  0.237** 0.116  0.159 0.118  0.240* 0.125 
Savelugu  0.415*** 0.082  0.356** 0.144  0.478*** 0.111  0.451** 0.219  0.533*** 0.133 
Kumbungu 0.359*** 0.079  0.233** 0.113  0.463*** 0.112  0.283* 0.170  0.493*** 0.122 
G. membership 0.313*** 0.064  - -  - -  - -  - - 
L. Likelihood -328.02   -166.34   -183.39   -240.86   -276.72  
𝜆 1.706*** 0.188  1.794*** 0.299  1.467*** 0.230  - -  - - 
𝜎2 0.748*** 0.001  0.712*** 0.003  0.729*** 0.002  - -  - - 
𝜎(𝑢) - -  - -  - -  0.544*** 0.196  0.588*** 0.152 
𝜎(𝑣) - -  - -  - -  0.393*** 0.095  0.430*** 0.070 
𝜌(𝑤,𝑣) - -  - -  - -  -0.388**  0.173  0.277 0.414 
N 412  186  226  186  226 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.4 Parameter estimates for the conventional and sample selection SPF models: Matched sample 
 
Variables  
Conventional SPF  Sample selection SPF 
Pooled  Members  Nonmembers  Members  Nonmembers 
Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E 
Constant  4.166*** 0.247  4.467*** 0.395  4.095*** 0.342  4.363*** 0.495  4.167*** 0.442 
ln land  0.222*** 0.049  0.261*** 0.084  0.221*** 0.064  0.273*** 0.105  0.242*** 0.069 
ln seed 0.057* 0.032  0.022 0.044  0.129*** 0.047  0.024 0.054  0.134*** 0.060 
ln fertilizer 0.148*** 0.050  0.188*** 0.072  0.092 0.075  0.196** 0.085  0.077      0.089 
ln chemical 0.304*** 0.067  0.291*** 0.096  0.321*** 0.097  0.282** 0.122  0.348*** 0.121 
ln labor 0.010 0.055  0.053 0.081  0.018 0.078  0.070 0.084  0.061 0.102 
Fertilizer dummy 0.638*** 0.231  0.486 0.371  0.550* 0.323  0.540 0.473  0.474 0.383 
Chemical dummy 0.329*** 0.112  0.141 0.179  0.348** 0.149  0.123 0.191  0.378** 0.170 
Soil quality 0.249*** 0.066  0.353*** 0.108  0.205** 0.084  0.365*** 0.126  0.220** 0.089 
Variety  0.421*** 0.063  0.427*** 0.096  0.372*** 0.086  0.422*** 112  0.374*** 0.094 
Irrigation  0.256*** 0.074  0.347*** 0.104  0.271** 0.110  0.307** 0.135  0.251** 0.122 
Tolon  0.166** 0.073  0.153* 0.092  0.239** 0.116  0.159 0.118  0. 231* 0.125 
Savelugu  0.399*** 0.084  0.356** 0.144  0.469*** 0.114  0.450** 0.219  0.506*** 0.138 
Kumbungu 0.359*** 0.079  0.233** 0.113  0.467*** 0.112  0.283* 0.170  0.488*** 0.121 
G. membership 0.311*** 0.065  - -  - -  - -  - - 
L. Likelihood -324.45   -166.34   -179.57   -240.66   -271.98  
𝜆 1.665*** 0.184  1.794*** 0.299  1.394*** 0.224  - -  - - 
𝜎2 0.744*** 0.001  0.712*** 0.003  0.720*** 0.002  - -  - - 
𝜎(𝑢) - -  - -  - -   0.544*** 0.196  0.578*** 0.158 
𝜎(𝑣) - -  - -  - -   0.393*** 0.095  0.430*** 0.071 
𝜌(𝑤,𝑣) - -  - -  - -  -0.391** 0.172  0.294 0.411 
N 407  186  221  186  221 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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in other past studies (e.g., Abate et al., 2014; Rahman, 2011). We also find that fertilizer makes 
significant contribution to the yield of group members, while quantity of rice seed plays a minor 
role. Labor contributes insignificantly to the yield of both members and nonmembers, which 
may be due to its decreasing marginal productivity resulting from abundance of labor force 
(Gonzalez-Flores et al. 2014; Rahman et al., 2009). The coefficients of soil quality, rice variety 
and irrigation are positive and significant for both member and nonmember specifications, 
indicating their importance in enhancing yield. Finally, we included location dummies to 
account for environmental, biophysical, and other aspects of socio-economic conditions such 
as neighbor effects in adopting new technologies, access to information and inputs, which are 
known to contribute to crop yield. In particular, relative to Tamale (reference district), farmers 
who live and farm around Tolon, Savelugu, and Kumbungu districts obtain significantly higher 
rice yield.    
4.5.3 Yield and technical efficiency scores  
The mean technical efficiency (TE) scores derived from the conventional and sample selection 
SPF models for the pooled sample, group members and nonmembers for unmatched and 
matched samples are presented in table 4.5. In addition, the table reports statistical t-test of 
mean TE differences between members and nonmembers. Table 4.5 reveals significant TE 
differences between group members and nonmembers for both SPF models. For the unmatched 
sample, the conventional SPF model results show that group members and nonmembers, 
respectively operate at mean TE levels of 69% and 63%, relative to their group frontiers. The 
sample selection SPF model, respectively yields mean TE scores of 74% and 65% for members 
and nonmembers, relative to their group frontiers, suggesting that group members perform 
better by operating closer to their own group frontier than nonmembers. For the matched 
sample, the results also show that group members operate closer to their own production frontier 
than nonmembers, as revealed by the higher mean TE scores associated with the conventional 
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SPF model (69% versus 64%), and the sample selection SPF model (74% versus 66%), 
respectively.  
Table 4.5 Technical efficiency levels across the SPF models 
 
SPF Model 
Pooled  Members  Nonmembers Test of 
meansb 
Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Unmatched 
Conventional  0.64 0.15  0.69 0.15  0.63 0.13 4.34*** 
Sample selection 0.79 0.13  0.74 0.12  0.65 0.13 7.23*** 
TE Differencea (%) 23.43   7.25   3.20   
Matched 
Conventional  0.63 0.14  0.69 0.15  0.64 0.13 3.60*** 
Sample selection 0.71 0.12  0.74 0.12  0.66 0.12 6.69*** 
TE Difference (%) 12.69   7.25   3.13   
a Percentage difference in TE before and after accounting for sample selection 
b  t test of mean TE difference between group members and nonmembers 
*** represents significance at 1% level 
 
We also provide insights on the importance of correcting for selection bias by comparing TE 
scores across SPF models. The results in table 4.5 show higher TE scores associated with the 
use of sample selection SPF model, relative to the conventional SPF model. Specifically, the 
mean TE scores in the unmatched sample increase by about 23.4%, 7.25%, and 3.2% for the 
pooled sample, group members and nonmembers, respectively when sample selection SPF is 
used. We also record similar pattern of results in the matched sample. This means that in our 
context, accounting for selection bias has enabled us to obtain efficient parameter estimates, 
resulting in a larger share of farmers observed to be operating closer to the production frontier.  
The distribution of TE scores of group members and nonmembers in Fig. 4.1 using unmatched 
conventional SPF model (without bias correction) and the matched sample selection SPF model 
(with bias correction) provides further insight on the importance of correcting for selection bias 
stemming from observed and unobserved attributes. We find that after controlling for these 
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biases, the percentage of farmers who operate at TE level of between 71-80% increased from 
22.1% to 28.3% for members, and from 28.8% to 30.9% for nonmembers. Moreover, only about 
8.4% of the group members operate at TE levels of up to 50%, after correcting for the biases, 
suggesting that majority of this category of farmers have moved to operating at relatively higher 
TE levels. We also observe that none of the nonmembers in the unmatched sample (without 
bias correction) is found operating at the highest TE range (91-100%). 
Fig. 4.1 Distribution of efficiency scores before and after selection bias correction. 
 
Finally, we examine the differences in yield between group members and nonmembers with 
and without selection bias correction. This is done using the mean predicted frontier yield 
generated from the unmatched conventional SPF (without bias correction) and the matched 
sample selection SPF (with bias correction) models. The results are reported in Table 4.6 
alongside the percentage yield differences and corresponding t-tests. We find that without 
correcting for selection bias, group members obtain higher yield than nonmembers, with 
percentage difference of about 36.2%. However, the difference in yield stands at 48.7% when 
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selection bias due to both observed and unobserved attributes are taken into account, suggesting 
that participation in farmer groups contributes significantly to enhancing farm yield. 
Table 4.6 Predicted frontier output before and after selection bias correction  
 
SPF model  
 
Pooled 
 
 
Members 
 
  
Nonmembers 
% increase 
in predicted 
output 
Test of 
means c 
Conventional a       
Mean 845.49 974.74  715.91 36.15 4.57*** 
Minimum  185.05 197.96  156.47   
Maximum 6444.82 6565.94  2781.66   
Sample selection b       
Mean 991.50 989.92  665.87 48.67 5.51*** 
Minimum  196.39 194.71  138.82   
Maximum 6872.62 6639.12  2697.82   
a Before selection bias correction (unmatched sample)  
b  After selection bias correction (matched sample) 
*** represents significance at 1% level. 
c  t test of predicted mean frontier output difference between members and non-members   
 
4.6 Conclusions     
This study analyzed the role of farmer groups in improving smallholder farm yield and technical 
efficiency, using recent survey data of 412 farmers from selected districts in northern Ghana. 
We used Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Greene’s (2010) sample selection Stochastic 
Production Frontier (SPF) approaches to account for potential selection bias associated with 
observed and unobserved attributes. These approaches allowed for the estimation of unbiased 
and consistent impact of farmer group participation on yield and technical efficiency. The 
estimates revealed the presence of selection bias, suggesting that unobserved attributes such as 
farmer motivation, innate skills and risk attitude influence farmers’ decisions to participate in 
farmer groups. The empirical results revealed that farmer groups tend to enhance farm yield 
and technical efficiency. In particular, for both conventional and sample selection SPF model 
estimations, the results show that farmers who belong to farmer groups operate closer to their 
own production frontier than farmers who produce and market paddy on their own. Moreover, 
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higher TE scores for group members and nonmembers are associated with the use of the sample 
selection SPF model. This means that in nonrandomized studies, it is important to account for 
selection bias when examining farmer welfare such as yield and technical efficiency. The 
empirical results show that farmer’s age, access to credit and irrigation, extension visits, 
distance to markets are the important positive determinants of participation in farmer groups. 
Moreover, rice yield is positively and significantly influenced by land, fertilizer, chemicals, rice 
variety, soil quality and access to irrigation for both farmer group members and nonmembers. 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from the findings of this study. The important 
role of farmer groups in enhancing smallholder farm yield and technical efficiency, as 
evidenced in this study, calls for continuous and increased support from government, 
development agencies, and private agribusiness companies in farmer group formation when 
implementing agriculture and value chain development interventions. This could help address 
the multiple production and marketing challenges facing smallholder farmers. The evidence of 
selection bias in our study also calls for a broader consideration of farmer group dynamics in 
selecting beneficiaries for project implementation. Specifically, farmers’ self-selection into 
project participation could as well be complemented with capacity building on group dynamics 
and technical capacity development. This is expected to enhance the skills and motivation of 
these farmers, as well as shape their attitudes towards risk for effective project participation and 
the achievement of project outcomes. Technical capacity development of farmer groups could 
also be complemented with effective extension services, especially on input application to 
increase yield and technical efficiency. Stakeholder collaborative efforts to establish and/or 
expand irrigation facilities in the study area would also enhance yield and efficiency. 
Incorporation of well-structured credit schemes into agricultural value chain interventions, 
coupled with the creation of sustainable business relationship between farmer groups and 
readily accessible financial institutions, could assist in addressing smallholder liquidity 
constraints for improved yield and technical efficiency gains. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.A1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis  
 
 
Variable 
Unmatched sample  Matched sample 
Members  Nonmembers Diff. 
(t-stat.) 
 
 
Members  Nonmembers Diff. 
(t-stat.) 
Mean Std  Mean Std Mean Std  Mean Std 
Age 40.40 11.89  35.83 11.30 3.99***  40.40 11.89  40.69 11.39 -0.21 
Education 1.97 4.03  2.11 4.05 -0.32  1.97 4.03  1.80 4.08  0.41 
Gender  0.89 -  0.91 - -0.63  0.89 -  0.90 - - 0.53 
Mobile phone 0.37 -  0.27 - 2.21**  0.37 -  0.44 - -1.25 
Distance to market 6.96 4.12  5.93 3.90 2.61***  6.96 4.12  6.88 3.89  0.20 
Bicycle  0.68 -  0.74 - -1.23  0.68 -  0.75 - -1.58 
Total Farm land 2.91 2.21  4.56 3.74 - 5.30***  2.91 2.21  2.93 2.46 -0.08 
Access to credit 0.63 -  0.29 - 7.38***  0.63 -  0.61 -   0.63 
Extension visits 2.13 2.87  1.08 2.55 3.92***  2.13 2.87  2.50 2.57 -1.03 
Access to irrigation  0.28 -  0.16 - 2.86***  0.28 -  0.31 - -0.75 
Variety  0.79 -  0.61 - 3.90***  0.79 -  0.82 - -0.82 
Rice output 842.68 925.31  639.12 558.95 2.75***  842.68 925.31  763.67 562.94   0.85 
Land 1.68 1.97  3.73 3.45 -7.20***  1.68 1.97  1.96 3.47 -1.32 
seed 37.08 33.30  44.53 42.64 -1.94**  37.08 33.30  37.65 42.88  -0.30 
Fertilizer  92.58 106.29  69.87 59.93 2.72***  92.58 106.29  91.33 59.01   0.13 
Chemical  2.65 2.75  2.17 2.61 1.78*  2.65 2.75  2.55 2.62   0.37 
labor 58.55 24.55  53.25 24.97 2.15**  58.55 24.55  62.70 25.06 -1.18 
Soil quality 0.13 -  0.26 - -3.05***  0.13 -  0.18 - -1.12 
Sagnarigu 0.29 -  0.17 - 8.57***  0.29 -  0.23 -  0.83 
Tolon 0.26 -  0.22 - 1.01  0.26 -  0.29 - -0.57 
Kumbungu  0.22 -  0.29 - -1.74*  0.22 -       0.23 - -0.21 
Savelugu Nanton 0.08 -  0.26 - -4.88***  0.08 -  0.24 - -4.50*** 
Sample size 186  226   186  221  
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.A2: First stage estimates for addressing potential endogeneity  
Variables  Extension visits  Access to credit 
Coefficient  Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. err 
Constant -1.364*** 0.409  -1.256*** 0.405 
Age  0.006 0.006   0.009 0.005 
Education  0.008 0.017   0.003 0.016 
Gender  -0.040 0.251  -0.134 0.250 
Mobile phone  0.635*** 0.159  -0.003 0.152 
Distance to market  0.024 0.017  -0.003 0.016 
Bicycle -0.058 0.165   0.322** 0.159 
Total farm land  -0.024 0.031   0.026 0.029 
Access to irrigation   0.448** 0.189   0.264 0.168 
Tolon 0.329 0.228   0.149 0.221 
Sagnarigu  0.578** 0.261   1.131*** 0.251 
Kumbungu  -0.765*** 0.237   0.194 0.217 
Savelugu Nanton -0.222 0.249   0.090 0.230 
Access to credit  0.012 0.143     
Farm road status  0.738*** 0.157    
Extension visits    -0.024 0.025 
Distance(km) to credit institution     -0.056*** 0.021 
Log likelihood -225.64   -261.21  
Number of observations 412      412  
Note: **, *** represent significance at 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Fig 4.A1 Density of propensity scores for members and nonmembers of farmer groups. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of inclusive value chain participation and social networks on 
smallholder market performance outcomes such as paddy price, quantity of paddy traded, and 
net returns, using data from a recent survey of 458 smallholder farmers in northern Ghana. We 
employed treatment effects model in the estimations to account for potential selection bias 
associated with both observed and unobserved factors. The empirical results reveal that 
smallholder farmers’ participation in rice value chain is associated with increased paddy price, 
quantity traded, and net returns. We also find that value chain participation decisions and market 
performance are positively and significantly influenced by social networks. The empirical 
results also suggest that gender, farm size, mobile phone ownership, and access to credit 
contribute positively and significantly to increased paddy prices, quantity traded, and net returns 
of smallholder rice farmers in the value chain. 
Keywords: Rice value chain, social networks, treatment effects model, market performance. 
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5.1 Introduction  
In the past 2-3 decades, the agricultural value chain system in developing countries has 
experienced dramatic structural transformation, driven by several factors such as population 
growth, rising urbanization, increasing consumer incomes, influx of both domestic and foreign 
direct investments, as well as varying consumer dietary requirements from food grains to high 
value and processed food products (Swinnen and Kuijpers, 2017; Henderson and Isaac, 2017; 
Reardon et al., 2009). While the value chain transformation is considered important in reducing 
rural poverty, improving food and nutrition security, and ensuring overall economic growth, 
smallholder farmers’ inclusion in these chains still remains a major challenge in developing 
countries, largely due to lack of institutional and infrastructural support, inadequate resources 
for effective and efficient value chain coordination, high transaction costs associated with 
accessing inputs and markets, and other challenges related to accessing services such as 
extension, finance, and transportation, all of which impact farm production and market 
performance (Trienekens, 2011; Dillon and Dambro, 2017; Ecker, 2018). 
Developing country governments, NGOs, and the private sector have increasingly recognized 
agricultural value chain development as an important area of donor interventions, and a 
centrepiece of agricultural development policies (World Bank, 2007; Humphrey and Navas-
Alemàn, 2010; Ton et al. 2011). Motivated by concerns for agribusiness development, value 
chain development interventions do not only focus on strengthening the capacities of value 
chain actors (smallholder farmers, aggregators/traders, processors etc.), but also the institutions 
and enabling policy environment that ensure efficient coordination and competitiveness of these 
chains. They facilitate vertical linkages, and foster governance of relationships between 
smallholder farmers and agribusinesses through written or verbal contracts within value chains 
for improved welfare gains such as increased incomes, and access to new services for 
production and marketing (Poulton et al., 2010; Devaux et al., 2018). 
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Smallholder farmers have been typically recognized as important actors for the diffusion of 
value chain innovations such as information and technology (Ramirez et al. 2018). With the 
underlying assumption that the behavior of social network members influences farmers’ 
decision-making with direct implications on welfare outcomes (Maertens and Barrett, 2012), 
the important role of farmers’ social networks in improving value chain efficiency and rural 
economic transformation needs to be highlighted in the empirical literature. The concept of 
social networks emphasizes on the connections among individuals (e.g., farmers) through 
which goods and services, money, and information flow (Maertens and Barrett, 2013). 
Interestingly, local level initiatives in building social networks can lead to diverse forms of 
value chain inclusion with considerable welfare and market performance outcomes for 
smallholder farmers (Ramirez et al. 2018). Within the context of agrifood value chains, social 
networks focus on both the horizontal and vertical relationships that exist among value chain 
actors (Ruben et al., 2006; Trienekens, 2011). Horizontal social networks reflect cohesive social 
relationships that promote collective action for successful inclusion in value chains (Ramirez 
et al. 2018). They can draw upon their social capital to strengthen vertical relationships with 
buyers and other actors within the value chain (Bijman et al., 2006). More importantly, 
smallholder farmers organized into a strong social network can benefit from improved access 
to credit and extension services, increased bargaining power, exchange of input and output price 
information, as well as buyer quality requirements through participation in such formalized 
value chains.  
This means that inclusive agrifood value chain development goes beyond vertically linking 
smallholder farmers to other actors in the value chain, but also organizing them into a strong 
cohesive social network for effective value chain participation (Poulton et al., 2010; Bijman et 
al., 2011; Kilelu et al., 2017). This argument is in line with the increasing calls for smallholder 
collective action (e.g., collective marketing) to improve farmers’ bargaining power, while 
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enhancing value chain efficiency (Bernardet al., 2010; Dillon and Dambro, 2017). Aside 
horizontal social networks, smallholder farmers often rely on their social connections and 
goodwill with other farmers in their communities to enjoy cost advantages associated with 
production and sales, as well as achieve optimum benefit from participating in agrifood value 
chains (Morgan, 2012). Such social connections are based on agreed-upon norms, and establish 
trust, as well as facilitate sharing of value chain information, skills, labor, and financial 
resources.   
Some recent studies have examined the welfare gains associated with smallholder farmers’ 
inclusion in agrifood value chains in developing countries (e.g., Bellemare, 2012; Michelson, 
2013; Bellemare and Novak, 2016; Henderson and Isaac, 2017; Maertens and Vande Velde, 
2017; Ma and Abdulai, 2017). Michelson (2013) found that inclusive value chain participation 
is associated with increased productive asset holdings among smallholder farming households 
in Nicaragua. Other studies also found that smallholder inclusion in agrifood value chains 
significantly improves prices received, farm profit, and gross income (e.g., Ma and Abdulai, 
2017), farm yields, household income, and net farm income (e.g., Maertens and Vande Velde, 
2017; Bellemare, 2012), and land and labour redistribution (e.g., Henderson and Isaac, 2017). 
Meanwhile there is increasing interests in the role of social networks on the economic behavior 
and decision-making of smallholder farmers in developing countries. For example, the study 
by Bandiera and Rasul (2006) reveals that social networks influence smallholder farmers’ 
sunflower and hybrid seed technology adoption decisions in northern Mozambique and India, 
respectively. Conley and Udry (2001) also find that social networks through social learning 
influence fertilizer adoption decisions by Ghanaian pineapple farmers. Moreover, the role of 
social networks in improving households’ access to credit, income diversification, and non-
farm employment decisions has also been revealed by past studies (e.g., Wydick et al., 2011; 
Johney et al., 2014; Mano et al., 2011). A recent study by Herforth et al. (2015) is limited to 
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examining how social networks, and other farm and household characteristics affect modern 
supply chain participation among blackberry farmers in the Ecuadorian Andes. 
This study explores the role of social networks in promoting smallholder inclusive value chain 
participation, as well as the impact of both social networks and inclusive value chain 
participation on smallholder market performance, using recent survey data from northern 
Ghana. Insights from this study could be relevant from development policy perspective, 
although lacking in the empirical literature. In particular, our study makes three contributions 
to the growing literature on social networks and inclusive value chains. First, we explore the 
role of social networks, and other farm and household characteristics in influencing smallholder 
farmers’ participation in agrifood value chains. Second, we examine how social networks and 
value chain participation influence smallholder market performance outcomes: prices, quantity 
traded, and farm net returns. Finally, we examine whether value chain participation effects vary 
with farm size.  
It is important to mention that examining the market performance outcomes associated with 
value chain participation poses unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity challenges. 
For instance, we argue that value chain participation may result in improved market outcomes, 
likewise better market performance status of farmers may lead to inclusion in agrifood value 
chains. In this study, we acknowledge that the systematic differences in the outcomes between 
participants and non-participants could be attributed to potential unobserved heterogeneity, 
which needs to be addressed to obtain unbiased and consistent impact estimates associated with 
value chain participation. Therefore, the present study employs a treatment effects model to 
account for endogeneity of value chain participation decision due to unobserved characteristics 
of the farmers, as well as their farms.  
The present study focuses on the rice sector, because of its potential of benefiting a large number 
of smallholder farmers in Ghana. In addition, agrifood value chain development efforts to 
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revamp the cereal staples sector are already in progress in Ghana. The government together 
with donor agencies and the private sector have collaboratively rolled out a number of value 
chain development interventions11 with the objective of ensuring smallholder market 
competitiveness, and rural economic transformation. These interventions promote inclusive 
value chain development by linking smallholder farmers with large agribusinesses12 and other 
produce buyers for output market transactions. Findings from this study can inform policy on 
the design and implementation of inclusive value chain development programs for the benefit 
of smallholder farmers in northern Ghana.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the conceptual framework 
employed to guide the empirical analysis, followed by specification of the empirical models in 
section 3. Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results, while conclusions and policy 
implications are presented in the final section. 
5.2 Conceptual framework 
5.2.1 Value chain participation decision and the role of social networks 
In this section, we explore the effects of social networks and other farm and household 
characteristics on inclusive value chain participation by smallholder farmers. As stated earlier, 
the crucial role of social networks in influencing individual’s economic behaviour, preferences, 
or decision-making cannot be overemphasized. This can be achieved through useful interactions 
                                                          
11Ongoing agricultural value chain development interventions in Ghana include the FtF-USAID-Ghana 
programme such as Agriculture Technology Transfer project (ATT), Resiliency in Northern Ghana (RING), 
Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement (ADVANCE), Strengthening Partnerships, Results and 
Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING) projects. The Ghanaian government is currently implementing some 
value chain development flagship programs including the Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) initiative and 1-village 
1-dam project spanning from 2017-2020 (MoFA, 2017).  
 
12Examples of agribusiness companies that transact with smallholder farmers in northern Ghana include premium 
foods limited, AMSIG Resources, SAVBAN limited, BUSAKA enterprise, Investment Protocol Services Limited 
(IPSL), Ofram supermarket, Avnash Industries Limited etc. 
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among network members, which may lead to sharing of valuable knowledge and information 
for improved innovative behavior and performance. Smallholder farmers’ participation in 
inclusive agrifood value chains is an example of such innovative behavior and decision-making, 
capable of enhancing market performance and rural livelihoods. Different types of social 
network effects on such behavior and decision-making have been documented in the empirical 
literature. These include endogenous effects, exogenous (contextual) effects and correlated 
effects. The influence of a network member’s behavior on the individual’s decision-making, 
such as value chain participation, is termed an endogenous network effect, whilst the effect that 
network member’s specific characteristics (e.g., age, education, gender etc.) may have on the 
individual’s decision to participate in a value chain is referred to as an exogenous (contextual) 
network effect (Manski, 2000). According to Lee (2007), the exogenous (contextual) effects 
are measures of network members that are not affected by current behavior. Correlated network 
effects on the other hand stem from controlling for unobservable invariant characteristics 
between network points in a community or district that may influence farmer’s value chain 
participation decision (Mekonnen et al, 2018). It is accounted for in an empirical analysis by 
including location dummies in the model.  
To examine the effects of social networks, and other farm and household characteristics on 
inclusive agrifood value chain participation decision, we assume that farmers make binary 
decisions whether to participate or not to participate in agrifood value chain, depending on these 
characteristics. This decision is determined by comparing the expected utility from the 
participation, (𝑈𝑖
𝑃), and the expected utility from non-participation, (𝑈𝑖
𝑁). Intuitively, a farmer 
decides to participate in an agrifood value chain if the utility difference (𝑉𝐶𝑖
∗) is positive, i.e. 
𝑉𝐶𝑖
∗ = 𝑈𝑖
𝑃 − 𝑈𝑖
𝑁 > 0, which implies that the utility the farmer derives from participating in the 
value chain outweighs the utility derived from non-participation. However, 𝑉𝐶𝑖
∗ is a latent 
variable, and cannot be directly observed. In this context, what is observed is the actual decision 
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by the farmer to participate in a value chain, 𝑉𝐶. Therefore, we specify it as a function of 
observable farm, household and social network characteristics as: 
𝑉𝐶𝑖
∗ = 𝑍𝑖𝛿 + 𝐷𝑖𝜑 + 𝜂𝑖 , 𝑉𝐶𝑖 = {
1   if𝑉𝐶𝑖
∗ > 0
0    if𝑉𝐶𝑖
∗ ≤ 0 
,                                                                        (1) 
where 𝑉𝐶𝑖 is a binary indicator variable that equals one if a farmer participates in an agrifood 
value chain, and zero otherwise; 𝑍 is a vector of farm and household characteristics believed to 
influence value chain participation decision. These include age, education, gender, farm size, 
distance to market, bicycle ownership, road status, mobile phone ownership, access to credit, 
and market perception; 𝐷𝑖 denotes variables representing social networks; 𝛿 is a vector of 
parameters capturing the direct effects of exogenous observable characteristics in 𝑍 whilst 𝜑  
measures the endogenous, contextual and correlated network effects on farmer’s decision to 
participate in the value chain; and 𝜂𝑖 is an error term, with zero mean and variance 𝜎
2. The 
choice of the explanatory variables in this study is based on existing literature, as well as 
observations from our field survey.  
Building on the existing literature on the effects of social networks on technology adoption 
(e.g., Bandiera and Rasul, 2006), and on modern supply chain participation (e.g., Herforth et 
al., 2015; Ramirez et al., 2018), we include in our analysis, variables representing farmer’s 
horizontal social network relationship, which is assigned a value of one if a farmer belongs to 
such a network, and zero otherwise. As stated earlier, cohesive horizontal social network of 
farmers improves collective bargaining power, increases members’ access to value chain 
services and ensures effective value chain participation. In addition, a variable that captures the 
number of value chain participants in a farmer’s social network is included in the analysis. This 
variable was a self-reported response elicited from farmers on how many other farmers he/she 
knows in the community who participated in the rice value chain at the time of survey, and 
whether or not regular interactions about rice marketing exist between him/her and this category 
144 
 
of value chain participants. These social network variables measure the existence of 
endogenous effects on value chain participation. However, measurement of these effects poses 
simultaneity issues, resulting from the fact that the behavior of an individual is influenced by 
the mean behavior of the group, who also in turn influences the group’s behavior. Manski 
(1993) refers to this identification problem as reflection problem.  
Moreover, smallholder farmers are normally organized horizontally into farmer groups, and 
taken through capacity building training to become strong and cohesive social network group 
for inclusion in agrifood value chains. Conversely, agribusiness companies and other produce 
buyers normally prefer to engage with smallholder farmers in the form of strong and cohesive 
groups to reduce transaction costs associated with having to aggregate paddy from individual 
farmers. Therefore, farmers may decide to be members of the horizontal social networks to be 
able to participate in a value chain, making both decisions jointly determined. With regards to 
the number of value chain participants in a farmer’s social network, we argue that a farmer’s 
network members who are already participants in a value chain can serve as sources of useful 
information, and potential avenues for sharing valuable experiences about the marketing 
opportunities in a value chain. The information and experience sharing between farmers and 
their network members are expected to influence the decisions of this category of farmers to 
participate in the value chain. On the other hand, produce buyers can also rely on participants 
for the information and recommendation of their network members for inclusion in the value 
chains.  Similarly, access to credit variable in 𝑍 may also pose potential endogeneity problems 
in the value chain participation equation. In the study area, government and NGOs who 
facilitate smallholder inclusion in agrifood value chains, also facilitate farmers’ access to credit 
through linkages with financial service providers. In that case, some farmers decide to 
participate in a value chain to be able to access credit to expand their farming operations, and 
to benefit from guaranteed market. This makes the decisions to participate in a value chain and 
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to access credit jointly determined. These issues need to be addressed to ensure consistent 
estimation of these variables. 
To address these issues, some approaches have been suggested in the literature. Manski (2000) 
suggests the introduction of dynamism to the model whereby an individual’s behavior is 
influenced by the lagged behavior of his/her network instead of contemporaneous values of 
mean behavior of the group. Another approach is to use instruments to address these challenges 
(Manski, 2000). Due to data limitation, we use the latter approach in the present study, a two-
stage approach clearly outlined in Wooldridge (2015). In the first-stage, we estimate the 
potential endogenous variables (access to credit, horizontal social network relationship and 
value chain participants in farmer’s network) as functions of all other explanatory variables in 
the value chain participation equation, in addition to a set of respective instruments. These 
instruments should directly influence the potential endogenous variables, but do not directly 
affect farmers’ value chain participation decisions. For the horizontal social network 
relationship variable, distance to meeting point of social network members was employed as 
instrument. Intuitively, farmers living farther away from the meeting point are less likely to be 
members of this network. For the number of value chain participants in a farmer’s network, we 
used as instrument, a variable representing number of neighbors living 5km radius around 
farmer’s home, which significantly influences number of value chain participants in a farmer’s 
network, but not value chain participation decision. We argue that more neighbors are likely to 
be part of a farmer’s network, and also double as value chain participants, if the number of 
neighbors living 5km radius around the farmer’s home is higher. We also used distance to credit 
institution, measured in kilometres, as instrument in the access to credit equation. In this 
context, we argue that farmers residing farther away from credit institutions could be less likely 
to access credit from these institutions.  In the second-stage, we estimate the value chain 
participation model, which includes both the observed potential endogenous variables and their 
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respective residuals predicted from the first-stage. The t-test on the coefficients of the residuals 
is used as test for the endogeneity of the variables. Table 1A in the appendix presents the first-
stage regression results. Following Mekonnen et al. (2018), we control for contextual network 
effects by averaging the values of observable exogenous characteristics of the farmers in the 
sample, based on the subsamples drawn from each study community. Based on our data, the 
exogenous characteristics used are the averages age, education, gender, and farm size. We also 
control for correlated network effects by including district dummies (location fixed effects) in 
our treatment effects model. 
5.2.2 Impact of social networks and value chain participation 
As indicated previously, we also examine the impact of social networks and inclusive value 
chain participation on smallholder farmers’ market performance in northern Ghana. The market 
performance outcome measures considered in this study include paddy price received, quantity 
traded, and net returns. To link value chain participation decision to the market performance 
outcomes, we assume a linear function between a vector of the outcome variables and a vector 
of farm, household, and social network characteristics (𝑋𝑖), and a dummy variable representing 
value chain participation (𝑉𝐶𝑖), specified as: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝜃 + 𝑉𝐶𝑖𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖,                                                                                                             (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is a vector of outcome variables: paddy price, quantity traded, and net returns; 𝜃 and 
𝛽 are vectors of parameters to be estimated; and 𝜇𝑖is the error term. Farmers’ decisions to 
participate in a value chain are not randomly assigned, but involves self-selection. In the 
decision making process, unobservable factors such as farmers’ risk preferences, motivation, 
and innate skills influencing their decisions to participate in the value chain, may as well 
influence their market performance outcomes, resulting in correlation between the error term 
(𝜂𝑖) in equation (1) and the error term (𝜇𝑖) in equation (2), such that corr (𝜂𝑖 , 𝜇𝑖) ≠ 0. This 
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leads to potential selection bias, which needs to be addressed to ensure unbiased and consistent 
value chain participation impact estimates. What this means is that, using standard regression 
methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS) would generate biased estimates. Some recent 
studies have employed propensity score matching (PSM) approach to address the selection bias 
(e.g., Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009; Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Maertens and Vande Velde, 
2017; Mojo et al., 2017; Mishra et al., 2018). However, the PSM accounts for selection bias 
stemming from only observed factors. In the present study, we use treatment effects model in 
the empirical analysis (Cong and Drukker, 2000). 
5.3 Empirical specification 
5.3.1 Treatment effects model 
In this section, we estimate the factors influencing smallholder rice farmers’ decisions to 
participate in a value chain, and their impacts on paddy price, quantity of paddy rice traded, and 
net returns, using treatment effects model. The treatment effects model accounts for selection 
bias due to both observed and unobserved factors, and provides direct marginal effect of value 
chain participation on the market performance outcomes. In the treatment effects model, the 
error terms in the selection equation (1) and the outcome equation (2) are assumed to follow a 
bivariate normal distribution with mean zero, and a covariance matrix [
𝜎 𝜌
𝜌 1]. Following Cong 
and Drukker (2000), we use the formula for the joint density of the bivariate normally 
distributed variables to specify respectively the expected market performance outcomes for 
farmer 𝑖 conditional on value chain participation (equation.3: treatment), and non-participation 
(equ.4: control) as: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑉𝐶 = 1) = 𝑋𝑖𝜃 + 𝛽 + 𝐸(𝜇𝑖|𝑉𝐶 = 1) = 𝑋𝑖𝜃 + 𝛽 + 𝜌𝜂𝜇𝜎𝜂𝜇
𝜙(𝑍𝑖𝛿)
Φ(𝑍𝑖𝛿)
                                    (3) 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑉𝐶 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝜃 + 𝐸(𝜇𝑖|𝑉𝐶 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝜃 − 𝜌𝜂𝜇𝜎𝜂𝜇
𝜙(𝑍𝑖𝛿)
1−Φ(𝑍𝑖𝛿)
,                                                (4) 
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where 𝜙(. ) is the standard normal density function, and Φ(. ) denotes the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function. The ratio of 𝜙(. ) and Φ(. ) is referred to as the inverse mills 
ratio.  𝜃 and  𝛽 are vectors of parameters to be estimated; 𝜎𝜂𝜇 is the covariance between the two 
error terms, 𝜂, 𝜇; 𝜌𝜂𝜇 is the correlation coefficient, and an indicator of selection bias on 
unobserved factors. In particular, a significant 𝜌𝜂𝜇 indicates the presence of selection bias, and 
insignificant 𝜌𝜂𝜇 means that selection bias due to unobserved factors is absent. The sign of 𝜌𝜂𝜇 
also has economic interpretation. For instance, a negative 𝜌𝜂𝜇 implies a negative selection bias, 
which means that in our sample, farmers with lower than average paddy price, quantity traded, 
and net returns are more likely to participate in the rice value chain. Conversely, if 𝜌𝜂𝜇 is 
positive, it means positive selection bias, suggesting that farmers with above average outcomes 
would be less likely to participate in the value chain. The average treatment effects (ATE) of 
value chain participation on the outcomes for sample N can be computed as the difference 
between the expected outcomes from participation (equ. 3), and the expected outcome from 
non-participation (equ. 4), specified as: 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
1
𝑁
∑[𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑉𝐶 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑉𝐶 = 0)].
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                              (5) 
It is important to properly identify the treatment effects model due to the fact that the variables 
in equations (1) and (2) are allowed to overlap. The identification requires that at least one 
variable known as instrument in 𝑍 should not appear in 𝑋 during estimation. This instrument is 
required to significantly influence farmers’ decisions to participate in a value chain, but does 
not directly affect the market performance outcomes. In this study, we use a variable 
representing farmers’ perception of market demand for paddy in the previous year as an 
identifying instrument, measured as dummy, where farmer’s perception of high market demand 
for paddy is assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise. We argue that farmers who perceive 
high market demand for paddy would be more likely to participate in a value chain to ensure 
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guaranteed markets for their produce. An instrument validity test conducted shows that the 
market perception variable has a significant influence on value chain participation decision, but 
insignificant effect on output price, quantity of paddy traded, and net returns, suggesting that 
the instrument is valid. The test results are presented in table A2 in the appendix. 
5.4 Data and descriptive statistics  
The data used in this study were collected from a recent farm household survey, which spanned 
from June to August, 2016 in five selected districts of northern Ghana; Tolon, Kumbungu, 
Sagnarigu districts, Savelugu Nanton Municipal and Tamale metropolis. We employed multi-
stage sampling approach in drawing our sample for the study. First, we used purposive sampling 
method to select the five study districts because of their geographic accessibility and the 
intensive rice production in these areas. In consultation with the agricultural extension agents 
(AEAs) of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) and other officials of ongoing donor 
funded projects (eg., Ghana-USAID/FtF), we randomly selected about two to three 
communities from each district based on the number of communities in each district. Finally, 
we used random matching within sample, whereby at least 20 households were randomly 
selected in each community. Each household were then matched with 5 farmers randomly 
drawn from the community sample.  
In total, we sampled 458 smallholder rice farmers, comprising 206 value chain participants and 
252 non-participants. In this context, value chain participants are smallholder farmers 
participating in the ongoing rice value chain development interventions in northern Ghana, 
received capacity building and input support, linked to agribusiness companies, and have 
successfully sold paddy to these companies for at least the past three years. However, non-
participants are smallholder farmers who produce and market paddy rice on their own. Both 
categories of farmers were then engaged in face-to-face interviews, using structured 
questionnaire. The social network variables captured include horizontal social networks and 
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number of value chain participants in a farmer’s network. As indicated previously, a farmer 
with membership in a horizontal social network is assigned a value of one and zero otherwise. 
In addition, information was gathered from farmers on the number of farmers in their social 
networks who are also participants in agrifood value chains. This was based on whether 
resources such as credit, labor and/land, and farming and marketing information have ever been 
exchanged between the farmer and the network members. In addition, we considered whether 
they are relatives, friends, neighbors (farm-plots or residential), belong to the same religion, or 
ever visited each other. Other information gathered include farm and household characteristics, 
asset ownership, production and marketing activities related to the 2015 growing season. The 
field survey was conducted by the authors, with the help of trained research assistants. The 
outcome variables include average selling price of paddy per kilogram, quantity of paddy traded 
in kilograms, and net returns. We measured net returns as the difference between value of rice 
output and variable input costs per hectare.  
The definition and summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis are presented 
in table 5.1. As shown in the table, 44% of farmers participate in the rice value chain. On 
average, a rice farmer in the sample is 37 years, with about 3 years of formal education, and 
cultivates about 1.14ha of farm size. Table 5.1 shows that on average, a rice farmer traded a 
quantity of 987.09 kg of paddy rice per hectare, received an average of GH¢1.21 for a kilogram 
of paddy rice, and generated GH¢ 725.26 of net returns per hectare.  Table 5.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics and statistical significance tests on equality of means of variables for 
participants and non-participants. As shown in table 5.2, significant differences can be observed 
between participants and non-participants for some of the variables. On average, the value chain 
participants are older, and more educated than non-participants. 
 
151 
 
 
Table 5.1: Variable definition and summary statistics  
Variable Definition Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Value chain 
participation  
1 if farmer participates in the rice value chain, 0 
otherwise 
0.44 (0.49) 
Price Average selling price of paddy rice (GH¢/kg) 1.21 (0.27) 
Quantity traded Quantity of paddy rice sold (kg/ha) 987.09 (766.50) 
Net returns Gross farm revenue from paddy rice production 
minus variable input cost (GH¢/ha) 
725.26 (967.47) 
Age Age of respondent (years) 37.46 (11.65) 
Education Education of respondent (years) 2.71 (4.40) 
Gender  1 if farmer is male, 0 otherwise  0.88 (0.32) 
Farm size  Size of farm (hectares) 1.14 (1.26) 
Distance to market Distance to market (km) 6.57 (4.08) 
Bicycle  1 if a farmer owns  bicycle, 0 otherwise 0.70 (0.45) 
Road status 1 if market road if motorable , 0 otherwise 0.73 (0.44) 
Mobile phone 1 if farmer owns mobile phone, 0 otherwise 0.45 (0.49) 
Access to credit 1 if farmer has access to enough credit and not 
credit constraint, 0 otherwise  
0.40 (0.49) 
Market perception  Farmer perception of market demand (1=high, 
0=low) 
0.35 (0.47) 
Horiz. social 
network relationship 
1 if farmer is member of HSN, 0 otherwise 0.42(0.49) 
VCP in farmer’s 
network 
No. of  value chain participants farmers in 
network 
4.79 (10.49) 
Sagnarigu 1 if farmer is located in Sagnarigu district, 0 
otherwise 
0.12 (0.33) 
Tolon 1 if farmer is located in Tolon district, 0 
otherwise 
0.22 (0.41) 
Kumbungu 1 if farmer is located in Kumbungu district, 0 
otherwise 
0.24 (0.42) 
Savelugu Nanton 1 if farmer is located in Savelugunanton 
Municipal, 0 otherwise 
0.20 (0.40) 
Tamale 1 if farmer is located in Tamale metropolitan 
area, 0 otherwise 
0.20 (0.40) 
Sample size Number of observations 458 
Note: GH¢ is Ghanaian currency (US$1 = GH¢ 4.19), Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation 
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Table 5.2 also depicts that value chain participants travel longer distance to the nearest market 
and mostly own mobile phones. . With regards to social network variables, table 1 shows that 
participants are mostly (76%) members of horizontal social networks than non-participants 
(15%). Moreover, participants have higher number of network members who are also value 
chain participants than non-participants. Value chain participants constitute higher proportion 
of farmers with access to credit and are not credit constrained than non-participants. In this 
study, the dummy variable representing access to credit was constructed by gathering responses 
from a farmer on whether he/she needed credit to undertake production and marketing of rice 
for the 2015 growing season, and if so, whether he/she received the required amount applied 
for. Based on the responses, a farmer who did not need credit, or demanded credit, applied for 
it, and received the required amount is assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
the value chain participants sold higher quantities of paddy rice, received higher paddy price, 
and generated higher net returns from paddy production and marketing than non-participants. 
Table 5.2 also shows that both categories of participants also vary significantly in terms of the 
perception of paddy market demand in the previous season. In particular, participants constitute 
higher proportion of farmers with perception of high paddy market demand in the previous 
season than non-participants. In the next section, we verify whether these mean differences 
remain unchanged using rigorous analytical estimation model where all confounding factors 
are controlled for. 
5.5 Empirical results and discussion 
5.5.1 Social network and other factors influencing value chain participation decisions  
The estimation results of the factors influencing farmers’ decisions to participate in the rice 
value chain, and the impact of participation on paddy price, quantity of paddy traded, and net 
returns are presented in tables 5.3-5.5. The treatment effects model jointly estimates the value 
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chain participation and the outcome models using maximum likelihood method. The results of 
the factors influencing value chain participation decisions are presented in the second column  
Table 5.2: Differences in characteristics of farmers by value chain participation  
Variable Participants Non-participants Difference  
(t-stat.) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 39.29 11.94 35.97 11.22  3.05*** 
Education 3.09 4.60 2.40 4.20  1.66 * 
Gender  0.89 0.30 0.87  0.33  0.83 
Farm size  1.19 1.27 1.10 1.24  0.75 
Distance to market 7.20 4.37 6.06 3.76  2.99*** 
Bicycle  0.69 0.46 0.71  0.45 -0.37 
Road status 0.81 0.39 0.66 0.47  3.49*** 
Mobile phone 0.56 0.49 0.36 0.48  4.21*** 
Access to credit 0.53 0.50 0.30 0.45  5.17*** 
Market perception  0.50 0.50 0.22 0.41  6.47*** 
Horiz. social network 
relationship 
0.76 0.42 0.15 0.35  16.85*** 
VCP in farmer’s network 7.89 13.91 2.25 5.29  5.93*** 
Sagnarigu 0.22 0.42 0.04 0.20 6.13*** 
Tolon 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40  1.05 
Kumbungu 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 -0.32 
Savelugu Nanton 0.12 0.32 0.26 0.44 -3.89*** 
Tamale 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42  -1.79*** 
Price 1.33 0.35 1.11 0.12 9.22*** 
Quantity sold 1,191.27 800.63 820.17 695.69 5.305*** 
Net returns 1,057.95 1157.21 453.31 667.36 6.99*** 
Sample size 206 252  
Note: *, *** represent significance at 10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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of tables 5.3-5.5. The results show that variables with the same name in these tables exert 
statistically similar effects on value chain participation decisions. We interpret and discuss these 
variables together as normal probit estimates. As shown in the tables, the coefficients of the 
residuals predicted from the first-stage regression for the potential endogenous variables such 
as access to credit, horizontal social network relationship, and number of value chain 
participants in a farmer’s network are not significantly different from zero, suggesting that these 
variables have been consistently estimated (Wooldridge, 2015). As stated earlier, the treatment 
effects model is identified by excluding at least one variable in the value chain participation 
model from the outcome models. A variable representing farmer’s perception of paddy market 
demand is employed as an identifying instrument, which significantly influences farmers’ 
decisions to participate in a value chain but does not directly affect paddy price, quantity traded 
and net returns. As shown in tables 5.3-5.5, farmers with perception of high market paddy 
demand are more likely to participate in a value chain.  
The empirical results reveal the important role of social networks in influencing farmers’ 
decisions to participate in value chains. In particular, the coefficients of horizontal social 
network relationship and number of value chain participants in farmer’s network are positive 
and significantly different from zero, suggesting farmers who are members of social network 
group, and those with higher number of value chain participants as network members are more 
likely to participate in a value chain. This finding presents a strong evidence of the role of social 
network externalities in inclusive value chain participation. Also, the coefficients of all the 
average exogenous characteristics of the farmer’s peers except gender were not statistically 
different from zero, suggesting that contextual effects are absent. This means that farmer’s 
value chain participation decision is not correlated with the exogenous characteristics of his 
network members in the sample. Similarly, we did not did find evidence of correlated network 
effects in our results, as revealed by the statistically insignificant effects of the district dummies  
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Table 5.3: Impact of value chain participation and social networks on paddy price 
 
Variable  
 Participation  Paddy price 
Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err 
Constant   -11.624*** 3.407  0.859*** 0.124 
VC participation   - -  0.120*** 0.021 
Horiz. social network relationship 1.530*** 0.220 0.011** 0.005 
VCP in farmer’s network 0.043*** 0.012 0.007** 0.004 
Av. age 0.036 0.043 0.003 0.002 
Av. education 0.097 0.133 0.009 0.006 
Av. gender 5.310*** 2.040 0.032 0.087 
Av. Farm size 0.222 0.229 0.000 0.011 
Age 0.010 0.012 0.003 0.010 
Education 0.016 0.020 0.001 0.001 
Gender  0.138 0.314 0.004 0.017 
Farm size  0.049 0.068 0.008** 0.003 
Distance to market 0.051** 0.024 -0.001 0.001 
Bicycle  -0.006 0.205 0.000 0.011 
Road status 0.111 0.354 -0.014 0.010 
Mobile phone 0.072** 0.022 0.009** 0.004 
Access to credit 0.454*** 0.164 0.008*** 0.003 
Tolon 0.243 0.415 0.028 0.017 
Kumbungu -0.386 0.333 0.039** 0.015 
Savelugu Nanton 0.733 0.575 -0.004 0.017 
Market perception  0.712*** 0.170   
Residual (HSNR) -3.298 2.995   
Residual (VCPN) 0.011 0.036   
Residual (Access to credit) -0.736 2.061   
ath(𝜌𝜀𝜇) -0.222*** 0.012   
𝜌𝜀𝜇 -0.218*** 0.011   
ln (𝜎) -2.340*** 0.034   
Wald test (𝜌𝜀𝜇 = 0) 12.26***, with 
prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
  
Sample size 458   
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
156 
 
on value chain participation.  Other important determinants of value chain participation 
decisions include distance to market, mobile phone ownership, and access to credit. As shown 
in the results, distance to market exhibits positive and statistically significant effect on value 
chain participation decision at least at 5% level, implying that farmers who travel longer 
distance to markets are more likely to participate in the rice value chain. This finding is in line 
with intuition because in the study area, paddy sales by value chain participants are usually 
carried out at farmgate, which can reduce farmers’ transaction costs associated with 
transporting paddy to market centers. Value chain participation decisions are also positively 
and significantly influenced by mobile phone ownership. Farmers who own mobile phones are 
more likely to participate in value chains. Apart from the fact that farmers who own mobile 
phones can receive input and output price information, they are also able to effectively 
communicate with buyers to make arrangements for produce delivery (Zanello, 2012; Acker et 
al., 2016).  Farmers with access to enough credit, and not credit constrained are more likely to 
participate in value chains, as revealed by the positive and significant effect of this variable on 
value chain participation. Farmers with access to credit from financial institutions participate 
in value chains to ensure guaranteed market for their paddy and probably timely credit 
repayment. 
5.5.2 Impact of social networks and value chain participation on market performance 
The estimation results of the impact of value chain participation and social networks on paddy 
price, quantity traded, and net returns are presented in the third column of tables 5.3-5.5. As 
can be observed, the correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜀𝜇is found to be negative and significant in all the 
model specifications, suggesting the presence of selection bias due to unobserved factors, and 
lending support to the use of treatment effects model for the estimation. Moreover, the negative 
𝜌𝜀𝜇 indicates negative selection bias, which means that farmers with below average paddy price 
received, quantity of paddy traded, and net returns have a higher probability of participating in 
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the rice value chain. This finding is consistent with other recent studies that participation in 
value chains tend to benefit smallholder farmers in developing countries (eg. Rao and Qaim, 
2011; Michelson, 2013; Ma and Abdulai, 2017; Mishra et al., 2018). It can be observed from 
tables 5.3-5.5 that the Wald test is significant in the estimates, indicating a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the error terms in the value chain participation and 
outcome specifications. 
With regards to the factors influencing the market performance outcomes of interest, we find a 
positive and significant marginal effect of the value chain participation dummy on paddy prices, 
quantity traded, and net returns by about 12.0%, 61.2%, and 86.3%, respectively. This finding 
further confirms the role of inclusive value chains in improving smallholder market 
performance. The results also reveal that social networks do not only influence farmers’ 
decisions  to participate in value chains, but also play significant role in enhancing the market 
performance outcomes for value chain participating farmers, relative to those who produce and 
market paddy rice on their own. In particular, the variable representing horizontal social 
network relationship is found to have positive and significant effect on paddy price, quantity 
traded, and net returns, suggesting that farmers who are members of such a social network tend 
to benefit from these outcomes. As stated previously, horizontal social networks promote 
sharing of information on input and output prices, which serve as guide for collective 
negotiations with buyers for increased bargaining power and prices. Moreover, horizontal social 
network can serve as conduit for the introduction and adoption of improved productivity-
enhancing technologies and practices (Conley and Udry, 2001; Maertens and Barret, 2012), 
which tend to increase farm yields and consequently, quantities traded and net returns. The 
results also show that the social network variable representing number of value chain 
participants in farmer’s network also exerts a positive and significant effect on paddy price, 
quantity traded, and net returns. This finding suggests that an increase in the number of value  
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Table 5.4: Impact of social network and value chain participation on paddy quantity traded 
 
Variable  
 Participation  Quantity Traded 
Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err 
Constant   -5.070*** 1.685  5.043*** 0.754 
VC participation  - -  0.612*** 0.181 
Horiz. Social network relationship 1.565*** 0.218 0.771*** 0.113 
VCP in farmer’s network 0.042*** 0.012 0.018*** 0.006 
Av. age 0.043 0.043 0.024* 0.013 
Av. education 0.108 0.129 0.064* 0.037 
Av. gender 4.057* 2.095 0.267 0.529 
Av. Farm size 0.164 0.226 0.215*** 0.071 
Age 0.005 0.010 0.003  0.002 
Education 0.024 0.020 0.009 0.006 
Gender  0.216 0.312 0.319*** 0.100 
Farm size 0.039 0.073 0.228*** 0.023 
Distance to market 0.065** 0.025 -0.005 0.007 
Bicycle -0.032 0.203 -0.014 0.065 
Road status 0.141 0.295 0.039 0.064 
Mobile phone 0.078*** 0.025 0.029 ** 0.013 
Access to credit 0.452*** 0.160 0.013 * 0.060 
Tolon 0.222 0.423 0.147 ** 0.010 
Kumbungu -0.525 0.339 0.346*** 0.092 
Savelugu Nanton 0.253 0.609 0.151 0.104 
Market perception 0.715*** 0.205   
Residual (HSNR) -1.672 2.065   
Residual (VCPN) -0.002 0.034   
Residual (Access to credit) -0.476 2.028   
ath(𝜌𝜀𝜇) -0.359*** 0.100   
𝜌𝜀𝜇 -0.344*** 0.106   
ln (𝜎) -0.576*** 0.022   
Wald test (𝜌𝜀𝜇 = 0) 15.06***, with 
prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
  
Sample size 458    
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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chain participants who are members of farmer’s network tend to enhance market performance. 
As argued earlier, network members doubling as value chain participants can share information 
on value chain opportunities, which encourages participation, and improvement in market 
performance outcomes. Similar to the effects on farmers’ value chain participation decisions, 
the coefficients of the average characteristics of farmers’ peers were found to be weakly 
significant on quantity traded, but insignificant on prices received and net returns, suggesting 
lack of evidence of contextual network effects on these outcomes. The coefficient of the 
location variables have positive and statistically significant effect on paddy prices, quantities 
traded and net returns.  
Other factors influencing paddy prices received, quantity traded, and net returns, conditional on 
value chain participation include farmer’s age, farm size, gender, mobile phone ownership, 
access to credit, and location variables. The results show that farmer’s age exhibits positive and 
statistically significant effect on net returns but insignificant positive effect on prices received 
and quantity of paddy traded, suggesting that older farmers tend to generate higher net returns. 
Farm size is found to have a positive and significant effect on prices received, quantity traded, 
and net returns at least at the 5% level, indicating the important role it plays in improving 
smallholder market performance in agricultural value chains. This finding is consistent with 
other recent studies, which found that farm size positively and significantly increase market 
performance (e.g., Mishra et. al., 2018).  
The results also reveal positive and significant effect of gender variable on quantities traded 
and net return, suggesting that male farmers tend to sell higher quantities of paddy, and net 
returns, suggesting that male farmers tend to sell higher quantities of paddy, and also generate 
higher net returns from rice production and marketing, relative to female farmers. Ownership 
of mobile phones increases paddy price received, quantities traded, and net returns, as revealed 
by its positive and significant impact on these performance outcomes. Ownership of mobile  
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Table 5.5: Impact of value chain participation and social networks on net returns 
 
Variable  
 Participation  Net returns 
Coefficient Std. err Coefficient Std. err 
Constant   -10.977*** 3.464  5.222 *** 1.537 
VC participation   - -  0.863 ** 0.408 
Horiz. social network relationship 1.498*** 0.223 0.260 ** 0.140 
VCP in farmer’s network 0.043*** 0.013 0.062*** 0.006 
Av. age 0.045 0.045 0.019 0.026 
Av. education 0.101 0.135 0.013 0.076 
Av. gender 4.964** 2.087 0.302 1.077 
Av. Farm size 0.212 0.237 0.140 0.147 
Age 0.004 0.012 0.004 ** 0.002 
Education 0.014 0.021 0.010 0.013 
Gender  0.152 0.317 0.592*** 0.201 
Farm size  0.031 0.069 0.072 *** 0.026 
Distance to market 0.061** 0.024 -0.012 0.015 
Bicycle  -0.032 0.205  0.079 0.133 
Road status 0.147 0.298 -0.039 0.131 
Mobile phone 0.074*** 0.022 0.071 ** 0.029 
Access to credit 0.457*** 0.161 0.354*** 0.122 
Tolon 0.177 0.423 0.584*** 0.217 
Kumbungu -0.527 0.340 1.168*** 0.187 
Savelugu Nanton 0.433 0.586 0.595*** 0.215 
Market perception  0.718*** 0.207   
Residual (HSNR) -2.397 2.057   
Residual (VCPN) 0.002 0.035   
Residual (Access to credit) -0.872 2.100   
ath(𝜌𝜀𝜇) -0.211*** 0.024   
𝜌𝜀𝜇 -0.208*** 0.021   
ln(𝜎) 0.120*** 0.037   
Wald test (𝜌𝜀𝜇 = 0) 25.82***, with 
prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
  
Sample size 458   
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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phones can enhance net returns of smallholder farmers by lowering transaction costs associated 
with searching for input suppliers or produce buyers. Input and output price information can be 
received via mobile phone, which may serve as guide for negotiating satisfactory prices in both 
input and output markets (Aker et al., 2016). Moreover, farmers can also make informed 
decisions about the quantities traded based on the price information received via mobile phone. 
Access to credit exerts positive and significant impact on prices received, quantities traded, and 
net returns at least at the 10% level. This finding suggests that farmers who accessed credit, and 
not credit constrained tend to receive higher prices for paddy rice, trade in higher quantities, 
and also receive higher net returns. Depending on the measurement of smallholder market 
access, farmers with access to credit can negotiate for better prices for their produce to ensure 
timely credit repayment and satisfactory net returns. In addition, farmers who are not credit 
constrained are able to procure production inputs to increase output, as well as pay for expenses 
associated with hiring labor for production activities, thereby increasing quantity traded and net 
returns.   
5.5.3 Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) 
In this section, we compute the average treatment effects (ATEs), which measure the difference 
(causal impact) in the predicted market performances outcomes between value chain 
participants and non-participants as illustrated in equation (5). Note that selection bias 
stemming from both observed and unobserved factors are accounted for in estimating the ATEs. 
The results, which are presented in table 5.6, reveal significant positive impact of value chain 
participation on the market performance outcomes. In particular, smallholder participation in 
the rice value chain is associated with about 10%, 7%, and 6% increase in paddy price received, 
quantity of paddy traded, net returns, respectively. This finding is in line with intuition, and 
consistent with the notion that smallholder farmers benefit from inclusive value chain 
participation (Ragasa and Golan, 2014; Bellemare and Novak, 2016; Ma and Abdulai, 2016; 
Belemare and Lim, 2018). 
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Table 5.6: Average Treatment Effects (ATE) of value chain participation on market 
performance outcomes 
 
Outcome 
Variables 
 Mean Outcome   
 Participants  Non-participants  ATE t-value Change 
(%) 
Paddy price  0.830 0.753  0.077*** 16.01 10.22 
Quantity traded  7.540 7.031  0.509*** 48.68 7.23 
Net returns   6.614 6.229  0.385*** 74.03 6.18 
ATE of outcome variables disaggregated by farm size 
Paddy price        
Small (≤  1.0 ha)  0.824 0.747  0.077*** 12.68 10.30 
Medium              
(1.1 - 1.5 ha) 
 0.838 0.760  0.078*** 6.74 10.26 
Large (> 1.5)  0.843 0.765  0.078*** 9.70 10.19 
Quantity traded        
Small (≤  1.0 ha)  7.451 6.844  0.607*** 38.72 8.86 
Medium              
(1.1 - 1.5 ha) 
 7.614 7.202  0.412*** 20.50 5.72 
Large (> 1.5)  7.778 7.560  0.218*** 21.70 2.88 
Net returns        
Small (≤  1.0 ha)  6.480 6.097  0.383*** 58.96 6.28 
Medium              
(1.1 - 1.5 ha) 
 6.841 6.451  0.389*** 31.26 6.03 
Large (> 1.5)  6.926 6.535  0.391*** 32.85 5.98 
Note: *** refers to significance at 1% level. The dependent variables are the log of outcome 
variables. ATE calculation is based on the log of the predictions. 
 
It is important to point out that the estimation of the aggregate effect of farm size on market 
performance outcomes, as reported in table 3 and discussed in section 5.2 above, may not reveal 
actual farm size effects.  Therefore, we estimate the causal impact of value chain participation 
on the market performance outcomes - paddy price, quantity traded, and net returns - for 
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different farm sizes. We argue that this disaggregation provides further insights into differential 
impacts of value chain participation on the outcomes for various farm sizes. Based on our data, 
we classify farm size into three categories: small (≤ 1.0 ha), medium (1.1 - 1.5 ha), and large (> 
1.5). As shown in table 4, value chain participation significantly increases paddy prices, 
quantity traded, and net returns for all the farm size categories, relative to non-participation. 
However, differential increments of these outcomes have been recorded for the different farm 
sizes, although not statistically significant. In particular, relative to non-participants, value 
chain participating farmers with small rice farm sizes receive the highest paddy price (10.30%), 
followed by farmers with medium farm sizes (10.26%). The lowest paddy prices are received 
by value chain participating farmers with larger farm sizes (10.19%). This finding suggests that 
farmers with small farm sizes tend to benefit the most from paddy prices when participating in 
agrifood value chains in the study area. Similar pattern of results can be observed for quantities 
traded and net returns. In particular, relative to non-participation, value chain participation is 
associated with significantly higher quantity traded by 8.86%, 5.72%, and 2.88% for farmers 
with small, medium, and large farm sizes, respectively. Similarly, rice farmers with small farm 
sizes who are value chain participants generate the highest (6.28%) net returns from rice 
production and marketing, followed by farmers with medium farm sizes (6.03%), and the lowest 
net returns is obtained by farmers with large farm sizes (5.98%). These findings are contrary to 
the assertion by Swinnen et al. (2010), but consistent with the study by Mishra et al. (2018) that 
smallholder farmers tend to benefit significantly from inclusive agrifood value chain 
participation for low-value crops such as rice in developing countries like Ghana. 
5.6 Conclusions  
In this study, we examined the role of inclusive value chains and social networks in improving 
smallholder market performance outcomes such as paddy price, quantity of paddy traded, and 
net returns, using data from a recent survey of 458 smallholder rice farmers from five districts 
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in northern Ghana. We employed treatments effects model in the empirical estimations to 
account for potential selection bias associated with both observed and unobserved factors. The 
estimation results revealed the presence of negative selection bias, implying that rice farmers 
with below average paddy price, quantity traded, and net returns are more likely to participate 
in a value chain. The empirical results showed that participation in a value chain contributes 
significantly to increased paddy prices, quantity traded, and net returns by 10%, 7%, and 6%, 
respectively. Relative to non-participants, value chain participating farmers with small farm 
sizes tend to benefit the most from these market performance outcomes, compared to those with 
medium and large farm sizes. This implies that inclusive value chain participation for low-value 
crops like rice improves smallholder market performance in developing countries such as 
Ghana.  
The empirical results also show that social networks significantly influence smallholder 
farmers’ inclusion in agricultural value chains, and improve market performance. Smallholder 
farmers who are members of horizontal social networks, and those with network members who 
are already value chain participants, are more likely to also participate in a value chain. This 
category of farmers also tend to benefit from increased paddy prices, quantity traded, and net 
returns. Similarly, value chain participation decisions are positively and significantly 
influenced by distance to market, mobile phone ownership and access to credit. The empirical 
results also revealed that mobile phone ownership, and access to credit exert positive and 
significant effects on paddy prices, quantity traded, and net returns of smallholder rice farmers 
in the value chain.  
Important policy implications can be drawn from the findings of this study. The significance of 
inclusive value chain participation in improving smallholder market performance calls for all 
stakeholder collaboration towards continuous promotion of agricultural value chain 
development for smallholder farmers. Agricultural value chain development interventions 
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could focus on setting incentives capable of promoting agribusiness transformation. This could 
include, but not limited to, investment in market infrastructure (e.g., grain dryers, warehouses), 
technology transfer and economic stimulus policies, as well as processing facilities to enhance 
value chain efficiency and smallholder market access. Government policies that promote credit 
access by facilitating smallholder linkages with financial service providers in value chain 
interventions could ease smallholder credit constraints for improved production and market 
performance. With effective coordination and implementation, value chain development 
programs have the potential to not only benefit smallholder production and market 
performance, but also create rural and off-farm jobs in agro-processing, as well as accelerate 
rural structural change. The promotion of social networks within the context of inclusive value 
chain development can contribute to upgrading developing country value chains in the cereal 
staple sector. It remains important that in value chain development interventions, smallholder 
farmers are organized into groups, and their capacities built to become strong and cohesive 
social network groups for effective and efficient participation in value chains. The capacity 
building can strengthen the connectedness of network members, and promote sharing of 
diversity of knowledge and resources for improved power balance and bargaining position in 
the value chain. 
  
166 
 
References 
Akar, J. C., Ghosh, I., and Burrell, J. (2016). The promise (and pitfalls) of ICT for agriculture  
initiatives. Agricultural Economics, 47(2016): 35-48. 
 
Bandiera, O., Rasul I., 2006. Social networks and technology adoption in northern  
Mozambique. Economic Journal, 116, 869-902. 
 
Bellemare, M.F., 2012. As you sow, so shall you reap: The welfare impacts of contract 
farming. World Development, 40, 1418-1434. 
 
Bellemare, M.F., Novak, L. (2016). Contract farming and food security. American Journal of  
Agricultural Economics, 99 (2), 357-378. 
 
Bellemare, M.F., Lim, S., 2018. In all shapes and colors: varieties of contract farming. Applied  
Economic Perspectives and Policy, 40 (3), 379-401. 
 
Bernard, T., Spielman, D. J., Taffesse, A. S., Gabre-Madhin, E. Z., 2010. Cooperatives for  
staple crop marketing: evidence from Ethiopia. IFPRI Research Monograph 164. 
Washington DC, USA. 
 
Bijman, J., Omta, S.W.F., Trienekens, J. H., Wijnands, J.H.M., and Wubben, E.M.F. (2006).  
Management and organization in international agri-food chains and networks. In 
International agri-food chains and networks, Management and organization. 
Wageningen Academic Publishers 15-28.  
 
Bijman, J., Muradian, R., Cechin, A., 2011. Agricultural cooperatives and value chain  
coordination. In Value Chains, Inclusion, and Endogenous Development: Contrasting 
Theories and Realities, 82-101 (Eds B. Helmsing and S. Vellema). New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Conley, T., Udry, C., 2001. Social learning through networks: The adoption of new agricultural  
technologies in Ghana. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83 (3), 668-673. 
 
Cong, R., Drukker, D. M., 2000. sg141-Treatment effects model. Stata Technical Bulletin, May  
167 
 
2000 STB-55. 
 
Devaux, A., Torero, M., Donovan, J., Horton, D., 2018. Agricultural innovation and inclusive  
value-chain development: a review. Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and 
Emerging Economies, 8(1), 99-123. 
 
Dillon, B., Dambro, C., 2017. How competitive are crop markets in sub-Saharan African?  
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 99(5), 1344-1361. 
 
Ecker, O., 2018. Agricultural transformation and food and nutrition security in Ghana: Does  
farm production diversity (still) matter for household dietary diversity? Food policy, 79, 
271-282. 
 
Faltermeier, L., Abdulai, A., 2009. The impact of conservation and intensification technologies:  
empirical evidence for rice farmers in Ghana. Agricultural Economics, 40, 365-379. 
 
Fischer, E. and Qaim, M. (2012). Linking smallholders to markets: Determinants and impacts  
of farmer collective action in Kenya, World Development, 40 (6): 1255–1268. 
 
Henderson, H., Isaac, A. G., 2017. Modern value chains and the organization of agrarian 
production. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 99, 379-400. 
 
Herforth, N., Theuvsen, L., Vasquez, W., Wollni, M., 2015. Understanding participation in  
modern supply chains under a social network perspective –evidence from blackberry 
farmers in the Ecuadorian Andes. Global Food Discussion Paper No. 54.  
 
Humphrey, J., Navas-Aleman, L., 2010. Value chain, donor interventions and poverty  
reduction: a review of donor practice, IDS Research Report 63, Institute of Development 
Studies, Brighton, UK.  
 
Kilelu, C. W., Klerkx, L., Leeuwis, C., 2017. Supporting smallholder commercialization by  
enhancing integrated coordination in agrifood value chains: experiences with dairy hubs 
in Kenya. Experimental Agriculture, 53(2), 269-287. 
 
168 
 
Ma, W., Abdulai, A., 2016. Does cooperative membership improve household welfare?  
Evidence from apple farmers in China. Food Policy, 58, 94–102. 
 
Ma, W., Abdulai, A., 2017. The economic impacts of agricultural cooperatives on smallholder  
farmers in rural China. Agribusiness: an International Journal, 33, 537-551.  
 
Maertens, M., &Vande Velde, K., 2017. Contract farming in staple food chains: The case of  
rice in Benin. World Development, 95, 73–89. 
 
Maertens, A. & Barrett, C., 2012. Measuring social networks’ effect on agricultural  
technology adoption. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 95 (2), 353-359. 
 
Mano, Y., Yamano, T., Suzuki, A. & Matsumoto, T. (2011). Local and Personal Networks in  
Employment and the Development of Labor Markets: Evidence from the Cut Flower 
Industry in Ethiopia. World Development, 39 (10), 1760-1770. 
 
Manski, C.F. (2000). Economic analysis of social interactions. National bureau of economic  
research.  
 
Manski, C.F. (1993). Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection problem.  
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 531–542. 
 
Mekonnen, D. A., Gerber, N., Matz, J. A. (2018). Gendered social networks, agricultural  
innovations, and farm productivity in Ethiopia. World Development, 105, 321-335. 
 
Michelson, H. C. (2013). Small farmers, NGOs, and a walmart world: welfare effects of 
supermarkets operating in Nicaragua. American Journal of AgriculturalEconomics,95, 
628-649. 
 
Mishra, A. K., Kumar, A., Joshi, P. K., D’souza, A., 2018. Cooperatives, contract farming, and  
Farmsize: The case of tomato producers in Nepal. Agribusiness: an International 
Journal, 2018, 1–22. 
 
Mishra, A. K., Kumar, A., Joshi, P. K., D’souza, A., 2018. Impact of contract farming on yield,  
169 
 
costs and profitability in low-value crop: evidence from a low-income country. 
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 00, 1-19. 
 
MoFA (Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture), 2017. Planting for food and Jobs: strategic  
plan for implementation (2017-2020). Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Accra, Ghana. 
 
Morgan, M., 2012. Social networks and value chain development. Technical note. The Seep  
Network. Arlington, Virginia, USA. 
 
Mojo, D., Fischer, C., and Degefa, T. (2017). The determinants and economic impacts of  
membership in coffee farmer cooperatives: recent evidence from rural Ethiopia. Journal 
of Rural Studies, 50 (2017): 84-94. 
 
Poulton, C., Dorward, A., Kydd, J., 2010. The future of small firms: New directions for services,  
institutions, and intermediation. World Development, 38(10), 1413-1428. 
 
Ragasa, C., & Golan, J. (2014). The role of rural producer organizations for agricultural service  
provision in fragile states. Agricultural Economics, 45, 537-553. 
 
Ramirez, M., Bernal, P., Clarke, I., Hernandez, I., 2018. The role of social networks in the  
inclusion of small-scale producers in agri-food developing clusters. Food Policy (2018), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2018.04.005.  
 
Rao, E.J.O., &Qaim, M. (2011). Supermarkets, farm household income, and poverty: insights  
from Kenya. World Development, 39, 784-796. 
 
Reardon, T., Barret, C.B., Berdegué, J.A., &Swinnen, J.F.M. (2009). Agrifood industry 
transformation and small farmers in developing countries. World Development,37, 
1717-1727. 
 
Ruben, R., Slingerland, M, Nijhoff, H., 2006. Agro-food chains and networks for development:  
Issues, approaches and strategies. In The Agro-food chains and networks for 
development, 1-25 (Eds R. Ruben, M. Slingerland and H. Nijhoff). Netherland: 
Springer.  
170 
 
 
Swinnen, J., Kuijpers, R., 2017. Value chain innovations for technology transfer in developing  
and emerging economies: Conceptual issues, typology, and policy implications. Food 
Policy (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.07.013.  
 
Swinnen, J., Vandeplas, A. and Maertens, M. (2010). Governance and Surplus Distribution in  
Commodity Value Chains in Africa, in Sarris, A. and Morrison, J. (eds) Food Security 
in Africa: Market and Trade Policy for Staple Foods in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
Edwards Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 77–88. 
 
Trienekens, J. H., 2011. Agricultural value chains in developing countries. A framework for  
analysis. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 14(2), 51-82. 
 
Ton, G., Vellema, S., de wildt, M. R., 2011. Development impacts of value chain interventions:  
how to collect credible evidence and draw valid conclusions in impact evaluations? 
Journal on Chain and Network Science, 11(1), 69-84. 
 
World Bank, 2007. World development report 2008: agriculture for development, World Bank,  
Washington DC, USA. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2015). Control function methods in applied econometrics. The Journal of  
Human Resources. 50(2): 421-445. 
 
Wydick, B., Hayes, H. &Kempf, S. (2011). Social networks, neighborhood effects, and  
credit access: evidence from rural Guatemala. World Development, 39 (6), 974–982. 
  
171 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 5.A1: First-stage regression results for addressing potentially endogenous variables 
 Access to credit Horiz. Social 
network 
VCP in farmer’s 
network 
Variable Coefficient  S. E Coefficient  S. E Coefficient  S. E 
Constant  -1.660*** 0.370 -1.489*** 0.404 4.930*** 0.638 
Age 0.005 0.005 0.020*** 0.005 -0.014*** 0.002 
Education 0.003 0.014 0.007 0.016 0.038*** 0.004 
Gender  0.196 0.229 0.159 0.250 -0.187*** 0.071 
Farm size  0.003 0.053 0.030 0.056 -0.367*** 0.043 
Distance to market 0.003 0.016 0.045** 0.021 0.024*** 0.005 
Bicycle  0.081 0.148 -0.122 0.160 -0.213*** 0.050 
Road status 0.168 0.148 0.541*** 0.159 -0.013 0.054 
Mobile phone 0.250 ** 0.139 0.074 0.141 0.473*** 0.047 
Tolon -0.114 0.240 -0.435 0.274 -0.686*** 0.077 
Kumbungu 0.006 0.203 -0.492 ** 0.221 -0.247*** 0.070 
Savelugu Nanton 0.023 0.235 -0.986*** 0.290 -0.497*** 0.088 
Market perception  0.288** 0.142 0.784*** 0.148 0.325*** 0.049 
Av. Age 0.009 0.029 0.051 0.031 -0.035*** 0.011 
Av. Education  -0.114 0.085 0.097 0.090 -0.325*** 0.032 
Av. Gender  0.389 1.197 -2.620** 1.324 -1.029** 0.416 
Av. Farm size 0.230 0.158 0.035 0.166 -0.087 0.067 
Access to credit - - 0.258 * 0.137 0.010 0.045 
Distance to credit instit. -0.034 ** 0.013 - - - - 
Horiz. social network 
relationship 
0.248 *  0.142 - - 0.410*** 0.053 
Distance to NMs meeting 
ground 
- - -0.062** 0.030 - - 
VCP in farmer’s network 0.001 0.006 0.011 * 0.006 - - 
Neighbors 5km around 
farmer’s home  
- - - - 0.008*** 0.004 
Log likelihood -287.98 -240.22 -2771.13 
Number of observations 458 458 458 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.A2: Instrument variable test for the Treatment Effects model (market perception) 
Treatment effects model Chi-square (𝑋2) 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
Value chain participation decision  7.28 0.005 
Paddy price 0.76 0.384 
Value chain participation decision 8.08 0.001 
Quantity traded 1.28 0.258 
Value chain participation decision 10.39 0.000 
Net returns 0.57 0.448 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The rapid transformation of agrifood value chains in developing countries, driven by factors 
such as urbanization, increasing consumer incomes, changes in consumer dietary requirements, 
among others has presented valuable opportunities for smallholder farmers’ integration into 
these chains. This study has contributed to the growing literature on smallholder farm and 
market performance impacts associated with participation in agrifood value chains in 
developing countries including Ghana. First, the study has examined the vertical coordination 
mechanisms- written contracts, verbal contracts and spot market- used for output market 
transactions in farmer-buyer relationships in agrifood value chains, and the impact of these 
mechanisms on farm performance including net farm income, total farm income, total 
household income, labor productivity and price margins. Second, due to the renewed interests 
of governments, donor agencies and the private sector in farmer groups’ role in enhancing 
effective value chain participation by smallholder farmers, this study has drawn a link between 
farmer group membership and collective marketing, and their implications on improving 
smallholder farmers’ livelihoods in northern Ghana.  
Third, the study has also explored the important role farmer groups play in improving 
smallholder farm performance such as farm yield and technical efficiency. Finally, the study 
examined the contribution of inclusive value chain participation and social networks to 
enhancing smallholder farmers’ market performance outcomes such as prices received, quantity 
traded, and net returns. In the following sections, the analytical methods employed in the 
empirical estimations are summarized and presented, followed by summary of the main results 
of the study. Suggested policy implications based on the findings from the study are presented 
in the last section.     
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6.1 Summary of empirical methods 
The empirical methods employed in this study include multinomial BFG model, bivariate probit 
model, endogenous switching regression (ESR), propensity score matching method, sample 
selection stochastic production frontier model, and treatment effects model. Given the fact that 
farmers self-select into participating in agrifood value chains, horizontal coordination (farmer 
groups, collective marketing), and vertical coordination (written contracts, verbal contracts and 
spot markets) mechanisms, some of the factors (observed and unobserved) influencing farmers’ 
participation decisions in these mechanisms may also influence their farm and market 
performance outcomes. This leads to potential selection bias stemming from both observed and 
unobserved factors, which needs to be addressed in the empirical estimations to obtain unbiased 
and consistent outcome impact estimates.        
In chapter two, the multinomial BFG model was employed to examine the factors influencing 
smallholder rice farmers’ decisions to participate in vertical coordination mechanisms such as 
written contracts, verbal contracts, and spot market, and the impact of these factors on farm 
performance outcomes including net farm income, total farm income, total household income, 
labor productivity and price margins. The multinomial BFG model is a two-stage impact 
assessment procedure involving the estimation of a multinomial logit model in the first-stage 
to examine the determinants of vertical coordination mechanism participation, and the 
computation of selectivity correction terms, which are included in the second-stage to estimate 
the farm performance outcomes consistently. The causal impacts of vertical coordination 
mechanisms: written contracts and verbal contracts on farm performance, relative to spot 
market transactions are also evaluated using the model. The multinomial BFG model accounts 
for selection bias due to both observed and unobserved factors. 
Chapter three employed the bivariate probit and endogenous switching regression models to 
assess the factors influencing farmer group and collective market participation decisions, and 
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the impact of these decisions on farm net revenues among smallholder rice farmers in northern 
Ghana. First, the joint determination of group membership and collective marketing decisions, 
and the related drivers of both decisions are estimated using a bivariate probit regression model. 
In the bivariate probit regression model estimation, if farmers’ decisions to join farmer groups 
and also to participate in collective marketing are interrelated, which is indicated by a 
significant 𝜌, then employing the traditional univariate probit model would generate biased and 
inconsistent estimates. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood method. Second, due 
to farmers’ self-selection into farmer groups and collective marketing, an endogenous switching 
regression model is also employed to examine the factors influencing farmer group and 
collective market participation decisions (binary endogenous treatment variables) and the 
impact of these factors on farm net revenues (continuous outcome variable). Full information 
maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the ESR model. Selection bias arising from 
both observed and unobserved factors are accounted for in the empirical estimations. Moreover, 
the ESR model also allows for the computation of average treatment effects (ATT) of farmer 
group and collective market participation on farm net revenues.  
In chapter four, the impact of farmer groups on farm yield and technical efficiency among 
smallholder rice farmers is examined using propensity score matching and sample selection 
stochastic production frontier approaches. Using the PSM method, a counterfactual group of 
farmers with similar time-invariant characteristics as farmer group members is constructed for 
the analysis. The method involves fitting a binary (in our case probit) model to generate 
propensity scores, which are then used to match group members and non-members with similar 
observed time-invariant characteristics. The PSM method accounts for farmers’ self-selection 
into farmer group participation arising from observed farmer attributes. After the matching 
procedure, the sample selection stochastic production frontier model is estimated, and 
compared with the estimates from conventional stochastic production frontier model in the 
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analysis for both matched and unmatched samples. The sample selection stochastic production 
frontier model accounts for farmers’ self-selection into farmer group participation due to 
unobserved farmer attributes. It is important to mention that accounting for the self-selection 
allows for the estimation of unbiased and consistent farmer group impact estimates.  
The treatment effects model is employed in the empirical estimations in chapter five to examine 
the role of inclusive value chain participation and social networks in improving market 
performance among smallholder rice farmers in northern Ghana. The market performance 
outcomes considered in this chapter are paddy prices received by farmers, quantity of paddy 
traded, and net returns. With the treatment effects method, the factors influencing inclusive 
value chain participation and their related effects on the market performance outcomes can be 
examined. It also allows for the estimation of the marginal effects and average treatment effects 
of inclusive value chain participation on the market performance outcomes, and as well 
accounts for selection bias arising from both observed and unobserved farmer attributes.  
6.2 Summary of results 
In chapter two, the results showed that participation in written and verbal contracts in 
smallholder output transactions tend to improve farm performance outcomes such as net farm 
income, total farm income, total household income, labor productivity and price margins, 
relative to farmers who supply paddy in spot market. Farmers who participate in written 
contracts tend to perform better than their counterparts who engage buyers through verbal 
contracts. The results further showed that participation in vertical coordination is significantly 
influenced by access to credit, mobile phone ownership, labor, membership in farmers’ 
associations, sales to institutional buyers, market perception, and importance attached to legal 
contracts. Education, farm size, mobile phone and farm vehicle ownership are found to be the 
important determinants of farm performance. 
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The results in chapter three revealed that farmers that were members of farmer groups and 
participated in collective marketing obtained higher prices, and also incurred lower input costs. 
In addition, farmers’ decisions on farmer group and collective market participation are shown 
to be jointly determined, indicating that most farmers with group membership also participate 
in collective marketing. The empirical results support the notion that farmer group membership 
and collective market participation decisions in smallholder agriculture essentially enhance 
farmers’ livelihoods through improvement in farm net revenues. Farmer’s age, access to credit, 
mobile phone ownership, distance to market and road status are found to be the main drivers of 
farmer group and collective market participation decisions. The empirical results also showed 
that both group membership and participation in collective marketing exerted positive and 
statistically significant impacts on farm net revenues. 
In chapter four, the findings indicate that unobserved attributes such as farmer motivation, 
innate skills, and risk attitude influence farmer group participation decisions. The empirical 
results revealed that members of farmer groups benefit significantly from improved yield and 
technical efficiency. In particular, farmer group members operate closer to their own production 
frontier than nonmembers. Moreover, the yield and efficiency gaps between group members 
and nonmembers increase significantly when self-selection is taken into account in the analysis. 
This means that in nonrandomized studies, it is important to account for self-selection when 
examining farmer welfare gains. The empirical results further showed that farmer’s age, access 
to credit and irrigation, extension visits, distance to markets positively influence participation 
in farmer groups. Moreover, rice yield is positively and significantly influenced by land, 
fertilizer, chemicals, rice variety, soil quality and access to irrigation for both farmer group 
members and nonmembers. 
The empirical results in chapter five showed that participation in rice value chain is associated 
with increased paddy prices received, quantity traded, and net returns, relative to non-
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participation. Moreover, participating farmers with small farm sizes tend to benefit the most 
from improved market performance outcomes, relative to those with medium and large farm 
sizes. Social networks have also been found to promote inclusive value chain participation. In 
particular, smallholder farmers who are members of horizontal social networks, and those with 
network members who are already value chain participants, are more likely to also participate 
in a value chain. Such category of farmers also tend to benefit from increased paddy prices, 
quantity traded, and net returns. Distance to market, mobile phone ownership, and access to 
credit positively and significantly influence farmers’ value chain participation decisions. In 
addition, gender, farm size, mobile phone ownership, and access to credit tend to influence 
smallholder market performance positively.  
6.3 Policy implications  
Several important policy implications can be drawn from the findings of this study, which 
suggest that written and verbal contracts are effective vertical coordination mechanisms that 
benefit smallholder farmers in output market transactions. This calls for promotion of contracts 
in smallholder output transactions, especially with the renewed interests of government, donor 
agencies, and the private sector in transforming the domestic rice value chain in Ghana. These 
stakeholders should as well intensify their engagement with smallholder farmers on the 
importance and use of legal contracts in output transactions, which could be an important 
contributor to improved and effective participation in agrifood value chains.  
The important role of farmer groups in improving smallholder farm performance, as evidenced 
in this study, calls for increased support from government, development agencies, and private 
agribusiness companies in farmer group formation when implementing agriculture and value 
chain development interventions. Moreover, these interventions should as well incorporate 
strategies to facilitate smallholder collective marketing. Such development efforts could help 
address the multiple production and marketing challenges facing smallholder farmers in 
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northern Ghana. The findings also suggest that social networks within the context of inclusive 
value chain development should be promoted since it can contribute to upgrading developing 
country value chains especially in the cereal staple sector. Capacity building of smallholder 
farmer groups to become strong and cohesive social network groups can strengthen the 
connectedness of network members, and promote sharing of diversity of knowledge and 
resources for improved power balance and bargaining position in agricultural value chains. 
Finally, policy initiatives to expand irrigation facilities, improve smallholder access to credit, 
extension services, and education could ease smallholder constraints, promote pro-poor 
agricultural growth and smallholder farmers’ welfare in northern Ghana. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
 
Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel, Germany  
Institute of Food Economics and Consumption Studies 
 
Coordination and Impact of Value Chain Approach, Evidence from Rice Value Chain in 
Northern Ghana 
Questionnaire for smallholder rice farmers 
This questionnaire is purposely for field survey on rice value chain in Northern Ghana. Please 
note that all information provided is for research purposes only and shall be kept strictly 
confidential. Thank you in advance for participating in this interview. 
 
Survey Identification 
Questionnaire number  ----------------------------------------------------- 
District& Community            -----------------------------------------------------  
Name of enumerator   ----------------------------------------------------- 
Code of enumerator  ----------------------------------------------------- 
Date of interview  ----------------------------------------------------- 
Time started                            ----------------------------------------------------- 
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Section A: Socio-demographic features of respondents 
Please provide the following basic information about the respondent 
A.1 Name of respondent……………………………………………………………………… 
A.2 Contact and house no. of respondent…………………………………………………….. 
A.3 Age of respondent………….(years) A.4 Number of years in school…………………… 
A.5 please complete the table below on other information about the respondent (table 1) 
Characteristics  Information   Characteristics  Information  
Gender 1=Male 
2=female 
Family kind 1=Monogamous 
2=Polygamous 
Marital status 1=Married 
2=Unmarried 
3=widowed 
4=Divorced 
5=separated 
Religion 1=Islam 
2=Christianity 
3=traditional 
4=None 
Relationship 
with 
Household 
head 
1=Head 
2=Spouse 
3=Child 
4=Parent 
5=other 
(specify)…….. 
……………… 
Ethnicity 
(Tribe) 
1=Dagomba 
2=Mamprusi 
3=Gonja 
4=Moshi 
5=other 
(specify)……………………
….. 
Gender of HH 1=Male 
2=Female 
Number of 
children 
 
................................... 
Status in 
community 
1=chief 
2=Imam/pastor/traditi
onalist 
3=Member 
4=”Magazia” 
5=Other(specify) 
………………… 
Educational 
Level 
1=Primary 
2=JHS 
3=SHS 
4=Tertiary  
5=Other(specify)……………
……….  
Family System 1=Nuclear 
2=Extended 
Household Size  
……………………………
……. 
Experience of 
HH (years) 
 
------------------- 
 HH years of 
schooling 
 
-----------------------------------
------ 
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A.6 When did you start farming on your own? ……………………..(years) 
A.7 When did you start cultivating rice? …………………………….(years) 
A.8 What is your major occupation? ………………………………………………. 
A.9 What is your secondary occupation? ………………………………………….. 
A.10 Please complete the table below on the age composition of the household members  
Children (less 
than 18 
years) 
Youths (18 - 
30 years) 
Adult 30 - 60 
years) 
Aged (above 
60 years) 
Male family 
farm workers 
Female family 
farm workers  
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
                        
            
 
Rice Production Information for 2015 Growing Season 
B Land Utilization and Land Preparation Information 
B.1 What is the total size of your farm land? ---------------- (Ha)  
B.2 What size of your land did you use for rice farming in 2015? ----------------------------------  
B.3What is the mode of acquisition of the farm land? (1) inherited (2) bought (3) tenancy (4) 
borrowed (5) other(specify)……………….. 
B.4 If tenant, what type of tenancy arrangement did you operate? (1) fixed rent (2) 
sharecropping  
B.5 If fixed rent: duration of tenure? -------------------- (years)  
B.6 How much do you pay for tenancy per year? ---------- (GhC)  
B.7 If share cropping, what arrangement or percentage of the crop do you give the land owner? 
----  
B.8 If land owner; what size of your land is currently under lease/rented out? --------- (Ha)  
B.9 Kindly provide information on land use for crop cultivation (in different locations) in 2015 
growing season (table 2) 
Item Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot 4 
Size (Ha)     
Rice (Ha)     
Other crops 
planted(Include 
Ha of each 
crop) 
1= 
2= 
3= 
1= 
2= 
3= 
1= 
2= 
3= 
1= 
2= 
3= 
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Distance from 
home (km) 
    
 
B.10 Do you keep some part of your land under fallow? (1) yes (2) no  
B.11 If yes for how long has the land been under fallow? ..................................... (years)  
B.12 What is the total farm land under sole rice cultivation? (Ha) --------------------------------  
B.13 What is the total farm land under rice intercropped with other crops? (Ha) ---------------  
B.14 What is the total farm land under cultivation of other crops? (Ha) --------------------------  
B.15 What is the overall type of the soil on your farm? (1) clayey (2) loamy (3) sandy  
B.16 Have you ever carried out soil test on your farm? (1) yes (2) no  
B.17 Do you practice crop rotation on the piece of land rice is cultivated? (1) yes (2) no  
B.18 Do you plant land enriching cover crops and legumes purposely to improve soil quality? 
(1) yes (2) no  
B.19 How will you describe the main soil on which rice is planted ----------- (1) fertile (2) 
better than average (3) Average (4) below average 
B.20 How long have you used this land for rice cultivation since you acquired it? .........(years)  
B.21 Has the land ever been under fallow after acquisition? (1) yes (2) no                                  
B.22 If yes, for how long? .................... (years)                                                                                                
B.23 How many planting season did you plant rice in 2015? (1) major season (2) Irrigation                 
B.24 Which tools did you use for rice cultivation in 2015 season? [    ] [     ] [     ] [     ]                                          
1=cutlass, 2= hoes, 3= tractor, 4=plough, 5=ridger, 6=harrow, 7=other facility (specify),                                          
B.25 Which land preparation method did you employ in 2015 growing season (1) Manual (2) 
Tractor                   
B.26 If tractor, please complete the table below on the cost of land preparation per hectare of 
rice in 2015 growing season (table 3) 
Item Plot 1 (GHc) Plot 2(GHc) Plot 3(GHc) Plot 4(GHc) 
Size     
Land clearing 
(slashing) 
    
1st ploughing     
2nd Ploughing     
Harrowing     
Ridging      
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transplanting     
others     
     
Value Chain Activities/Services 
C. Formal Value Chain Participation 
C.1 Are you currently benefiting or have you ever benefited from a rice value chain 
development project? (1) Yes (2) No 
C.2 If yes to C1 above, please provide information on your value chain project participation in 
the table below 
Name of VC project Year 
began 
Year 
ended 
Satisfactory? 1=yes 2=no 
3=don’t know 
    
    
    
    
    
 
C.3 which of the following services did you benefit from the project (tick the ones 
applicable) 
(i) Capacity building services (production techniques, Business development and marketing, 
group dynamics)                                                                                                                                                        
(ii) Attending business networking events                                                                                             
(iii) Crop insurance services                                                                                                                     
(iv) Quality assurance services and quality improvement standards                                                       
(v) Market linkage services (contract design, negotiation meetings/platforms)                                                
(vii) Market information services (prices, product demand, and quality specification)                            
(viii) Microfinance services (credit acquisition ) 
C.4 Are you willing to pay for these value chain services? (1) Yes (2) No 
C.5 If no, please state reasons for your inability to pay for these services 
C.6 If yes in C.5, which of the services are you willing to pay for? (use the roman numerals) 
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C.7 Before participating in formal rice value chains, what were your expectations? Multiple 
response is allowed ………(1) Yield increase (2) increased revenue (3) reduced cost (4) 
labour savings (5) food security, (6) input subsidy (7) other (specify)………………………… 
C.8 Were your expectations met? (1) yes (2) No 
C.9 if no to C.8, why?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------- 
C.10 if yes to C.8, how?------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
C.11 Please provide information on your participation in rice value chain project  
Item  Before participation During participation 
Participants  Non-
participants 
Participants  Non-
participants 
Land size (Ha)     
Cost of rice production per 
hectare (GhC) 
    
Quantity of rice harvested in 
2015 (kg) 
    
Quantity of rice sold in a 
year (kg) 
    
Price per kg of paddy (GhC)     
 
D. Planting Information 
D.1 Please provide information on planting activities for 2015 growing season in table 4 
below 
Item   Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot 4 
Size (Ha)     
Varieties of rice planted     
Reasons for planting the 
varieties 
    
Duration of crop planted 
(months) 
    
List the other crops planted 
on the plot 
1= 
2= 
3= 
1= 
2= 
3= 
1= 
2= 
3= 
1= 
2= 
3= 
Quantity of seeds planted 
(kg) 
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How much did you buy 1kg 
of the seed? 
    
How many times did you 
plant rice on this plot in 
2015 planting seasons? 
    
 
 
 
D.2 What is the source of the rice seed you used for planting in 2015 growing season? ---------
---------- 
1=Mofa, 2= family member, 3=own seeds kept from last harvest, 4= farmer friend, 5=NGO 
6=village seed merchant 7=other (specify) 
D.3 What is the source of knowledge of the rice varieties you planted in 2015 growing 
season? ----------1=farmer from the village, 2= farmer from another village, 3= private seed 
company, 4=MoFA/Extension Services 5=NGO (specify name), 6=local market, 7 = Agro-
input dealer 8=other (specify) 
D.4 If not MoFA in D.3, is the source a member of formal value chain? (1) Yes (2) No 
E Fertilizer Application, Pest, disease and Weed Management 
E.1 Did you apply fertilizer on your rice field? (1) Yes (2) No 
E.2 If yes to E.1, please provide detailed information on fertilizer use in 2015 growing season 
in the table below. 
Name of 
fertilizer 
Price/ 
kg 
(GhC) 
Round 
of 
applica
tion (1st 
or 2nd) 
Quantity of fertilizer applied (kg)  
Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot 4 Total 
qty (kg) 
Total 
cost 
(GhC) 
NPK         
Urea         
Ammonia         
Manure         
Other 
(specify) 
……………
….. 
        
 
E.3 How did you decide on the type of the fertilizer applied -------- (1) result from soil test (2) 
input dealer’s recommendation (3) extension service recommendation (4) any other please 
specify -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
E.4 Was there any pest infestation on your farm(s) during 2015 season? (1) yes (2) no.  
E.5 if yes which pest -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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E.6 Was there any disease infestation on your farm(s) during 2015 season? (1) yes (2) no.  
E.7 If yes which disease -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
E.8 What is the value of your crop lost to pest and diseases? --------------------------------------  
E.9 Did you use any pesticide for pest control? (1) yes (2) no.  
E.10 If yes, what is the name and how many of it did you use? ----------------------------------  
E.11 Did you use any other chemical for disease control? If yes what is the name and how 
many of it did you use ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
E.12 Kindly provide information on chemical used for disease and pest control for 2015 
growing season. 
Name of 
pesticide 
Price per 
litre 
(GhC)  
Volume of pesticide used  
Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot Total 
Volume 
(Litre) 
Total 
Cost 
(GhC) 
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
E.13 What method did you use for weed control? (1) Chemical (2) Manual (3) both (4) others 
(specify) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
E.14 If manual which tools do you use? (1) Cutlass (2) Hoes (3) both, others specify -----------        
E.15 Are the sources of the agro-chemicals members of formal value chains? (1) Yes (2) No  
E.16 If chemical, kindly provide detailed information on weed control on your farm in 2015 
growing season. 
Name of 
chemical 
Volume of chemical used (Litres) Total 
volume 
(litres) 
Price 
per litre 
(GhC) 
Total 
cost 
(GhC) 
Herbicides Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot 4    
Pre-
emergence  
       
Post-
emergence 
       
Total        
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F. Technical Support/Extension services 
F.1 Have you ever visited any agricultural extension office? (1) yes (2) no. 
F.2 If yes specify number of visits in 2015 farming season------------------------------------------- 
F.3 Has an extension officer ever visited you? --------------------------------------------------------- 
F.4 If yes, how many visits in 2015 production season? ---------------------------------------------- 
F.5 Kindly provide detailed information about extension visits in the table below 
Item Public Private NGO 
extension  visit (yes or no)       
frequency of visit*       
where do you meet**       
distance to extension office 
from meeting point (km)    
*(1) weekly (2) monthly (3) once in 6 months (4) once in a year (5) Never ** (1) my farm  (2) 
my house  (3) farmers field school (4) others, specify 
F.6 which of the following is the major source of useful information for your farming 
operations? (1) TV (2) Radio (3) newspaper (4) extension agents (5) fellow farmers (6) 
farmers’ organisation (7) others; please specify -------------------------------------------------------- 
F.7 Rank your level of confidence is the government extension system (1-5), 5 is very 
confident ……  
F.8 Rank the level of qualification of the government extension officers (1-5), 5 is very 
qualified … 
F.9Have you received farming or business training before (1) yes (2) no 
F.10 If yes, please provide specific training and technical support services in the table below 
When  Topic?  How was it done By whom? How 
relevant 
was it? 
1=irrelevant
…..5=very 
relevant 
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G. Harvest Information for 2015 growing season 
G.1 Did you carry out timely harvesting? (1) Yes (2) No                                                                                   
G.2 If No, please state reason(s)--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.3 Which method did you use to harvest your rice? (1) Mechanical (combine harvester) (2) 
manual (3) others (please specify) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
G.4 Please provide detailed information on rice harvesting in 2015 season in the table below 
Item  Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot 4 Total 
quantity of 
rice 
Quantity of rice paddy 
harvested (rain-fed) (kg)  
 
     
Quantity of rice harvested 
(irrigation season) (kg)  
 
     
Varieties planted  
 
     
Yield (kg) 
 
     
Quantity sold before 
processing  
 
     
Quantity sold after processing  
 
     
Quantity stored and sold later  
 
     
Total      
 
H. Marketing, Coordination Mechanisms and Transaction costs  
H.1 Do you apply agro-inputs on your farm(s)? 1. Yes 2. No (if No, skip to H 25)                         
H.2 If yes to H.1, where do you normally buy the inputs from? (1) farmer’s community (2) 
District capital (3) regional capital (4) other (specify)----------------------------------------------            
H.3 which mechanism do you employ in buying your inputs? (1) Contracts       (2) open 
market (pricing mechanism)   (3) through trust and relationship with buyers (Relational 
coordination mechanism). (Tick the applicable ones)                                                                                                 
H.4 If you use all mechanisms in H.3, which of them do you think is the most effective and 
why? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.5 If contracting mechanism is used in H.3, is it written or Oral contract? -------------------          
H.6 What was the contract duration? -------------------------------------------------(months)               
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H.7 Did you meet the contract terms and conditions? 1. Yes 2. No                                                     
H.8 If no to H.7, please state reasons---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.9 If yes to H.7, How?------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.10 Did your Agro-input dealer(s) meet the contract terms and conditions? 1. Yes 2. No             
H.11 If no to H.10, please state reasons------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.12 If yes to H.10, How?---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.13 If contract was used as in H.3, was the contract arrangement facilitated under a value 
chain project? 1. Yes 2. No                                                                                                                    
H.14 If yes to H.13, please provide details--------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.15 If no to H.13, How was the contract arrangement initiated? -----------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.16 Do your Agro-input dealer(s) support you in any way? 1. Yes 2. No                                    
H.17 If yes to H.16, state how they support you.-------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.18 Do the agro-input dealer(s) sometimes supply you with inputs and you pay them later? 
1. Yes 2. No 
H.19 If yes to H.18, what is the value of inputs in a year?--------------------------(Ghc) 
H.20 Did you pay back on time? 1. Yes 2. No                                                                                     
H.21 If no to H.20, state reasons--------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.22 If yes to H.20, how?----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.23 What other support do you get from your agro-input dealers? --------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.24 Are your agro-input dealers members of formal value chains? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Both 
formal and Informal value chains.                                                                                                                                                
H.25 How do you sell your rice produce after harvest? (1) Group sale (2) individual sales (3) 
both  
H.26 What is your percentage distribution of your rice output after harvest?                                         
Family use………..sales………..gifts…………………other (specify)………………..(%)                      
H.27 Do you sell your paddy to particular/regular customers? (1) yes (2) No                                           
H.28 if yes to H.27, who are these customers? (Tick the ones applicable) (1) Aggregators (2) 
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small scale processors (3) large scale processors (4) Institutional Buyers (5) Other(specify)----
H.29 Where are these customers located?---------------------------------------------------------------
H.30 How do you supply/deliver your rice to customers? (1) Community level (2) Farmgate 
(3) Market center                                                                                                                                                       
H.31 If delivery is done at market center, indicate the distance from home to market------(Km)                                 
H.32 Are your buyers members of formal value chains? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Both formal and 
Informal value chains                                                                                                                                             
H.33 which mechanism do you employ in selling your rice produce after harvest? (1) 
Contracts (2) open market (pricing mechanism)  (3) through trust and relationship with buyers 
(Relational coordination mechanism). (Tick the applicable ones)                                                                          
H.34 If you use all mechanisms in I.8, which of them do you think is the most effective and 
why?------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                        
H.35 If contracting mechanism was used in H.33, was it written or Oral contract? -------------
H.36 What was the contract duration? ------------------------------------------------------------
(months)             
H.37 Did you meet the contract provisions? 1.Yes 2. No                                                                    
H.38 If no to H.37, please state reasons------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.39 If yes to H.37, How?---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.40 How important are these contracts to your business transactions? (1) Very important (2) 
Partly important (3) not important.                                                                                                                    
H.41 How does the buyer support you? (1) Provision of training (3) provision of credit service 
in kind or cash (4) any other please specify ----------------------------                                                                         
H.42 If you received trainings, which topics were you trained on? ---------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                          
H.43 What value of credit did you receive from them in 2015 season? --------------------------                 
H.44 How did you repay the credit? (1) Deduction from farm proceed (2) cash payment (3) 
other please specify ----------------------------------------------------- 
H.45 What other support do you get from your buyers? ----------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                  
H.46 kindly provide information on rice marketing for 2015 season in the table below 
192 
 
Item Community 
level 
market processed Large scale 
processor 
small scale 
processor 
Quantity of rice 
paddy sold in kg  
     
Selling price/kg       
Distance (km)      
Frequency of 
sales* 
     
Travel time 
(hours) 
     
Transportation 
cost 
(aggregator)GhC 
     
Transportation 
cost per bag of 
paddy Ghc 
     
Price of empty 
jute sack 
     
Cost of twines 
(Ghc) 
     
Cost of sowing a 
bag of paddy 
     
Cost of loading 
a bag of paddy 
(Ghc) 
     
Cost of 
offloading a bag 
of paddy (Ghc) 
     
Communication 
cost per 
transaction 
     
Storage cost per 
bag(GhC) 
     
Cost of 
chemicals for 
fumigation 
(Ghc) 
     
*1=weeky 2=monthly 3=quarterly 4=every six months 5=annually  
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H.47 Which of the following best describes your advance knowledge of rice prices in the 
market? (1) Full knowledge (2) Partial Knowledge (3) no Knowledge  
H.48 Where do you obtain knowledge of advance prices? (1) Fellow farmers (2) traders and 
buyers (3) Government institution (4) mass media………………………….(4) through 
negotiation other(specify)---------------------------------------------- 
H.49 How available are your buyers of rice? (1) Readily available (2) somehow available (3) 
difficulty getting buyers 
H.50 Please indicate the distance from farm to main road of your community----------(km) 
H.51 Do you use mobile phone in your farm business? (1) Yes (2) No 
H.52 If yes to H.51, what do you specifically use it for in the farm business? (Tick the 
applicable ones)(1) Searching for buyers (2) searching for input prices (3) sourcing price 
information (4) others (specify)-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
H.53 On average, how much worth of air time do you spend in a season for the activities in 
H52?-----------(GHc)                                                                                                                            
H.54 Are you normally successful in the choices in I.26? (1) Yes (2) No                                        
H.55 if no, kindly state reason(s)-------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.56 If yes to H.54, how?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I. Labour Information/Activities 
I.1 What was the wage rate per day during 2015 season? --------------------------------------------  
I.2 Was the wage rate same for male and female? --------------------------------- (1) yes (2) no  
I.3 If no, what was the wage rate for a female worker during 2015growing season? -------------  
I.4 Please provide detailed information on labour use in 2015growing season 
Activity/T
ask 
Un
it 
 
Male>14 years Female>14 years Child (10-14 years) 
No. 
of 
meal
s 
Cash 
pay-
GhC 
In-
kind 
(Valu
e)-
GhC 
No. 
of 
mea
ls 
Cash 
pay(Gh
C) 
In-
kind 
(Valu
e)-
GhC 
No. 
of 
mea
ls 
Cash 
pay(Gh
C) 
In-
kind 
(Valu
e)-
GhC 
Land 
Preparatio
n 
          
Planting           
Chemical 
spraying  
          
Manual 
weeding 2 
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Manual 
weeding 2 
          
Fertilizer 
applicatio
n 1 
          
Fertilizer 
applicatio
n 2 
          
Manure 
applicatio
n 
          
Disease/pe
st control-
spraying 
          
Harvesting 
 
          
Threshing 
 
          
Bagging/p
ackaging 
          
Loading 
and 
offloading 
          
Codes for units-1=day, 2=Acre, 3=Task, 4=hours, 5=other(specify) 
 
J. Household Information 
J.1 Please complete the table below on the asset owned by your household 
  
which of the assets 
below do you have? 
availability 
  
if yes, please 
state the 
number 
available 
year of 
purchase 
  
cost of 
purchase 
  
Please 
indicate 
source of 
income for 
the purchase 
 
Yes  No  
 Cutlass            
 Hoe            
 Knapsack            
 Radio            
 Television            
 Bicycle            
 Motorcycle            
 Car/minitruck            
 Mobile phone            
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 Bullock            
 Paddy weeder            
 Tractor            
Tractor accessories       
 Mechanized ripper            
Combine harvester        
Weighing scale       
House       
Warehouse        
       
              
 
J.2 Please provide information on sources and amount of your household income the last 3 
years in table below. 
Revenue from 
Agriculture 
code 2013-GhC 2014- GhC 2015- GhC 
Rice income      
Income derived from 
other produce  
 
    
Non-agricultural 
income  
    
First non-agricultural 
income source  
    
Second non-agricultural 
income source  
    
Third non-agricultural 
income source  
    
     
Codes for non-agricultural income: 1=handicraft, 2=rearing, 3=processing, 
4=commerce, 5=extraction (salt, honey, gravel, sand, mine), 6=salary (fixed, temporary, 
contracts, etc.), 7=other(specify) 
 
J.3 please provide information on ownership of livestock in the table below 
1 
 
What types of animals 
do you own? (tick)  
Cattle Sheep Goat pigs chicken guinea 
fowls 
Others 
       
2 How many did you 
have at the beginning 
of 2015? 
       
3 On average how many 
do you acquire in a 
year 
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4 On average how many 
do you sell/kill in a 
year 
       
5 How many did you 
have at the end of 
2015? 
       
6 How many more have 
you acquired this 
year? 
       
7 How many did you 
sell in 2015? 
       
8 Do you seek for 
veterinary services for 
them ? (1=yes, 2=no) 
       
 
J.4 Please provide detailed information on your household size and educational profile 
Members  *Level of 
education  
Members *Level of 
education 
Members  *Level of 
education  
Respondent   Female 1  Male child 3  
Head  Female 2  Male child 4  
Male 1  Female 3  Female child 
1 
 
Male 2  Female 4  Female child 
2 
 
Male 3  Male child 1  Female child 
3 
 
Male 4  Male child 2  Female child 
4 
 
*1=Illiterate, 2=1-5 years of schooling, 3=6-10 years of schooling, 4=Above 10 years of 
schooling, 5=tertiary education 
 
J.5 Please provide detailed information on expenditure of your household in the last year 
Items Expenditure/year 
(Ghc) 
Items Expenditure/year 
(Ghc) 
Housing (rent/repair)  Medical  
Food items  Education   
Clothing and 
footwear 
 Recreation   
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Tobacco  Water charges  
Fuel, lighting   Durable goods  
Electricity   Social expenses 
(marriages, gifts, 
funerals etc.) 
 
Transport   Miscellaneous   
Livestock    Personal   
Poultry   Other (specify)  
 
K. Financial support/Access to Credit Information 
K.1 Did you access credit for the purchase of inputs during 2015 growing season? (1) Yes (2) 
No     
K.2 If no to K.1, please state the reasons for not using credit in the season? ---------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
K.3 If yes to K.1, from which source did you get the credit? (1) Rural Bank (2) microfinance 
company (3) financial NGO (4) Lead firm (5) Other (specify)--------------------------------------- 
K.4 Do you have information about all credit sources? (1) yes (2) No                                                   
K.5 Did you buy any input on credit during the 2015 season? (1) yes (2) no.  
K.6 If yes, provide detailed information ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
K.7 If you suddenly need money where do you turn to?.---------------------------------------------- 
K.8 What is the average amount of money you can get from this source?-------------------------- 
K.9 What are your other sources of finance for your farm operations?.---------------------------- 
K.10 Do you know of other farming credit sources in your locality? ----- (1) yes (2) no 
K.11 if yes please name them.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
K.12 Have you sourced credit from them before?.........(1) Yes (2) No 
K.13 If yes to K.12, do you still source credit from them and why?--------------------------------- 
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K.14 If yes to K.13, was the credit enough for farming business?  (1) yes (2) no 
K15 If no to K.13, did you apply for more credit? (1) yes (2) no 
K.16 If yes to K.15, was your application granted? (1) yes (2) no 
K.17 Has your loan application ever been rejected? -------- (1) yes (2) no 
K.18 If yes, for what reason?---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
K.19 Did you buy any input on credit during the 2015 season? -------- (1) yes (2) no. 
K.20 If yes list the inputs --------------------------------------------------------------------------  
K.21 If yes, what were the terms of the credit?--------(1) repay in cash (2) repay with farm 
produce (3) repay with cash and farm produce (4) other (specify) ---------------------------------- 
K.22 Did you repay with interest............(1) yes (2) no 
K.23 If yes what was the interest rate ....................(% p.a.) 
K.24 What was the average repayment period ...............................months 
K.25 please indicate the distance to credit source for your farm business------------(km) 
K.26 Kindly provide detailed information about your credit history in the table below 
Source of credit Year Amount 
(GhC) 
Intere
st rate 
Purpose Duration  Installmen
t 
Amount(G
hC) 
       
       
       
 
L. Community Level Information 
L.1 What type of access road is in your community?    [    ] [    ] [    ]  
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1 = Asphalt 2=track in good shape all year round 3= track hardly usable 4= track unusable 
in certain periods of the year, 5=use of a ferryboat, 6=use of a canoe, 7=path, 8=other 
specify)  
L.2 if road is untarred (asphalted), show distance from the nearest tarred road: ----------- Km  
L.3 Where road is tarred, since when? --------------------------------------------                                                                                            
L.4 Does your community have Market (s)? ----------------- 1=yes 2=no market  
L.5 If there is no market show distance to the nearest market: ------------------------- km  
L.6 if people go to market by car/bus, how much does it cost----------------------- GhC 
L.7 if there is a market, how many communities are involved? ------------------------  
Code: 1=less than 5 2=5 to 10 3= 11 to 20 4= more than 20.  
L.8 other institutions present in the community [           ] [           ] [          ]  
Code: 1=rural credit, 3=NGO, 4=other institutions (specify)  
L.9 Has the community benefited from development projects? (1)Yes (2) No 
L.10 If yes, please indicate which of these development projects your community benefited 
from. 
1=Irrigation development project, 2=acquisition of community-based infrastructures, 
3=acquisition of agricultural equipment, 4=extension, 5=training courses/awareness, 
5=other (specify)-------------------------  
L.11 Are there stores where production inputs are traded in your village? --- (1) yes (2) no  
L.12 If yes which of the following inputs are traded in the stores? [      ] [      ] [   ] [   ] [  ] [ ]   
1= rice seeds for planting, 2=chemical fertilizer, 3=herbicides for weed control, 4=pesticides 
for disease control 5=tillage equipment 6= knapsack sprayer 7=other (specify)  
L.13 If no, please list inputs not available --------------------------------------------------------------  
L.14 If no, what is the distance to the nearest input store? ----------------- (km) 
L.15 Which of the following water point(s) exists in your community? [     ] [    ] [    ] [     ]  
1=waterworks 2=borehole 3= developed source 4=improved wells 5=traditional wells 6= 
river/dam and others  
L.16 Existing but non-operational water points [    ] [    ] (use codes in L.15) 
L.17 Which of the following school infrastructure and vocational training exists in your 
community?     [   ] [   ] [   ]  
1=pry. sch. 2=junior high sch. 3=senior high sch. 4=Arabic sch. 5=vocational school 
6=Tertiary institution  
L.18 Where there is a primary school, since when: --------------------------------------------------- 
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L.19 Where there is no primary school, show distance to the nearest primary school-------km.  
L.20 Which of the following health care infrastructures exists in your community? [     ] [     ]  
1= CHIPS compound 2= health center, 4=hospital, 5=others (specify)--------------------------- 
L.21 Is there a medicine store in the village: [      ] 1=yes 2=no  
L.22 Where there is no medicine stores, show how far to the nearest medicine store: [ ] km  
L.23 Is there electricity in the village? [      ] 1= yes 2=no  
L.24 If there is electricity, since when? [     ]  
L.25 Existence of irrigation facility (1) yes (2) No 
L26 What is the estimated population in your community? --------------------- 
M. Social Capital and Network Information 
M.1 Social capital from participation in farmer group activities 
No. Description  Farmer  Spouse 
1 Are you a member of a farmer group? (1=yes, 2=no)   
2 If yes to 1, when did you join the group?   
3 Was the group formed because of a particular project?(1) yes 
(2) no 
  
4 If yes to 3, what is the name of the project?  
 
 
3 What benefits do you derive from the farmer group (1) 
training (2) marketing assistance (3) input support (4) lead 
farmer training services (5) bulk input purchase (6) social 
network within the group (7) others (specify)--------------------- 
  
4 Name of farmer group you belong 
 
  
5 What is the size of your group: Male------- Female------------   
6 How often do you meet? (1) once a week (2) twice in a month 
(3) once in a month (4) once every quarter 
  
7 How often do you attend meetings? (1= very often …..5=not 
at all 
  
8 Indicate the distance to your meeting venue ----------------km   
9 Current relationship with this farmer group…(1) member (2) 
not a member (3) old member 
  
10 Status in farmer group …(1) executive member (2) non- 
executive member (3) old executive (4) ordinary member (5) 
other (specify) 
 
  
11 Do you discuss production and marketing issues during 
meetings? (1) Yes (2) No 
  
12 If yes to 9, do you learn and implement the ideas generated 
from these discussions in your farming business? (1) Yes (2) 
No 
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13 Do your group members influence your produce selling 
strategies? (1) Yes (2) No 
  
14 if Yes to 11, please provide details  
 
 
15 Do you have other farming groups in your community? (1) 
Yes (2) No 
  
16 If yes to 13, do you tap ideas from these groups on production 
and marketing techniques? (1) Yes (2) No. 
  
17 if yes to 14, kindly provide details  
 
 
18 Do you trust your group and implement their ideas on 
production and marketing strategies? (1) Yes (2) No 
  
19 If yes to16, kindly indicate the level (%) of trust for these 
peers 
  
20 If no to 16, kindly state reasons for the mistrust: 
 
  
 
G/2 Social Networks 
No. (A) Informal Social Networks Farmer  Spouse 
1 Do you have friends apart from your relatives? (1=yes, 2=no)   
2 If yes to 1, how many times do you visit these friends (in a 
month) 
  
3 How many farmers live in a radius of 5km around your home 
(and your farm) 
  
4 How many of them do you discuss business with?   
5 How often do you have these discussions (in a month)?   
(B ) Networks for specific purposes 
1 Do you have someone who assists you practically in your 
farming activities (1= yes, 2=no) 
  
2 If yes to 1, who is he/she (1=field officer, 2=farmer 
coordinator, 3=other (specify) 
  
3 If yes to 1, how many times does he/she visit you (in a month)  
 
 
4 If yes to 1, how many of you does he/she help?  
 
 
5 Is there someone who assists you with money in case of need? 
1= yes, 2=no 
  
6 If yes to 5, how many would help you? Differentiate between 
1=relatives, 2= friends and neighbours, 3=others (specify)  
(use the code and state number of individuals for each)  
How much will they help you with?-------------------------------
(GhC) 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Name the religious network you belong (if any)  
 
 
8 Do you have close relation in government?   
9 If yes to 8, indicate exact relationship (1=member of the 
nuclear family, 2=extended family member, 3=friends and 
neighbours, 4=other (specify) 
  
10 Indicate the position   
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(C) Information and Networks 
 Community Level   
1 On the average, when you decide to participate in Formal 
Value Chains (FVC) how many formal value chain 
participants were in your community/village? 
  
2 On the average, how many do you think are in your 
community/village now? 
  
3 How many of them participated in FVC through you?   
4 How many of them are your family members?   
5 How many of them are your friends and neighbours?    
6 How many of them belong to your religious faith (if any)?   
7 How many of your religious faith participate in FVC?   
8 What is the experience of your friends and or neighbours in 
FVC participation? 1=very bad, 2=bad, 3=average, 4=good, 
5=very good 
  
9 Do you discuss value chain activities with some of them? 
(1=yes, 2=no) 
  
10 If yes to 9, how many of them do you discuss with?   
11 If yes 9 applies, how many times in a year?   
12 Do members of your group/locality seek your advice on FVC 
participation? (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
13 If yes to 12, how many of them do you seek advice from?   
14 How many of them seek your advice on FVC participation?   
15 If so, how many times in a year?   
16 Do you seek advice on FVC from other members of your 
community? (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
17 If yes to 16, from how many of them?   
18 If so, how many times in a year?   
19 Do you experience new FVC participants in your community 
often? (1=yes, 2=no)  
  
20 If yes, on the average how many people in a year?   
21 Do you anticipate a time that there will no longer be new 
participants? (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
22 If yes, how many years from now and why?   
23 Are you aware the government is promotion rice value chains 
in your community? (1=yes, 2=no) 
  
 
N. Challenges Faced by Rice Producers 
N.1 kindly provide information on the challenges you face in rice farming  
  
Yes/No If yes, please 
rank Additional Information 
Land       
Small land size       
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Poor property  rights (ownership) 
on land   
    
  
Difficulty in getting land to rent        
Difficulty in getting land to buy       
Land Preparation 
  
 
Difficulty in getting tractor 
services 
  
 
Seed       
 Poor quality seed       
 Unavailablity of certified seed       
Seed Price variability  
  
 
Fertilizer       
High cost       
Not available throughout the year       
Available late in the season       
Long distance to the fertilizer 
market 
    
  
Labor       
Not enough labour       
Labour cost too high       
Seasonal shortage 
  
 
Equipment & Infrastructure       
Difficult to acquire rice production 
equipment 
    
  
Difficult to acquire rice harvesting 
equipment 
  
 
Difficult to acquire planters       
Difficult to maintain equipment       
Poor access to the road       
Water management at plot level       
Difficult to access water       
Difficult to manage water        
High cost of water fees       
Credit Aquicision        
 Non- availability of credit       
 High interest rate charges on 
credit 
    
  
Delays in acquiring credit       
 Difficult to repay credit       
Post-harvest grain losses due to       
Threshing       
Winnowing       
Storage       
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Transport       
Decorticating (removing husks)       
Product market       
Long distance to market for rice       
Low prices for rice       
High transport cost       
Lack of market/demand for rice       
Extension services       
Unavailability of extension 
services  
    
  
Lack of effectiveness       
Long distance to the extension 
workers 
    
 
Others        
Code: 1=High; 2= Medium; 3= Low; 0= Not exist 
NB: Use code 99 where farmer(s) knows nothing on the characteristic referred to (99= 
don’t know) 
 
Thank you for your time, patients and responses. Is there any other information you will like 
us to know about your business? Please feel free to discuss it. 
 
Time ended                                     ----------------------------------------------------- 
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